Utah. R. Civ. P. 65C
Advisory Committee Notes
This rule replaces former paragraph (b) of Rule 65B. It governs proceedings challenging a conviction or sentence, regardless whether the claim relates to an original commitment, a commitment for violation of probation, or a sentence other than commitment. Claims relating to the terms or conditions of confinement are governed by paragraph (b) of the Rule 65B. This rule, as a general matter, simplifies the pleading requirements and contains two significant changes from procedure under the former rule. First, the paragraph requires the clerk of court to assign post-conviction relief to the judge who sentenced the petitioner if that judge is available. Second, the rule allows the court to dismiss frivolous claims before any answer or other response is required. This provision is patterned after the federal practice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ยง 2254. The advisory committee adopted the summary procedures set forth as a means of balancing the requirements of fairness and due process on the one hand against the public’s interest in the efficient adjudication of the enormous volume of post-conviction relief cases.
The requirement in paragraph (l) for a determination that discovery is necessary to discover relevant evidence that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing is a higher standard than is normally used in determining motions for discovery.
The requirement in paragraph (m) for a determination that discovery is necessary to discover relevant evidence that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing is a higher standard than is normally used in determining motions for discovery.
The 2009 amendments embrace Utah’s Post-Conviction Remedies Act as the law governing post-conviction relief. It provides an independent and adequate procedural basis for dismissal without the necessity of a merits review. See Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 884-85 (10th Cir. 2009). It is the committee’s view that the added restrictions which the Act places on post-conviction petitions do not amount to a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) (relying on McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489 (1991)).
Section 78B-9-202 governs the payment of counsel in death penalty cases.