Annotation Law reviews. For article, “Keeping up With Local Dissolution Procedures”, see 12 Colo. Law. 767 (1983). For article, “Alternative Depositions: Practice and Procedure”, see 19 Colo. Law. 57 (1990). For article, “Colorado’s New Rules of Civil Procedure, Part I: Case Management and Disclosure”, see 23 Colo. Law. 2467 (1994). For article, “Motions for Default Judgments”, see 24 Colo. Law. 1295 (1995). For article, “Discrete Task Representation a/k/a Unbundled Legal Services”, see 29 Colo. Law. 5 (January 2000). For article, “Electronic Filing’s First Year in Colorado”, see 31 Colo. Law. 41 (April 2002). For article, “Revisiting the Recovery of Attorney Fees and Costs in Colorado”, see 33 Colo. Law.11 (April 2004). For article, “Bonds in Colorado Courts: A Primer for Practitioners”, see 34 Colo. Law. 59 (March 2005). For article, “2006 Amendments to the Civil Rules: Modernization, New Math, and Polishing”, see 35 Colo. Law. 21 (May 2006). For article, “Limited Scope Representation Under the Proposed Amendment to C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-1 “, see 40 Colo. Law. 89 (November 2011). Purpose of rule. This rule is intended to provide uniformity among the various district courts as to procedural matters. People ex rel. Sullivan v. Swihart, 897 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1995). Authority of district court rules is recognized so long as they do not conflict with the Colorado rules of civil procedure or with any directive of the supreme court. Danburg v. Realties, Inc., 677 P.2d 439 (Colo. App. 1984). Not all standing orders are local rules. Section (a) of this rule clearly distinguishes between “standing orders having the effect of local rules” and those that do not. Therefore, not all standing orders are required to be reviewed by the supreme court. People ex rel. Sullivan v. Swihart, 897 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1995). Standing order of chief judge of judicial district prohibiting possession of a deadly weapon or firearm in designated areas of courthouse was a valid exercise of the chief judge’s authority as to administrative matters, did not affect the procedural rights of litigants, and did not require supreme court approval under this rule. People ex rel. Sullivan v. Swihart, 897 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1995). Late filings. This rule applies only to the failure to file a brief and does not apply to late filings. Charles Milne Assoc. v. Toponce, 770 P.2d 1313 (Colo. App. 1988). Trial court’s failure to comply with procedural requirements concerning notice and time for filing responsive brief before ruling on motion to dismiss is an abuse of discretion. Lanes v. Scott, 688 P.2d 251 (Colo. App. 1984). Court’s sua sponte order of dismissal for failure to prosecute cannot stand if it is not preceded by the notice required by § 1-10 and C.R.C.P. 41. In re Custody of Nugent, 955 P.2d 584 (Colo. App. 1997); Koh v. Kumar, 207 P.3d 900 (Colo. App. 2009). A delay reduction order does not suffice to provide notice of dismissal under § 1-10. Koh v. Kumar, 207 P.3d 900 (Colo. App. 2009). Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider failure of the mother to file a responsive pleading to the father’s posttrial motion as a confession of motion. M.H.W. by M.E.S. v. D.J.W., 757 P.2d 1129 (Colo. App. 1988). Failure to give an opportunity to respond to authority cited in support of or in opposition to a motion is harmless unless prejudice is shown. Benson v. Colo. Comp. Ins. Auth., 870 P.2d 624 (Colo. App. 1994). Where there has been an unusual delay in prosecuting an action, prejudice to the defendant will be presumed. Therefore, in the absence of mitigating circumstances, an unusual delay in prosecuting an action justifies dismissal with prejudice. Richardson v. McFee, 687 P.2d 517 (Colo. App. 1984). Trial court held not to have abused discretion in dismissing action with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Rossi v. Mathers, 749 P.2d 964 (Colo. App. 1987). Scope of issues raised by a trial data certificate is limited only by the breadth of notice provided by the complaint. Under our rules of civil procedure, the precise legal theory asserted by a claimant is not controlling, so long as the complaint gives sufficient notice of the transaction sued upon. Yoder v. Hooper, 695 P.2d 1182 (Colo. App. 1984), aff’d, 732 P.2d 852 (Colo. 1987). Trial court erred when it concluded deponent received “reasonable notice” of deposition under § 1-12 (1). Deponent received deposition notice only two days before the deposition, and one of those days was a Sunday. As such, deponent did not receive at least five days notice before the deposition. However, under C.R.C.P. 32(d)(1), “all errors and irregularities in the notice for taking a deposition are waived unless written objection is promptly served upon the party giving the notice”. Keenan ex