ANNOTATION Law reviews. For formal opinion of the Colorado Bar Association on Ethical Duties of Attorney Selected by Insurer to Represent Its Insured, see 22 Colo. Law. 497 (1993). For article, “Representation of Multiple Estate Or Trust Fiduciaries: Practical and Ethical Issues”, see 34 Colo. Law. 65 (July 2005). For article, “Ethical Concerns When Dealing With the Elder Client”, see 34 Colo. Law. 27 (October 2005). For article, “The Duty of Loyalty and Preparations to Compete”, see 34 Colo. Law. 67 (November 2005). For article, “The New Rules of Professional Conduct: Significant Changes for In-House Counsel”, see 36 Colo. Law. 71 (November 2007). For article, “Ethics in Family Law and the New Rules of Professional Conduct”, see 37 Colo. Law. 47 (October 2008). For article, “Engagement Letters and Common Conflicts of Interest in Joint Representation”, see 38 Colo. Law. 43 (February 2009). For article, “Climate Change and Positional Conflicts of Interest”, see 40 Colo. Law. 43 (October 2011). For article, “Repugnant Objectives”, see 41 Colo. Law. 51 (December 2012). Annotator’s note. Rule 1.7 is similar to Rule 1.7 as it existed prior to the 2007 repeal and readoption of the Colorado rules of professional conduct. Relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this rule. Where there is a large group of clients who are not recognized as a single legal entity, an attorney has an attorney-client relationship with each individual member of the group. Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (D. Colo. 1999). Representation agreement that gives counsel the ability to negotiate settlement for each member of a large group of clients without providing him or her with personalized advisement and without obtaining individual authority to enter into a settlement agreement violates the professional and ethical standards created to regulate the legal profession in Colorado. Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (D. Colo. 1999). Any provision of an attorney-client agreement that deprives a client of a right to control his or her case is void as against public policy. Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (D. Colo. 1999). Valid client consent to waive the potential conflict of interest cannot be obtained under the circumstances. Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (D. Colo. 1999). Where counsel simultaneously represented company’s interests as well as those of company’s employees for a substantial period of time and the representation continued through the emergence of conflicts, counsel could continue to represent company because the company and the former clients, the employees, through counsel, consented to such representation after consultation and there was an indication that counsel reasonably believed that the continued representation would not adversely affect the relationship with the former clients. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 855 F. Supp. 330 (D. Colo. 1994). A defendant may waive the right to conflict-free counsel. The waiver is valid when: (1) The defendant is aware of the conflict and its likely effect on the attorney’s ability to render effective assistance; and (2) the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. A waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent when the defendant is aware of and understands the various risks, has the capacity to make a decision on the basis of this information, and states unequivocally a desire to hazard those dangers. People v. Preciado-Flores, 66 P.3d 155 (Colo. App. 2002). A waiver is not knowing and intelligent where a defendant gives merely pro forma answers to pro forma questions. People v. Preciado-Flores, 66 P.3d 155 (Colo. App. 2002). Defendant does not have an absolute right to revoke waiver of conflict-free counsel at any time, but is subject to the same limitations as any defendant terminating counsel. The court may refuse to revoke an untimely waiver or to grant a revocation that is filed for improper purposes based upon evidence presented at the time of attempted revocation. People v. Maestas, 199 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2009). Attorney violated paragraph (a) by simultaneously representing both a borrower and the purported lenders to a proposed transaction that he attempted to persuade both parties to enter into. People v. Calvert, 280 P.3d 1269 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2011). Lawyer violated section (b) when his representation of a client was materially limited by his responsibilities to another client. He represented loan documents to be investment agreements to circumvent a provision in the Colorado Liquor Code that restricts the cross-ownership of businesses holding liquor licenses. In re Lopez, 980 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1999). Public censure was appropriate