Me. R. Civ. P. 23
Advisory Committee’s Notes 1981
Rule 23 is amended by substituting for the present Maine rule the verbatim text of Federal Rule 23.
When the Maine Rules were first promulgated in 1959, Federal Rule 23 as it then stood was adopted virtually verbatim. The present federal rule was promulgated in 1966, but the Maine rule was not changed to follow suit, because Maine’s experience with class actions had been limited and it seemed wisest to allow time for local development. Nevertheless, the more detailed and specific provisions of the new federal rule were viewed as appropriate guidelines for class action practice in Maine. See 1 Field, McKusick, and Wroth, Maine Civil Practice §23.1 (2d ed., 1970). Since 1966 there has been an increasing number of class actions in the Maine courts, and it has become clear that a more specific and authoritative procedural provision for such actions is necessary.
The present federal rule is adopted for three reasons: (1) It codifies in general the pattern previously followed in Maine and it has over the years been the subject of a substantial body of interpretation in the federal courts which is available as further guidance to the Maine practitioner. See 1 Field, McKusick, and Wroth, supra, § §23.1-23.6; 7 and 7A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § §1751-1803 (1972; Supp., 1981); (2) The Maine practice has not yet become systematized enough to provide the basis for a rule reflecting significant local variation from the federal model; and (3) The only alternative, the Uniform Class Actions [Act] [Rule], adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1976, 12 Uniform Laws Annotated 20 (Supp. 1981), is admirable drafting but deals with a range of complex problems which have not yet arisen, and may never arise, in Maine.
Promulgation of the rule marks a new departure in class actions for Maine. It is to be expected that experience with the more systematic procedure afforded by the rule will lead to amendments designed to adapt its provisions to the specific conditions and needs of Maine practice.
Advisory Committee’s Notes January 1, 2001
P.L. 1999, Chapter 731, § § II. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION: SERVICE OF PROCESS, PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND ORDERSZ-2 et seq. unified the Superior Court and the District Court civil jurisdiction, with certain stated exceptions. Rule 23 is amended to delete the reference to the Superior Court, since class actions may now also be brought in the District Court.
Annotations:
Rule 23: Denial of certification. Millett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 2000 ME 178.
Rule 23(b)(1)(B): Ortiz v. Fiberboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
Advisory Notes – January 1, 2013
When settlements of class actions result in payments to class members, especially by mail, often some payments will not be claimed, leaving “residual” funds that are not allocated to class members because the cost of distribution will equal or exceed the amounts involved. Anticipating such a possibility, the parties to a class action settlement often seek court approval to distribute the residual funds to a third party in what is sometimes analogized to cy pres distributions under trust law. See generally 2 J. McGlaughlin, McGlaughlin on Class Actions, Law & Practice, § 8:15 (7th ed. 2011). Practice and reason consel that, when possible, the parties choose a third party whose interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class members. See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 307(c) (2010). Often, though, the nature of the suit or the class members will be such that there is not an obvious third party recipient whose interests reasonably approximate those of the class members.
Against this backround, this new Rule 23(f) accomplishes two aims. First, it confirms the appropriateness of the generally recognized practice of providing for distributions of residual funds to third parties. Second, it specifies that when it is not clear that there is a third party whose interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class, the Maine Bar Foundation, which manages and distributes IOLTA funds, should be the recipient.
Specifying the selection of the Maine Bar Foundation in such circumstances has two advantages. First, it eliminates any possibility that a recipient is being chosen to benefit or garner credit for the defendant, for plaintiff’s counsel, or for the court. Second, the principle aim of the Maine Bar Foundation – to support efforts to widen access to justice for those who cannot afford it – aligns with a basic aim of Rule 23 itself. See Buford v. H&RBlock, Inc., 168 FRD 340, 345-46 (S.D. Ga. 1996 ) aff’d without op. 117 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997)(stating that one of the purposes of class action lawsuits is “to provide a feasible means for asserting the rights of those who ‘would have no realistic day in court if a class action were not available'” (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985))). As the Supreme Court has observed, in adopting Rule 23 of the federal rules, “the Advisory Committee had dominantly in mind vindication of ‘the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.'” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (citing Bejamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 497, 497 (1969)).
This Rule should not be viewed as affecting or commenting on issues other than the distribution of residual funds arising from voluntary settlement agreements approved under Rule 23(e).