rel. Hickman v. Gregg, 192 P.3d 485 (Colo. App. 2008) Provision inapplicable to summary judgment motions. Because of the drastic nature of summary judgment, provisions under § 1-15 concerning confession of motions are inapplicable to motions for summary judgment under this rule. Seal v. Hart, 755 P.2d 462 (Colo. App. 1988). Failure to present controverting affidavit or other evidentiary materials are not grounds for summary judgment. Murphy v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 747 P.2d 691 (Colo. App. 1987). Failure of nonmoving party to present affidavits or other evidentiary materials opposing a motion for summary judgment does not alone provide a proper basis for the entry of a judgment on the pleadings. Quiroz v. Goff, 46 P.3d 486 (Colo. App. 2002). Only under extreme circumstances should sanction of dismissal or entry of default judgment be imposed. This rule should not be applied in a manner which unreasonably denies a party its day in court. Nagy v. District Court, 762 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1988) (decided under rule in effect prior to 1987 repeal and readoption); Pinkstaff v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 211 P.3d 698 (Colo. 2009). It is within the district court’s discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing or rule on the submitted motions to vacate or modify an arbitration award. BFN-Greely, LLC v. Adair Group, Inc., 141 P.3d 937 (Colo. App. 2006). Mere citation of a rule of civil procedure is not a “recitation of legal authority” as required by § 1-15 (7) of this rule. Box v. Wickham, 713 P.2d 415 (Colo. App. 1985). Trial court improperly awarded attorney fees upon determining that a motion was frivolous due to an erroneous finding that the court had no jurisdiction. In re Smith, 757 P.2d 1159 (Colo. App. 1988). Post-trial motion for the award of attorney fees is analogous to a request for taxing costs and should follow procedures established by C.R.C.P. 54(d) and § 1-22 of this rule. A trial court may address the issue of the award of attorney fees for services rendered in connection with the underlying litigation on a post-trial basis, whether or not counsel has previously sought to “reserve” the issue. Roa v. Miller, 784 P.2d 826 (Colo. App. 1989). An award of attorney fees under § 13-17-102 cannot be held to be confessed by failure to respond to a motion for fees. Artes-Roy v. Lyman, 833 P.2d 62 (Colo. App. 1992). A claim or defense is frivolous for purposes of assessing attorney fees if the proponent can present no rational argument based on the evidence or law in support of that claim or defense. McKown-Katy v. Rego Co., 776 P.2d 1130 (Colo. App. 1989), rev’d in part on other grounds, 801 P.2d 536 (Colo. 1990). Determination of whether motion is frivolous is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. McKown-Katy v. Rego Co., 776 P.2d 1130 (Colo. App. 1989), rev’d in part on other grounds, 801 P.2d 536 (Colo. 1990). Whether motion was frivolous under § 1-15 (7) is applied in Liebowitz v. Aimexco Inc., 701 P.2d 140 (Colo. App. 1985). Award of attorney fees incurred in pursuing motions for sanctions improper under § 1-15 (7) where the defense to the motions, while ultimately unsuccessful, had a rational basis in fact and law and did not lack substantial justification. Boulder County Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Kraft Bldg. Contractors, 122 P.3d 1019 (Colo. App. 2005). The provisions of § 1-15 concerning confession of a motion by failing to respond thereto are inapplicable to a motion for summary judgment. Koch v. Sadler, 759 P.2d 792 (Colo. App. 1988). Rule is permissive, not mandatory, so that failure to file brief in opposition to motion for partial summary judgment may be considered a confession of the motion, but is not automatically considered such. Visintainer Sheep v. Centennial Gold, 748 P.2d 358 (Colo. App. 1987). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be considered on its merits like a motion for summary judgment and cannot be deemed confessed by a failure to respond. Therefore, trial court erred in failing to consider the merits of plaintiffs’ claims for relief as required by C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) in resolving defendant’s motion to dismiss. Hemmann Mgmt. Servs. v. Mediacell, Inc., 176 P.3d 856 (Colo. App. 2007). A party has 15 days to respond to a motion and it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to grant a motion only 12 days after it was filed. Weatherly v. Roth, 743 P. 2d 453 (Colo. App. 1987). Trial court’s ex-parte communication with defendant’s counsel directing counsel to prepare the form of order was not improper and did not require the attorney fee order to be vacated, where the communication was made after the court had reached its decision based on full briefing of the issues and a telephone hearing, where plaintiff’s counsel was given