for attorney who violated this rule by simultaneously representing, as defendants in a quantum meruit and lis pendens suit initiated by a subcontractor, the homeowners, the general contractor, the bank holding deed of trust on homeowners property, and two other parties who had contracted with contractor. Balancing the seriousness of the misconduct with the factors in mitigation, and taking into account the respondent’s mental state when he entered into the conflicts in representation, public censure is appropriate. People v. Fritze, 926 P.2d 574 (Colo. 1996). Public censure warranted for attorney’s solicitation of prostitution during telephone conversation with wife of client whom he was representing in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. People v. Bauder, 941 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1997). Critical inquiry when representation of one client may be limited by representation of another is whether a conflict is likely to arise, and, if so, whether it materially interferes with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment. People in Interest of J.A.M., 907 P.2d 725 (Colo. App. 1995). Actual conflict existed where criminal charges were pending against defense counsel in the same district in which his client was being prosecuted. People v. Edebohls, 944 P.2d 552 (Colo. App. 1996). Attorney’s representation of criminal defendant for whom attorney negotiated a plea bargain for testifying against another criminal defendant prohibited attorney from also representing the other criminal defendant where such other defendant did not consent to conflict-free counsel. People ex rel. Peters v. District Court, 951 P.2d 926 (Colo. 1998). Attorney who was the trustee of client’s trust violated section (b) by utilizing the trust’s funds to loan money to his daughter and to purchase his son-in-law’s parents’ former residence for the purpose of leasing it back to them, and by then failing to take any legal action against them when they did not make lease payments. People v. DeRose, 945 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1997). Preparation of an extension agreement on the repayment of a loan made to a client by the attorney violated section (b) because certain exceptions were not satisfied. People v. Ginsberg, 967 P.2d 151 (Colo. 1998). Thirty-day suspension warranted where lawyer, who represented an individual accused of first-degree murder, communicated with co-defendant who also was charged with first-degree murder and whose interests were adverse to the lawyer’s client, without the knowledge or consent of the co-defendant’s lawyers. The potential for harm was high in a first-degree murder case and the number of unauthorized contacts demonstrated more than negligence on the lawyer’s part. People v. DeLoach, 944 P.2d 522 (Colo. 1997). Suspension for three years was appropriate in case involving violation of this rule and others, together with attorney’s breach of his duty as client’s trustee to protect his client, who was a particularly vulnerable victim that was recuperating from a serious head injury. People v. DeRose, 945 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1997). Suspension for three years, rather than disbarment, was appropriate where violation of this rule and others caused serious harm to attorney’s clients, but mitigating factors were present, including no previous discipline in 14 years of practice, personal and emotional problems, and cooperation and demonstrated remorse in proceedings. Attorney’s ability to represent his client in a bankruptcy was materially limited by his own interest as a creditor in collecting attorney fees. People v. Henderson, 967 P.2d 1038 (Colo. 1998). The presumed sanction of suspension is appropriate where the attorney knew of a conflict of interest and did not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict even though such action caused no actual harm. In re Cimino, 3 P.3d 398 (Colo. 2000). Whether an attorney expects to be paid or not is insignificant to the issue of whether an attorney-client relationship existed. In re Cimino, 3 P.3d 398 (Colo. 2000). The hearing panel of the former grievance committee committed harmless error by failing to consider the personal and emotional problems that an attorney was experiencing at the time of the attorney’s misconduct as mitigating in determining sanctions because no medical or psychological proof of emotional problems was brought forward. In re Cimino, 3 P.3d 398 (Colo. 2000). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Robinson, 853 P.2d 1145 (Colo. 1993); People v. Good, 893 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1995); People v. Silver, 924 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1996); People v. Mason, 938 P.2d 133 (Colo. 1997); People v. Reed, 955 P.2d 65 (Colo. 1998); In re Tolley, 975 P.2d 1115 (Colo. 1999); People v. Beecher, 224 P.3d 442 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2009); People v. Albani, 276 P.3d 64 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2011). