Ark. R. Civ. P. 62
Reporter’s Notes to Rule 62: 1. With the exception of minor wording changes and the omission of certain provisions which are inapplicable to state practice, Rule 62 is substantially the same as FRCP 62.
2. Section (a) omits the reference in FRCP 62 to patent disputes and combines the language of superseded Ark. Stat. Ann. § 30-102 (Repl. 1962) and that of the Federal Rule. This rule does not change prior Arkansas practice concerning the enforcement of judgments. Under both Arkansas and federal law, execution or other enforcement of a judgment or decree is automatically stayed for a ten-day period unless specifically directed by the trial court. Whetstone v. Atlas Drilling & Production Co., 241 Ark. 387, 409 S.W.2d 322 (1966); FDIC v. Steinman, 53 F. Supp. 644 (D.C. Pa., 1943 ). Under the Federal Rule, the ten-day stay is more or less mandatory and the trial court is given little discretion to waive such period. The Committee recognized that there are situations, however, where execution or other enforcement should not be delayed; therefore, Rule 62 was drafted so as to retain the trial court’s discretion to waive this ten-day period.
3. Section (a) does work one minor change in prior Arkansas practice. Under superseded Ark. Stat. Ann. § 30-102 (Repl. 1962), no action could be taken within ten days after rendition of the judgment unless otherwise ordered by the court. Such language permitted the execution on a judgment even before it was actually filed. Under Rule 62, no action can be taken until ten days after the entry or filing of the judgment or decree unless ordered by the court.
4. The portion of Section (a) dealing with stays and appeals in cases involving interlocutory orders and injunctions is substantially the same as superseded Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-2102 (Repl. 1962). Under that statute and the Federal Rule, such proceedings are not stayed unless otherwise ordered by the court.
5. Section (b) is identical to its counterpart in FRCP 62. There was no specific provision under prior Arkansas law to stay an execution or other enforcement proceedings during the pendency of post-judgment motions and it was doubtful that a trial court had the power to stay execution beyond the ten-day period normally allowed. Taylor v. O’Kane, 185 Ark. 782, 49 S.W.2d 400 (1932). Thus, this rule confers upon the trial court power which it did not apparently have under prior law.
6. With the exception of the omission of the last sentence in FRCP 62(c), Rule 62 is otherwise identical to the former. The omitted provision simply has no applicability to state practice. There was no specific authority under prior Arkansas law which permitted an injunction during an appeal and this rule does add such authority. This authority is discretionary, however, and generally requires a finding that the applicant is likely to succeed on appeal; that irreparable harm will result unless it is granted and that no substantial harm is likely to result to the other party. Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat’l Bank, 395 F.2d 685 (C.C.A. 5t h, 1968); Bauer v. McLaren, 332 F. Supp. 723 (D.C. Iowa, 1971).
7. Section (d) is a modified version of FRCP 62(d) and basically follows prior Arkansas law as codified in superseded Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-2119, et seq. (Repl. 1962) and should not work any changes in Arkansas practice and procedure.
8. Section (e) is revised from the Federal Rule so as to make it compatible with state practice. This section follows prior Arkansas law which did not require the posting of a bond or other security in order to stay proceedings pending an appeal prosecuted by the State of Arkansas. Superseded Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-215 (Repl. 1962). It is, however, incumbent upon the State, or its officers or agents, to cause the trial court to specifically stay the proceedings even though security is not required.