an opportunity to object and did in fact object, and where there was no evidence of bias on the part of the judge or prejudice to plaintiff as a result of the court’s action. Aztec Minerals Corp. v. State, 987 P.2d 895 (Colo. App. 1999). Trial judge’s refusal to disqualify himself from proceeding amounted to abuse of discretion where trial judge acted as settlement judge in litigation underlying the present legal malpractice case and allegations, in light of policies expressed in § 1-17 of this rule that a settlement judge for a particular action should not thereafter have any dealings with the case and that a judge assigned for proceedings other than settlement should not be privy to discussions that occurred at court settlement conferences, were sufficient to raise a reasonable inference of the appearance of actual or apparent bias or prejudice. Tripp v. Borchard, 29 P.3d 345 (Colo. App. 2001). For factors to use in determining appropriateness and severity of sanctions for failure to file a trial data certificate, see Nagy v. District Court, 762 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1988) (decided under rule in effect prior to 1987 repeal and readoption). Sanction imposed for violation of § 1-18 ‘s requirement of timely filing of trial data certificate denied defendant its right to defend against plaintiff’s claim. AAA Crane Serv. v. Omnibank, 723 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1986). Sanctions may include dismissal, but only if court follows notice requirements of C.R.C.P. 41(b) and § 1-10 (2) of this rule. Maxwell v. W.K.A. Inc., 728 P.2d 321 (Colo. App. 1986). In addition, it was an abuse of discretion for court to impose a sanction for both parties’ failure to file trial data certificates which was detrimental only to plaintiff, and benefitted the equally noncomplying defendants. Maxwell v. W.K.A. Inc., 728 P.2d 321 (Colo. App. 1986). Imposition of sanctions for noncompliance is not mandated; the language of § 1-18 (1)(d) is permissive in nature. Nagy v. District Court, 762 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1988) (decided under rule in effect prior to 1987 repeal and readoption). The trial court has considerable discretion to determine whether noncompliance with mandatory pretrial procedures justifies the imposition of sanctions against the noncomplying party. People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1987). Trial court’s decision not to impose any sanction for noncompliance with pretrial procedures is an abuse of discretion only if, based on the particular circumstances, the decision was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1987). Trial court did not abuse its discretion for failing to prohibit the state’s witnesses from testifying in case in chief for failure to file trial data certificate setting forth the names of the witnesses. People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1987). Trial court did not apply an erroneous legal standard in determining reasonableness of plaintiff’s attorney fees. Without any supporting affidavit or exhibit, defendants’ opposition to award of attorney fees incurred in connection with contempt proceedings constituted mere argument and did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to the reasonableness of the fees. Moreover, the award of attorney fees was based on sufficient evidence supporting the reasonableness of the fees. Madison Capital Co., LLC v. Star Acquisition VIII, 214 P.3d 557 (Colo. App. 2009). Notwithstanding the discretionary language in § 1-22 (2)(c), a party is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine a reasonable amount of attorney fees, when the party presents an expert’s affidavit raising disputed issues of fact and a significant amount of fees has been requested. Roberts v. Adams, 47 P.3d 690 (Colo. App. 2001). Discretion to grant or deny belated request. Where party did not file motion for fees until 24 days after expiration of 15-day period and did not request extension of time nor offer excuse for delay, court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion. Major v. Chons Bros., Inc., 53 P.3d 781 (Colo. App. 2002). Although § 1-22 requires a party seeking costs to file a request within 15 days of the judgment, it also permits the request to be filed within such greater time as the court may allow. Although plaintiff filed the request for costs outside of the deadline, the court chose to address the issue. There is no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to address plaintiff’s request under the “within such greater time as the court may allow” standard. Phillips v. Watkins, 166 P.3d 197 (Colo. App. 2007). A request for an award of costs and fees under § 1-22 which has been filed beyond the 15-day deadline does not preclude the trial court’s consideration even though the party fails to request an extension of time. In re Wright, 841 P.2d 358 (Colo. App. 1992). Not an abuse of discretion for trial court to award attorney fees under § 1-22 beyond the 15-day deadline and without expressly granting an extension. US Fax Law Ctr., Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 205 P.3d 512 (Colo. App. 2009); Anderson v. Pursell, 244 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2010). The court relied on specified information indicating the reasons for the late filing of the motion for attorney fees. US Fax Law Ctr., Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 205 P.3d 512 (Colo. App. 2009). Trial court not required to deny a motion for costs and attorney fees if it is filed outside of the 15-day time limit, even if the submitting party does not request an extension of time. Anderson v. Pursell, 244 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2010). Issues concerning recovery of attorney fees not sought as damages are outside the purview of C.R.C.P. 59 and outside the purview of C.R.C.P. 59(j) ‘s requirement that a motion be denied as a matter of law if it is not decided within 60 days. Anderson v. Pursell, 244 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2010). Even though plaintiff filed his bill of costs and an amended bill of costs more than 15 days after the entry of judgment, the trial court considered both the bill of costs and the amended bill in awarding minimal costs. Thus, the bill of costs was filed within “such greater time as the court may allow” and the trial court was required under § 13-17-202 to award the plaintiff “reasonable costs” incurred after the offer of settlement. Borquez v. Robert C. Ozer, P.C., 923 P.2d 166 (Colo. App. 1995), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997). The rule does not require a court to determine that a filing made outside the 15-day period was attributable to excusable neglect or to make any other findings such as those required under C.R.C.P. 6(b). Parry v. Kuhlmann, 169 P.3d 188 (Colo. App. 2007). Section 1-22 (2) does not require a party seeking attorney fees as costs to provide the disclosures mandated under C.R.C.P. 26 for experts who will testify at trial. Chartier v. Weinland Homes, Inc., 25 P.3d 1279 (Colo. App. 2001). Failure of wife to file a motion in conformity with this rule in dissolution of marriage action does not operate as a waiver of her request for fees where wife had properly requested fees in her response to husband’s petition; attorney fees were also listed as a disputed issue in the parties’ joint trial management certificate; and husband acknowledged that wife raised the issue at the permanent orders hearing. In re Hill, 166 P.3d 269 (Colo. App. 2007). The right to a jury trial, once proper demand is made and fee is paid pursuant to § 1-3 of this rule, may be lost only for reasons stated in C.R.C.P. 39(a). The trial court, in an action for payment of medical benefits, abused its discretion in denying the insured a jury trial on the basis that the insured failed to file jury instructions in accordance with § 1-19 of this rule. Neither this rule nor C.R.C.P. 39(a) includes a waiver provision on such basis. Whaley v. Keystone Life Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 404 (Colo. App. 1989). Where defendant in prior action sought and obtained dismissal for failure to prosecute but did not specifically request dismissal with prejudice, order of dismissal did not so specify, and no good cause was shown for defendant’s failure to request dismissal with prejudice, subsequent “clarification” of order to specify dismissal with prejudice was ineffective. McElvaney v. Batley, 824 P.2d 73 (Colo. App. 1991). Expert’s designation and summary of testimony was available and met the requirement of this rule to provide both sides with the opportunity to prepare adequately for trial and to prevent undue surprise. Fenton v. Fibreboard Corp., 827 P.2d 564 (Colo. App. 1991). Confession of motion due to failure to respond in accordance with subsection (3) does not automatically render a pro se litigant’s claims “frivolous and groundless”. Separate findings on the issue are required before court may award attorney fees against such parties under § 13-17-102. Artes-Roy v. Lyman, 833 P.2d 62 (Colo. App. 1992). Defendants waived their rights to a hearing on costs pursuant to this section where they did not request such hearing at trial. Van Schaack v. Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd., 856 P.2d 15 (Colo. App. 1992). It was within the trial court’s discretion to award expert witness fees for designated experts who did not testify at trial where such award was supported by evidence in the record. Van Schaack v. Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd., 856 P.2d 15 (Colo. App. 1992). Trial court had discretion to impose sanctions, including issuing an order limiting scope of expert’s testimony at trial where plaintiff failed to disclose identity of experts or their opinions and failed to supplement responses to discovery when additional information became known. Locke v. Vanderark, 843 P.2d 27 (Colo. App. 1992). Trial court properly excluded psychiatrist’s testimony regarding the association between IQ and hydrocephalic condition where plaintiff failed to disclose opinion, failed to disclose psychiatrist’s qualifications, and failed to update discovery responses. Locke v. Vanderark, 843 P.2d 27 (Colo. App. 1992). Trial court properly held that tardily disclosed expert opinion went beyond fair scope of previously disclosed opinion where plaintiff failed to make timely disclosure of expert’s opinion concerning damages relating to matters beyond those provided in discovery. Locke v. Vanderark, 843 P.2d 27 (Colo. App. 1992). Generally, the trial court determines a motion on the written motion and submitted briefs, and it is within the discretion of the court whether to allow an evidentiary hearing. City & County of Denver v. Ameritrust, 832 P.2d 1054 (Colo. App. 1992). Section 1-5 creates a presumption that all court records are to be open. Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). Section 1-5 places the burden upon the party seeking to limit access to a court file to overcome this presumption in favor of public accessibility by demonstrating that the harm to the privacy of a person in interest outweighs the public interest in the openness of court files. Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). The fact that the parties claim that a court file contains extremely personal, private, and confidential matters is generally insufficient to constitute a privacy interest warranting the sealing of that entire file under § 1-5. In re Purcell, 879 P.2d 468 (Colo. App. 1994); Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). The expectation of privacy or confidentiality in court records has been found to exist only in those limited instances involving sexual assault claims, trade secrets, potentially defamatory material, or threats to national security. Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). A broad limited access order denying access to the entire court file was not warranted where a medical malpractice charge against a licensed health care professional implicates the public interest and involves more than a private dispute between individuals. Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). Court may not enter a limited access order based solely upon an agreement between the parties to the litigation. If the evidence does not support the required finding under § 1-5 (2), no such order may be entered. Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). Court did not abuse its discretion in denying party’s request to seal record where it was not required to seal the record under this section and the record contained nothing unusual and no material that would mandate that it be sealed. In re Purcell, 879 P.2d 468 (Colo. App. 1994). Movant’s constitutional right to due process was not violated by trial court’s denial of motion for costs and damages without a separate hearing on the motion where movant did not request an evidentiary hearing on its motion and trial court, in ruling on the motion, assumed movant could prove damages but determined, based on written motion and briefs, that an award of damages would be oppressive and inequitable. City & County of Denver v. Ameritrust, 832 P.2d 1054 (Colo. App. 1992). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing defendants to file their reply to plaintiff’s response more than ten days after the response was filed where, in accepting the reply, the court stated that it had been filed within a reasonable time and that, in the interest of fundamental fairness, substance would be placed ahead of procedure. Armstead v. Memorial Hosp., 892 P.2d 450 (Colo. App. 1995). Letter of credit was properly released by trial court, since the court was the beneficiary of the letter of credit. Vento v. Colo. Nat’l Bank, 985 P.2d 48 (Colo. App. 1999). Section 1-1 (2) is applied in Barry v. Ashley Anderson, P.C., 718 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Colo. 1989). Section 1-10 is applied in Powers v. Prof’l Rodeo Cowboys, 832 P.2d 1099 (Colo. App. 1992). Section 1-10 (2) is applied in Maxwell v. W.K.A. Inc., 728 P.2d 321 (Colo. App. 1986). Section 1-11 is applied in Herrera v. Anderson, 736 P.2d 416 (Colo. App. 1987); Todd v. Bear Valley Village Apts., 980 P.2d 973 (Colo. 1999). Section 1-15 is applied in Herrera v. Anderson, 736 P.2d 416 (Colo. App. 1987); Ogawa v. Riley, 949 P.2d 118 (Colo. App. 1997). Section 1-18 is applied in Baumann v. Rhode, 710 P.2d 493 (Colo. App. 1985); Conrad v. Imatani, 724 P.2d 89 (Colo. App. 1986); Coffee v. Inman, 728 P.2d 376 (Colo. App. 1986). Section 1-19 is applied in Whaley v. Keystone Life Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 404 (Colo. App. 1989).