No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

Annotations:

Rule 61: Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999).

Rule 61: Civil obvious error discussed. Provenzano v. Deloge, 2000 ME 149, 14-15.

Rule 61: Civil obvious error discussed. Morey v. Stratton, 2000 ME 147, 10-11.

COMMENT

§61.1 HARMLESS ERROR AND REVERSIBLE ERROR

Any action of the trial court that is deemed to have been in error will be reviewed by the “harmless error” standard set in M.R. Civ. P. 61. See also M.R. Crim. P. 52(a); M.R. Evid. 103(a). A trial court ruling, even if in error, will not result in reversal of the trial court’s judgment if the Law Court determines that the error was “harmless” that is, that the error did not result in substantial injustice or affect substantial rights.

The distinctions between harmless error and obvious error, and what makes either error reversible on appeal were addressed in In re Joshua B., 2001 ME 115, 9-11, 776 A.2d at 1243-44, as follows:

Obvious error requires the court to vacate the trial court’s judgment if the error deprived the party of a fair trial and resulted in a substantial injustice.” [In re William S., 2000 ME 34, 8, 745 A.2d 991, 995].

The “obvious error” standard addressing unpreserved claims of error and the “harmless error” standard addressing preserved claims of error are sometimes applied using similar terminology, but with differing burdens and emphasis. Thus, preserved error is reversible and not harmless if a “substantial right” of the party is affected. State v. Phillipo, 623 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1993); State v. Zinck, 457 A.2d 422, 426 (Me. 1983). See also M.R. Civ. P. 61; M.R. Crim. P. 52(a); M.R. Evid. 103(a). Unpreserved error is obvious and reversible if the error affects “substantial rights” or results in a substantial injustice. In re William S., 2000 ME 34, 8, 745 A.2d at 995. See also M.R. Crim. P. 52(b); M.R. Evid. 103(d). Any party claiming error must demonstrate prejudice from the error. Phillips v. E. Maine Med. Ctr, 565 A.2d 306, 308 (Me. 1989); Field & Murray, Maine Evidence §103.5 (2000 ed.).

Although clear distinction between the two may not be possible, the threshold for reversal based on preserved error is much lower. Thus, preserved error is reversible if any substantial right is compromised, to the prejudice of the objecting party, and the supporting party cannot convince the court that the error was harmless in the context of the other events and evidence in the proceeding. For obvious error to require reversal, the error must be such as to deprive the party of a fair trial or to result in such a serious injustice that, in good conscience, the judgment cannot be allowed to stand. See In re William S., 2000 ME 34, 8, 745 A.2d at 995; State v. Griffin, 438 A.2d 1283, 1285 (Me. 1982).

A trial error is harmless “when it is highly probable that it did not affect the jury’s verdict.” State v. DeMass, 2000 ME 4, 17, 743 A.2d 233, 237; see also Phillips v. E. Maine Med. Ctr., 565 A.2d 306, 308 (Me. 1989).

An unpreserved trial error is “obvious” when the Law Court regards it as depriving the party of a fair trial or resulting in such a serious injustice that the Court cannot in good conscience let the judgment stand. State v. White, 2002 ME 122, 8, 804 A.2d 1146, 1149; In re Joshua B., 2001 ME 115, 11, 776 A.2d at 1243-44.