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. Bennett, 843 P.2d 1385 (Colo. 1993); In re Lopez, 980 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1999); People v. Sweetman, 218 P.3d 1123 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2008); People v. Calvert, 280 P.3d 1269 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2011). Cases Decided Under Former DR 5-101. Law reviews. For article, “The Conflicted Attorney”, see 11 Colo. Law. 2589 (1982). For article, “The Ethics of Moving for Disqualification of Opposing Counsel”, see 13 Colo. Law. 55 (1984). For article, “Why Shouldn’t an Attorney Go Into Business With a Client?”, see 13 Colo. Law. 431 (1984). For article, “Avoiding Family Law Malpractice: Recognition and Prevention — Part I”, see 14 Colo. 787 (1985). For article, “Conflicts of Interest”, see 15 Colo. Law. 2001 (1986). For article, “Defending the Federal Drug or Racketeering Charge”, see 16 Colo. Law. 605 (1987). For article, “Sex, Lawyers and Vilification”, see 21 Colo. Law. 469 (1992). License to practice law assures public that the lawyer who holds the license will perform basic legal tasks honestly and without undue delay, in accordance with the highest standards of professional conduct. People v. Dixon, 621 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1981). Public expects appropriate discipline for misconduct. The public has a right to expect that one who engages in professional misconduct will be disciplined appropriately. People v. Dixon, 621 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1981). A lawyer, by preparing 95 to 99 percent of the pleadings, continues to represent a client even though he has other attorneys sign the pleadings. People v. Garnett, 725 P.2d 1149 (Colo. 1986). Public censure warranted where attorney engaged in sexual relations with client attorney represented in dissolution of marriage action even though client suffered no actual harm. People v. Zeilinger, 814 P.2d 808 (Colo. 1991). By investing trust funds in a venture in which the attorney was involved financially and professionally, he allowed his personal interests to affect the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client in violation of DR 5-101(A), justifying suspension from practice. People v. Wright, 698 P.2d 1317 (Colo. 1985). Theft of client’s money, misrepresentations, representation of multiple clients with adverse interests, and failure to respond to informal complaints warrants disbarment. People v. Quick, 716 P.2d 1082 (Colo. 1986). Conduct found to violate disciplinary rules. People v. Razatos, 636 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1981), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 930, 102 S. Ct. 1415, 71 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1982). Representing client without full disclosure of potential conflict of interest violates disciplinary rule. People v. Watson, 787 P.2d 151 (Colo. 1990). No violation of paragraph (A). Although disclosure was inadequate as to the nature of the business relationships between the attorney and his business-partner client, record does not support conclusion that attorney’s business relationship with individual client would or reasonably might affect his professional judgment with respect to his representation of that client. In re Quiat, 979 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1999). Violation of paragraph (B) where attorney knew, when he accepted employment in connection with his client’s bankruptcy, that he could be a witness by virtue of his interests in the general and limited partnerships that were assets of the bankruptcy estate, and by his failure to transfer the partnership interests to his client’s children prior to the filing of the bankruptcy. In re Quiat, 979 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1999). Representation of client when the exercise of the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of the client will be or reasonably may be affected by the lawyer’s own financial, business, property, or personal interests violates disciplinary rule. People v. Ginsberg, 967 P.2d 151 (Colo. 1998). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify public censure. People v. Stevens, 883 P.2d 21 (Colo. 1994); People v. Wollrab, 909 P.2d 1093 (Colo. 1996); People v. O’Donnell, 955 P.2d 53 (Colo. 1998). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Schmad, 793 P.2d 1162 (Colo. 1990); People v. Lopez, 796 P.2d 957 (Colo. 1990); People v. Watson, 833 P.2d 50 (Colo. 1992); People v. Boyer, 934 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1997); In re Quiat, 979 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1999); In re Cohen, 8 P.3d 429 (Colo. 1999). Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Vernon, 660 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1982); People v. Stineman, 716 P.2d 1079 (Colo. 1986). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. McGrath, 833 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1992). Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. McGrath, 833 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1992). Applied in People v. Spiegel, 193 Colo. 161, 567 P.2d 353 (1977); Jones v. District Court, 617 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1980); McCall v. District Court, 783 P.2d 1223 (1989). Cases Decided Under Former DR 5-102. Law reviews. For article, “Prior Representation: The Specter of Disqualification of Trial Counsel”, see 11 Colo. Law. 1214 (1982). For article, “The Ethics of Moving for Disqualification of Opposing Counsel”, see 13 Colo. Law. 55 (1984). For article, “Defending the Federal Drug or Racketeering Charge”, see 16 Colo. Law. 605 (1987). For article, “Ethical Problem Areas for Probate Lawyers”, see 19 Colo. Law. 1069 (1990). A lawyer cannot act as an advocate on behalf of his client and yet give testimony adverse to the interests of that client in the same proceeding. Riley v. District Court, 181 Colo. 90, 507 P.2d 464 (1973). Prosecution subpoena of accused’s attorney may stand. A prosecutorial subpoena served on a criminal defendant’s attorney can withstand a motion to quash only if the prosecution shows the following: (1) Defense counsel’s testimony will be actually adverse to the accused; (2) the evidence will likely be admissible at trial; and (3) there is a compelling need for the evidence which cannot be satisfied from another source. Williams v. District Court, 700 P.2d 549 (Colo. 1985). The act of subpoenaing defense counsel is itself the functional equivalent of a motion to disqualify. Williams v. District Court, 700 P.2d 549 (Colo. 1985). Test applied in Rodriquez v. District Court, 719 P.2d 699 (Colo. 1986). Paragraph (A) of this rule relates to potential testimony of a lawyer during the trial of a matter for which he is presently employed. People v. Rubanowitz, 688 P.2d 231 (Colo. 1984). When deputy district attorney was endorsed as witness for prosecution, disqualification of deputy district attorney was proper, and disqualification of entire staff of county district attorney’s office, under the circumstances, was not an abuse of discretion. People v. Garcia, 698 P.2d 801 (Colo. 1985). Dismissal of charge is not an appropriate remedy. People v. Garcia, 698 P.2d 801 (Colo. 1985). Motion to disqualify must set forth specific facts which point to a clear danger that either prejudices counsel’s client or his adversary. People ex rel. Woodard v. District Court, 704 P.2d 851 (Colo. 1985). Paragraph (B) does not provide a tool for disqualifying counsel by the mere stratagem of suggesting that opposing counsel may be called as a witness during the trial. People ex rel. Woodard v. District Court, 704 P.2d 851 (Colo. 1985). Although the Code mandates that an attorney withdraw on the attorney’s own initiative if the attorney violates paragraph (B), there are no provisions in this rule for the trial court to disqualify attorneys and this rule does not require a new trial if the attorney does not withdraw. Although plaintiff’s attorneys testified for the defendant, the court found that plaintiff was bound by his counsel’s decision not to withdraw and refused to grant plaintiff a new trial. Taylor v. Grogan, 900 P.2d 60 (Colo. 1995). Applied in Jones v. District Court, 617 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1980); Fed. Deposit Ins. v. Isham, 782 F. Supp. 524 (D. Colo. 1992). Cases Decided Under Former DR 5-104. Law reviews. For article, “Why Shouldn’t an Attorney Go Into Business With a Client?”, see 13 Colo. Law. 431 (1984). For article, “Conflicts of Interest”, see 15 Colo. Law. 2001 (1986). For article, “Update on Ethics and Malpractice Avoidance in Family Law — Part I”, see 19 Colo. Law. 465 (1990). For article, “Update on Ethics and Malpractice Avoidance in Family Law — Part II”, see 19 Colo. Law. 647 (1990). Attorney, with power to act as trustee, who obtains a loan from the trust through the actual trustee, but does not disclose conflict and does not discuss security for the loan with the actual trustee, violates this section. People v. Tanquary, 831 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1992). Public censure appropriate for lawyer who failed to make full disclosure to client of their differing interests prior to obtaining her consent for a loan to the lawyer. People v. Potter, 966 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1998). An attorney’s conduct in lending money to a client, preparing a promissory note with an excessive interest rate, and failing to fully disclose his differing interest in the business transaction constitutes conduct violating this rule. People v. Ginsberg, 967 P.2d 151 (Colo. 1998). Exploiting a client’s friendship and trust to extort funds for one’s personal use is reprehensible conduct deserving of disbarment. People v. McMahill, 782 P.2d 336 (Colo. 1988). Lawyer’s encouragement of a client to enter into a business transaction with said lawyer in which the two had differing interests and lawyer’s failure to disclose relevant facts warrant disbarment. People v. Martinez, 739 P.2d 838 (Colo. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1054, 108 S. Ct. 1003, 98 L. Ed. 2d 970 (1988); People v. Score, 760 P.2d 1111 (Colo. 1988). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Lopez, 796 P.2d 957 (Colo. 1990); People v. Schubert, 799 P.2d 388 (Colo. 1990); People v. Sigley, 917 P.2d 1253 (Colo. 1996). Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Vernon, 660 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1982); People v. Foster, 716 P.2d 1069 (Colo. 1986). An attorney’s conduct in borrowing money from his former clients and in failing to record deeds of trust on their behalf to be used as security constitutes professional misconduct and justifies his suspension. People v. Brackett, 667 P.2d 1357 (Colo. 1983). An attorney’s failure to disclose to his clients that he was a lender and holder of a long-term mortgage on their property and that his interests in the transaction were necessarily adverse to their interests constitutes conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Nutt, 696 P.2d 242 (Colo. 1984). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. Broadhurst, 803 P.2d 478 (Colo. 1990); People v. Rouse, 817 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1991); People v. Mulligan, 817 P.2d 1028 (Colo. 1991); People v. Tanquary, 831 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1992). Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. Quick, 716 P.2d 1082 (Colo. 1986); People v. Foster, 733 P.2d 687 (Colo. 1987); People v. Score, 760 P.2d 1111 (Colo. 1988). Conduct found to violate disciplinary rules. People v. Razatos, 636 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1981), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 930, 102 S. Ct. 1415, 71 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1982); People v. Bennett, 810 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1991); People v. McKie, 900 P.2d 768 (Colo. 1995). Applied in People v. Good, 195 Colo. 177, 576 P.2d 1020 (1978); People v. Cameron, 197 Colo. 330, 595 P.2d 677 (1979); People v. Luxford, 626 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1981); People v. Barbour, 639 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1982); People v. Underhill, 683 P.2d 349 (Colo. 1984); People v. Stineman, 716 P.2d 1079 (Colo. 1986). Cases Decided Under Former DR 5-105. Law reviews. For article, “Conflicts in Settlement of Personal Injury Cases”, see 11 Colo. Law. 399 (1982). For article, “Prior Representation: The Specter of Disqualification of Trial Counsel”, see 11 Colo. Law. 1214 (1982). For article, “The Conflicted Attorney”, see 11 Colo. Law. 2589 (1982). For article, “Some Comments on Conflicts of Interest and the Corporate Lawyer”, see 12 Colo. Law. 60 (1983). For article, “The Professional Liability Insurer’s Duty to Defend — Part II”, see 15 Colo. Law. 1029 (1986). For article, “Conflicts of Interest”, see 15 Colo. Law. 2001 (1986). For article, “Conflict of Interest Systems”, see 16 Colo. Law 628 (1987). For article, “Corporate Fiduciary Surcharge Litigation”, see 16 Colo. Law. 983 (1987). For article, “Ethics and the Estate Planning Lawyer”, see 17 Colo. Law. 241 (1988). For article, “Update on Ethics and Malpractice Avoidance in Family Law — Part I”, see 19 Colo. Law. 465 (1990). For article, “Update on Ethics and Malpractice Avoidance in Family Law — Part II”, see 19 Colo. Law. 647 (1990). For article, “Ethical Problem Areas for Probate Lawyers”, see 19 Colo. Law. 1069 (1990). Intent of rule is to guarantee the independence of counsel from the conflicting interests of other clients in order to preserve the integrity of the attorney’s adversary role. Allen v. District Court, 184 Colo. 202, 519 P.2d 351 (1974). Genuine conflicts of interest must be scrupulously avoided. Allen v. District Court, 184 Colo. 202, 519 P.2d 351 (1974); McCall v. District Court, 783 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1989). It is of the utmost importance that an attorney’s loyalty to his client not be diminished, fettered, or threatened in any manner by his loyalty to another client. Allen v. District Court, 184 Colo. 202, 519 P.2d 351 (1974); Watson v. District Court, 199 Colo. 76, 604 P.2d 1165 (1980). Conflict arises where parties would be opposed in subsequent contribution action. Where litigants in a negligence action are represented by the same attorneys, a conflict of interest arises if the plaintiff are considered opposing parties in the same action for purposes of a subsequent contribution action, because both parties would want to place a higher degree of fault on the other party. Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Gas. Co. v. Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1983). Whenever a motion to withdraw is filed on the grounds that a conflict of interest may exist or may arise in the future, the trial judge must conduct a hearing to determine if a conflict of interest, or a potential conflict of interest, requires that counsel withdraw, and if, from the facts presented at the hearing, it appears that a substantial conflict of interest exists, or will in all probability arise in the course of counsel’s representation, the motion to withdraw should be granted. Allen v. District Court, 184 Colo. 202, 519 P.2d 351 (1974); McCall v. District Court, 783 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1989). Consent of all parties may be insufficient. There are certain factual situations where the conflicts of interests between parties are so critically adverse to one another so as not to permit the representation of multiple parties by an attorney, even with the consent of all parties made after full disclosure. In re King Res. Co., 20 Bankr. 191 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982). Attorney should evaluate potential for impropriety. The attorney should not only inform the parties of the former representations, but should evaluate for himself, as well as for his client, any potential for impropriety that might arise. In re King Res. Co., 20 Bankr. 191 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982); People v. Belina, 765 P.2d 121 (Colo. 1988). It must be “obvious” that attorney can adequately represent clients. The general rule that a lawyer may represent clients with potentially conflicting interests with the consent of the clients is qualified in that it must be “obvious” that he can adequately do so. In re King Res. Co., 20 Bankr. 191 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982); People v. Chew, 830 P.2d 488 (Colo. 1992). Attorney may represent individual officer of client corporation. When an individual director or officer of a corporation seeks representation from an attorney hired by the corporation, the attorney may serve the individual only if the lawyer is convinced that differing interests are not present. In re King Res. Co., 20 Bankr. 191 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982). Knowledge of one attorney must be imputed to lawyers with whom he practices. Osborn v. District Court, 619 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1980). Imputed disqualification applies to public law firm. The same rule of imputed disqualification stated in subdivision (D) of this rule may be considered in determining the ethical standards for disqualification of a public law firm, such as a district attorney. People v. Garcia, 698 P.2d 801 (Colo. 1985); McCall v. District Court, 783 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1989). Rule of imputed disqualification applies to public defenders. Allen v. District Court, 519 P.2d 351 (Colo. 1974); McCall v. District Court, 783 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1989). Due to imputed disqualification, appellate division of state public defender’s office must be permitted to withdraw from representing on appeal a defendant who claims ineffective counsel provided by local deputy public defender. McCall v. District Court, 783 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1989). Disqualification of district attorney’s office required where two former district attorneys are witnesses on contested issues in case. Pease v. District Court, 708 P.2d 800 (Colo. 1985). Trial dates accepted should be honored before withdrawal from employment. When a public defender or a busy defense lawyer finds that his representation of one client is inimical to his representation of another client and he must make an election as to the client he will represent, he has a heavy duty to the court to see that he honors dates that he has agreed to for the trial of a case. Watson v. District Court, 199 Colo. 76, 604 P.2d 1165 (1980). Attorney’s compensation may be denied. Where an attorney is shown to represent more than one party with conflicting interests, a court may deny him all compensation under a retainer agreement. In re King Res. Co., 20 Bankr. 