Annotation I. General Consideration. Law reviews. For article, “Notes on Proposed Amendments to Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure”, see 27 Dicta 165 (1950). For article, “Injunctions and Receivers: Rules 65 and 66 “, see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 594 (1951). For article, “Amendments to the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure”, see 28 Dicta 242 (1951). For article, “Use of Receivers in Real Estate Foreclosures”, see 16 Colo. Law. 988 (1987). Annotator’s note. Since this rule is similar to § 180 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was supplanted by the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, relevant cases construing that section have been included in the annotations to this rule. A receiver is an officer of the court. Casserleigh v. Malone, 50 Colo. 597, 115 P. 520 (1911); McClain v. Saranac Mach. Co., 94 Colo. 145, 28 P.2d 1009 (1934). This rule does not authorize a receiver to practice law on behalf of the receivership estate in federal court. This rule makes a receiver accountable to the state court that appointed the receiver. In re Shattuck, 411 B.R. 378 (B.A.P. 10 th Cir. 2009). His possession of property in his official capacity is the possession of the court and not of the party at whose instance he is appointed. McClain v. Saranac Mach. Co., 94 Colo. 145, 28 P.2d 1009 (1934). One who interferes with receivership property in the custody of the law, without permission of the court in whose custody it is, is guilty of contempt. Clear Creek Power Dev. Co. v. Cutler, 79 Colo. 355, 245 P. 939 (1926). Receiver has only right and title of owner. A receiver holds the property coming into his hands by the same right and title as the person for whose property he is receiver, subject to liens, priorities, and equities existing at the time of his appointment. Tolland Co. v. First State Bank, 95 Colo. 321, 35 P.2d 867 (1934). A stranger has right to have receiver institute suit to try title. While the court which appoints a receiver exercises general control over the property that comes into the possession of the receiver as such, this power of control does not deprive a stranger, who claims by paramount title, of the right to have a suit or proceeding instituted by the receiver to try the question of title. Pomeranz v. Nat’l Beet Harvester Co., 82 Colo. 482, 261 P. 861 (1927). The better practice is for the receiver to bring an independent adverse suit in the tribunal where the defendant has the right to have the controversy decided. Pomeranz v. Nat’l Beet Harvester Co., 82 Colo. 482, 261 P. 861 (1927). The better practice is for the receiver to bring an independent adverse suit in the tribunal where the defendant has the right to have the controversy decided. Pomeranz v. Nat’l Beet Harvester Co., 82 Colo. 482, 261 P. 861 (1927). The plaintiffs have established their entitlement to an evidentiary hearing relative to the appointment of a receiver. It need not appear from the movant’s request for appointment that any imminent insolvency result only from fraud. Diaz v. Fernandez, 910 P.2d 96 (Colo. App. 1995). For the power of receiver to administer assets, see Flint v. Powell, 18 Colo. App. 425, 72 P. 60 (1903). For the duties as to management of railroad property, see Frank v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry., 23 F. 757 (D. Colo. 1885). Applied in State ex rel. Colo. Dept. of Health v. I.D.I., Inc., 642 P.2d 14 (Colo. App. 1981). II. When Appointed. This rule does not apply to any case in which an action is not pending. Jones v. Bank of Leadville, 10 Colo. 464, 17 P. 272 (1887). Action is “pending” under section (a) of this rule after it is commenced under C.R.C.P. 3, by either filing a complaint with the court or by the service of a summons. Johnson v. McCaughan, Carter & Scharrer, 672 P.2d 221 (Colo. App. 1983). The plain intent of this rule is that there shall be a controversy between two or more adverse parties moved in the court, involving some conflicting and hostile claims to property that is, at least in part, the subject matter of the litigation in the mind of the general assembly it is necessary to this jurisdiction that there should be some party in all these proceedings who is adverse to the defendant and whose right to certain property are to be protected and adjudicated. Jones v. Bank of Leadville, 10 Colo. 464, 17 P. 272 (1887). Appointment of receiver is discretionary. Whether a receiver will or will not be appointed upon a preliminary hearing is a matter which ordinarily rests in the sound discretion of a trial court. Melville v. Weybrew, 106 Colo. 121, 103 P.2d 7, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 695, 61 S. Ct. 140, 85 L. Ed. 450 (1940); Rigel v. Kaveny, 133 Colo. 556, 298 P.2d 396 (1956); Oman v. Morris, 