Me. R. Civ. P. 50
Advisory Note – June 2014
See Advisory Note – June 2014 to M.R. Civ. P. 52. The change to Rule 50(d) is made simply to eliminate the redundancy with Rule 52.
Advisory Committee’s Notes 1993
Rule 50 is amended to adapt a 1991 amendment of Federal Rule 50 for Maine. The general purpose of the amendment is to render the terminology and procedure of the rule more accurate and reflective of practice. As the federal Advisory Committee Note said:
The revision abandons the familiar terminology of direction of verdict for several reasons. The term is misleading as a description of the relationship between judge and jury. It is also freighted with anachronisms . . . . The term “judgment as a matter of law” is an almost equally familiar term and appears in the text of Rule 56; its use in Rule 50 calls attention to the relationship between the two rules. Finally, the change enables the rule to refer to pre-verdict and post-verdict motions with a terminology that does not conceal the common identity of two motions made at different times in the proceeding.
Amended Rule 50(a) incorporates the new terminology and makes clear that the motion for judgment as a matter of law in a jury trial may be made at any time before the case goes to the jury, thus retaining the right to offer evidence and renew the motion before or after verdict if it is not initially granted. The amended rule also makes clear that the motion may be made as to one or more claims and must specify not only the claims but the specific issues involved. The amended rule is designed to assure that each party has a full opportunity to present all relevant evidence. Thus, the court is not to act on a motion under the rule without ascertaining that the opposing party has been fully heard.
The final sentence of the amendment sets forth in functional terms the standard for direction of a verdict or grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict found in many Maine cases. The court is to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment is sought. The motion for judgment will be granted on any claim (which may be part or all of the party’s case) if the court concludes that the jury could not reasonably find for the party opposing the motion on an issue that as a matter of the controlling substantive law is essential to the claim. See, e.g., Bates v. Anderson, No. 6315, slip op. at 3 (Me. Oct. 5, 1992); Kraul v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 600 A.2d 389, 390 (Me. 1991); Baker v. Mid Maine Med. Ctr., 499 A.2d 464, 466-67 (Me. 1985).
Rules 50(b) and (c) are amended to conform to the changes of terminology made in subdivision (a). The amendment of subdivision (b) makes clear that, as under present practice, the motion for judgment may be renewed orally in open court, as well as in writing.
Rule 50(d) is amended to make provision for cases tried without a jury comparable to those of amended Rule 50(a) for jury cases. The equivalent federal provisions are found in F.R. Civ. P. 52(c), added by amendment in 1991.
Advisory Committee’s Notes 1983
Rule 50(d) is added to clarify a situation that has been a continuing source of confusion. The Rules as promulgated and subsequently amended follow Federal Rule 41(b)(2), in providing for a defendant’s motion for involuntary dismissal at the close of the plaintiff’s case in a nonjury case. This motion, like the common law motion for nonsuit, in effect seeks a judgment for the defendant on the merits. It is the functional equivalent of a motion for directed verdict under Rule 50(a) in a jury case. The judge, however, does not merely decide the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence but may decide the factual issues and render judgment against the plaintiff, making findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52(a). See 1 Field, McKusick, and Wroth, Maine Civil Practice ยง41.7 (2d ed. 1970).
Confusion has arisen under Rule 41(b)(2), because what is in fact a motion for judgment is misleadingly entitled a motion for involuntary dismissal. Lawyers frequently move for directed verdicts in nonjury cases. While the court can and should treat such an improperly labeled motion as one for involuntary dismissal, there is no reason to continue the confusion. Moreover, technically the judgment is one of dismissal, only operating as an adjudication on the merits by virtue of Rule 41(b)(3). The court’s order, like the judgment entered after grant of a directed verdict in a jury case, should be a judgment on the merits of its own force.
To clarify this situation, the last three sentences of Rule 41(b)(2), which outline the procedure, have been eliminated from that rule by simultaneous amendment and are by this amendment incorporated virtually verbatim in new Rule 50(d). The only change is the significant verbal one that the motion is now one for “judgment” instead of “dismissal.”
Annotations:
Rule 50(a): Saucier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1999 ME 197, 1.
Rule 50(a) & (c): Stewart v. Machias Savings Bank, 2000 ME 207, 8-9.
Rule 50(b): Walker v. MaineGeneral Medical Center, 2002 ME 46, 14.