191 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982). Continued representation of clients with conflicting interests violates this rule and warrants discipline. People v. Awenius, 653 P.2d 740 (Colo. 1982). Public censure is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in determining whether the representation of a client will adversely affect another client, causing injury or potential injury to a client. Attorney’s representation of two estates where the beneficiaries of the estates have conflicting interests and the attorney fails to obtain waivers from the beneficiaries violates this rule. People v. Gebauer, 821 P.2d 782 (Colo. 1991). Public censure was appropriate where attorney simultaneously represented one client in automobile accident case and another client, who was involved in the automobile accident, in a bankruptcy proceeding without listing the accident client as a creditor of the bankruptcy client, and where aggravating factors existed. People v. Gonzales, 922 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1996). Public censure warranted where attorney entered into compensated consulting agreement with law firm to which he referred client’s cases, without full disclosure of agreement to client. People v. Mulvihill, 814 P.2d 805 (Colo. 1991). An attorney is not always precluded from representing a client in a transaction with a former or currently inactive client. Whether an attorney properly may do so depends upon the nature and extent of the former legal work performed for the previous client as well as the possible relationship between the two transactions. Crystal Homes, Inc. v. Radetsky, 895 P.2d 1179 (Colo. App. 1995). Evidence sufficient to justify suspension from the practice of law. People v. Belfor, 197 Colo. 223, 591 P.2d 585 (1979); People v. Foster, 716 P.2d 1069 (Colo. 1986). Three-month suspension appropriate for violation of DR 5-105 (A) and (B) and DR 5-101 (B). The interests of the client and the client’s wife, from whom the client was then separated, were so adverse, or potentially adverse, that the conflicts could not be waived even had there been full disclosure. As such, it was not obvious that the attorney could represent the client, the client’s estranged wife, and their children in the client’s bankruptcy proceedings. Because the attorney knew of the conflicts involved when he undertook the multiple representation, a short period of suspension is warranted, but not the requirement of reinstatement proceedings. In re Quiat, 979 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1999). Forty-five-day suspension appropriate for violation of this rule where pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses are factors in aggravation. People v. Chew, 830 P.2d 488 (Colo. 1992). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify public censure. People v. Odom, 829 P.2d 855 (Colo. 1992); People v. Stevens, 883 P.2d 21 (Colo. 1994); People v. Vsetecka, 893 P.2d 1309 (Colo. 1995); People v. Wollrab, 909 P.2d 1093 (Colo. 1996). Public censure appropriate where attorney represented buyer and seller of restaurant and did not properly advise the buyer or protect the buyer’s interest. People v. Odom, 829 P.2d 855 (Colo. 1992). Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify public censure. People v. Gebauer, 821 P.2d 782 (Colo. 1991). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Lopez, 796 P.2d 957 (Colo. 1990); People v. Hansen, 814 P.2d 816 (Colo. 1991); People v. Watson, 833 P.2d 50 (Colo. 1992); People v. Butler, 875 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1994); People v. Banman, 901 P.2d 469 (Colo. 1995); People v. Miller, 913 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1996); People v. Silver, 924 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1996); In re Cohen, 8 P.3d 429 (Colo. 1999). Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. Quick, 716 P.2d 1082 (Colo. 1986); People v. Martinez, 739 P.2d 838 (Colo. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1054, 108 S. Ct. 1003, 98 L. Ed. 2d 970 (1988). Conduct found to violate disciplinary rules. People v. Razatos, 636 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1981), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 930, 102 S. Ct. 1415, 71 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1982). Applied in People ex rel. MacFarlane v. Boyls, 197 Colo. 242, 591 P.2d 1315 (1979); People v. Meldahl, 200 Colo. 332, 615 P.2d 29 (1980); People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932 (Colo. 1983); People v. Underhill, 683 P.2d 349 (Colo. 1984); People v. McDowell, 718 P.2d 541 (Colo. 1986). Cases Decided Under Former DR 5-107. Law reviews. For article, “Conflicts in Settlement of Personal Injury Cases”, see 11 Colo. Law. 399 (1982). For article, “Conflicts of Interest”, see 15 Colo. Law. 2001 (1986). For formal opinion of the Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee on Collaboration with Non-Lawyers in the Preparation and Marketing of Estate Planning Documents, see 19 Colo. Law. 1793 (1990). Applied in People ex rel. MacFarlane v. Boyls, 197 Colo. 242, 591 P.2d 1315 (1979).