28 Colo. App. 124, 471 P.2d 430 (1970). There will be no interference with the exercise of that discretion by an appellate court, save in a clear case of abuse. Melville v. Weybrew, 106 Colo. 121, 103 P.2d 7, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 695, 61 S. Ct. 140, 85 L. Ed. 450 (1940); Oman v. Morris, 28 Colo. App. 124, 471 P.2d 430 (1970). Court held not to have abused its discretion in making appointment. Riant Amusement Co. v. Bailey, 80 Colo. 65, 249 P. 7 (1926). Courts have no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver except in a suit pending in which the receiver is desired, unless in cases of persons under disability which is a particular jurisdiction. Jones v. Bank of Leadville, 10 Colo. 464, 17 P. 272 (1887). A minor may by his guardian or next friend procure the appointment of a receiver for the purpose of collecting the rents and profits of premises deeded. Hutchinson v. McLaughlin, 15 Colo. 492, 25 P. 317, 11 L.R.A. 287 (1890). Courts of equity have no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver except in a pending action in which the receiver is desired. People ex rel. Daniels v. District Court, 33 Colo. 293, 80 P. 908 (1905). Allegations of a complaint in a receivership proceeding held sufficient. Riant Amusement Co. v. Bailey, 80 Colo. 65, 249 P. 7 (1926). Complaint held insufficient where indebtedness not alleged. In a proceeding by petition for the appointment of a receiver for the purpose of an accounting where there is no complaint alleging the indebtedness and no service of process, a court has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment. Paddack v. Staley, 13 Colo. App. 363, 58 P. 363 (1899). The appointment of a receiver to impound assets of an estate to pay a claim that does not exist is a nullity. Wright v. Halley, 95 Colo. 148, 33 P.2d 966 (1934). While courts have jurisdiction to appoint receivers for corporations, the power should be exercised with the utmost caution and only where a receiver is imperatively necessary to protect property rights. Eureka Coal Co. v. McGowan, 72 Colo. 402, 212 P. 521 (1922). A receiver should not be appointed for a corporation in an action by a simple contract creditor to prevent the corporation from fraudulently disposing of its property, and putting beyond its power the ability to respond to a judgment sought to be obtained on an unsecured debt. International Trust Co. v. United Coal Co., 27 Colo. 246, 60 P. 621 (1900). This rule does not give an equity court authority to appoint a receiver at the suit of an individual stockholder who complains of fraud in the management of the affairs of the corporation. People ex rel. Daniels v. District Court, 33 Colo. 293, 80 P. 908 (1905). Receiver for corporation may be appointed when no board of directors to manage. Where the principal stockholders of a corporation are engaged in a contest over the control of the property, and the outstanding capital stock is so distributed that no board of directors can be elected to manage the affairs of the company, a receiver is properly appointed. Eureka Coal Co. v. McGowan, 72 Colo. 402, 212 P. 521 (1922). This rule does not give an equity court authority to dissolve a corporation. People ex rel. Daniels v. District Court, 33 Colo. 293, 80 P. 908 (1905). The appointment of a receiver for a corporation does not work its dissolution. Steinhauer v. Colmar, 11 Colo. App. 494, 55 P. 291 (1898). Appointment of a receiver is authorized under appropriate circumstances without a pending request for dissolution of the company. A member of a limited liability company has a personal property interest in the company. Diaz v. Fernandez, 910 P.2d 96 (Colo. App. 1995). Where equity will sustain a creditor’s bill, it will also grant the aid of the ancillary remedies of injunction and receiver. Livingston v. Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co., 12 Colo. App. 320, 56 P. 351 (1898). The appointment of a receiver contrary to this rule is only an error, and not a jurisdictional question where it appears that the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and parties. Riant Amusement Co. v. Bailey, 80 Colo. 65, 249 P. 7 (1926). Improper appointment cannot be considered in contempt proceedings. In proceedings where a receiver is appointed to take charge of property, the improper appointment of the receiver cannot be considered in contempt proceedings based upon interference with the receivership property. Clear Creek Power & Dev. Co. v. Cutler, 79 Colo. 355, 245 P. 939 (1926). Where there is no objection made by defendant to the appointment of a receiver, he is deemed to have acquiesced in the court’s action. Oman v. Morris, 28 Colo. App. 124, 471 P.2d 430 (1970).

For appointment of receivers for dissolution of corporations, see § 7-114-303 , C.R.S.