Substitution of parties pursuant to Rule 25 does not affect the right to use depositions previously taken; and, when an action has been brought in any court of this state or of the United States or of any other state and another action involving the same subject matter is afterward brought between the same parties or their representatives or successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the former action may be used in the latter as if originally taken therefor.
(dc) District court rule. Rule 32 applies in the district courts in those instances when a deposition on oral examination or a deposition on written questions is permitted by Rule 26(dc).
Ala. R. Civ. P. 32
Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption
Subdivision (a). Use of Depositions. This section is comparable to Tit. 7, § 474(4), Code 1940. Note that Rule 32(a) clearly eliminates the possibility of certain technical hearsay objections which are based not on the contents of deponent’s testimony but on his absence from court.
Rule 32(a)(2) is expanded to include the use of the deposition of a person designated by an organizational party in response to a subject matter description in a deposition notice.
Rule 32(a)(3) is quite similar to Tit. 7, § 474(4), Code 1940, although the Alabama section’s categories wherein use of a deposition is permitted appear to be much broader. The justification for the broad scope arose from the dual thrust of Alabama statutes regulating discovery. Earlier provisions for depositions were drawn only to cover situations wherein justification for other than live testimony at trial might have once existed. Subsequent deposition statutes were enacted for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery. This latter discovery statute catalogued the instances wherein depositions in lieu of live testimony were permissible for discovery purposes and also for purposes of obtaining a deposition wherein other than live testimony at trial was justified under the older statutes. Hence, situations from both sets of deposition statutes were lumped into Tit. 7, § 474(4), Code 1940. By way of example, a woman was entitled to be spared the embarrassment of a court appearance under Tit. 7, § 474(4)(c)(2) and Ex parte Brooks, 249 Ala. 606, 32 So.2d 534 (1947). Modern examples of such reluctance on the part of the distaff are sparse. Consequently, the less specific catalogue provided by federal Rule 32(a)(3) is more appropriate for the purposes of these rules.
A detailed examination and comparison of the circumstances wherein a deposition was permitted to be used under Tit. 7, § 474(4), Code 1940, and federal Rule 32(a)(3) yields the conclusion that adoption of federal Rule 32(a)(3) would not substantially alter prior practice with the possible exception of the situation arising when the witness is a doctor. This conclusion is based upon federal Rule 32(a)(3)(E) and Alabama Rule 32(a)(3)(F) wherein a deposition may be used when it is in the interest of justice and under exceptional circumstances. In order to eliminate any possibility of alteration of the existing practice with respect to doctors, this rule differs from the federal rule in that a special section has been inserted to cover the situation when the witness is a doctor. The practitioner cannot assume that Mobile Infirmary v. Eberlein, 270 Ala. 360, 119 So.2d 8 (1960) is no longer applicable. In Eberlein, supra, the court held that provisions governing the use of depositions in lieu of live testimony did not change the rule of law that when a witness whose deposition has been taken is personally present in court, at the trial, and is competent to testify, objection to the introduction of the deposition of the witness is well taken. These same results should obtain where a physician or dentist is under subpoena and has agreed to be “on call” and is presently available to the party resisting introduction of the deposition.
Rule 32(a)(4). The right to offer other parts of a deposition was protected in Tit. 7, § 474(4)(d), Code 1940. This section goes further to eliminate the necessity of retaking depositions already on file in another action involving the same subject matter and parties or their successors.
Subdivision (b). Objections. See Tit. 7, § 474(5), Code 1940, for similar treatment.
Subdivision (c). Effect of Taking. See the substantially similar provisions of Tit. 7, § 474(6), Code 1940.
Subdivision (d). Errors & Irregularities. Rule 32(d)(1-4) are similar to Tit. 7, § 474(16), Code 1940.
Committee Comments to October 1, 1995, Amendment to Rule 32
Subdivision (a). This amendment conforms subdivision (a) to the present version of F.R.Civ.P 32(a). It differs substantively from the former Ala.R.Civ.P. 32(a) at subparagraph (4) by eliminating the requirement that a prior action must have been dismissed before depositions from that action can be used in a later proceeding.
Committee Comments to January 1, 1996, Amendment to Rule 32
Subdivision (a) was amended to change the reference therein from “rules of evidence” to “Alabama Rules of Evidence.” The clause “or for any other purpose permitted by the Alabama Rules of Evidence” was added to the end of subdivision (a)(1) for the reasons stated in the following committee comment to the 1980 amendment to F.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(1):
“Rule 801(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a prior inconsistent statement of a witness in a deposition to be used as substantive evidence. And Rule 801(d)(2) makes the statement of an agent or servant admissible against the principal under the circumstances described in the Rule. The language of the present subdivision is, therefore, too narrow.”
As amended, Rule 32(a)(1) is not abrogated or superseded by the Alabama Rules of Evidence, which are effective January 1, 1996.
The last sentence of subdivision (a)(4) was added for the reasons stated in the following committee comment to the 1980 amendment to F.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(4):
“The final sentence is added to reflect the fact that the Federal Rules of Evidence permit a broader use of depositions previously taken under certain circumstances. For example, [see] Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence ….”
The amendment omits former subdivision (c) for the reasons stated in the following committee comment to the 1972 amendment to F.R.Civ.P. 32(c):
“The concept of ‘making a person one’s own witness’ appears to have had significance principally in two respects: impeachment and waiver of incompetency. Neither retains any vitality under the Rules of Evidence. The old prohibition against impeaching one’s own witness is eliminated by Evidence Rule 607…. Subdivision (c)is deleted because it appears to be no longer necessary in the light of the Rules of Evidence.”