C.R.C.P. 1
Comments
2015
(1) The 2015 amendments are the next step in a wave of reform literally sweeping the nation. This reform movement aims to create a significant change in the existing culture of pretrial discovery with the goal of emphasizing and enforcing Rule 1 ‘s mandate that discovery be administered to make litigation just, speedy, and inexpensive. One of the primary movers of this reform effort is a realization that the cost and delays of the existing litigation process is denying meaningful access to the judicial system for many people.
(2) The changes here are based on identical wording changes proposed for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They are designed to place still greater emphasis on the concept that litigation is to be treated at all times, by all parties and the courts, to make it just, speedy, and inexpensive, and, thereby, noticeably to increase citizens’ access to justice.
Annotation I. General Consideration. The requirements of the rules may be waived by failure to file objection. Continental Air Lines v. City & County of Denver, 129 Colo. 1, 266 P.2d 400 (1954). The requirements may be waived by consent. Rose v. Agricultural Ditch & Reservoir Co., 69 Colo. 232, 193 P. 671 (1920); Continental Air Lines v. City & County of Denver, 129 Colo. 1, 266 P.2d 400 (1954). Where sufficient objection is made at the proper time and place, there is no alternative but to enforce the applicable rule. Continental Air Lines v. City & County of Denver, 129 Colo. 1, 266 P.2d 400 (1954). Violation of a rule of civil procedure does not create a private cause of action. Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, 732 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Colo. 1990). Applied in Murray v. District Court, 189 Colo. 217, 539 P.2d 1254 (1975); Inwood Indus., Inc. v. Priestley, 37 Colo. App. 78, 545 P.2d 732 (1975), aff’d, 191 Colo. 543, 560 P.2d 822 (1976); Smith v. Bridges, 40 Colo. App. 171, 574 P.2d 511 (1977); Sherman v. District Court, 637 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1981); In re Brantley, 674 P.2d 1388 (Colo. App. 1983). II. Procedure Governed. Law reviews. For article, “Shall Colorado Procedure Conform with the Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?”, see 15 Dicta 5 (1938). For article, “The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure”, see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 527 (1951). Section 21 of the Colorado Constitution’s article VI confers upon the supreme court the power to make rules governing practice in civil cases. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mt. Power Co., 174 Colo. 309, 486 P.2d 438 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 996, 92 S.Ct. 1245, 31 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1972). The Colorado rules of civil procedure are patterned after the federal rules. Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959). These rules provide a complete and orderly procedure for the trial and determination of civil actions. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Architects v. Marshall, 136 Colo. 200, 315 P.2d 198 (1957). At law or equity. The rules of civil procedure provide for the application of the rules to the procedure in all actions, suits, or proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Architects v. Marshall, 136 Colo. 200, 315 P.2d 198 (1957). Rules of civil procedure apply to habeas corpus actions when the rules are not in conflict with habeas corpus statutes. Zaborski v. Dept. of Corr., 812 P.2d 236 (Colo. 1991). The primary purpose of the rules of civil procedure is to simplify and clarify procedure and to expedite litigation. Swan v. Zwahlen, 131 Colo. 184, 280 P.2d 439 (1955); Seymour v. District Court, 196 Colo. 102, 581 P.2d 302 (1978). The rules indicate clearly a general policy to disregard narrow technicalities and to bring about the final determination of justiciable controversies without undue delay. Swan v. Zwahlen, 131 Colo. 184, 280 P.2d 439 (1955). Taking into consideration the general policy of the rules, they should be liberally construed. Swan v. Zwahlen, 131 Colo. 184, 280 P.2d 439 (1955); Crosby v. Kroeger, 138 Colo. 55, 330 P.2d 958 (1958); Roosevelt v. Beau Monde Co., 152 Colo. 567, 384 P.2d 96 (1963); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mt. Power Co., 174 Colo. 309, 486 P.2d 438 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 996, 92 S.Ct. 1245, 31 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1972); Moses v. Moses, 180 Colo. 397, 505 P.2d 1302 (1973). Amendments to pleadings should be granted in accordance with overriding purposes of rules of civil procedure-to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Varner v. District Court, 618 P.2d 1388 (Colo. 1980). Technical errors or defects in proceedings not affecting the substantial rights of parties should be disregarded. Moses v. Moses, 180 Colo. 397, 505 P.2d 1302 (1973). A strict technical application of time requirements is punitive. While unjustified delay in complying with procedural requirements is not condoned, to apply a strict technical application of time requirements appears to be a punitive disposition of the litigation, resulting in an arbitrary denial of substantial justice, contrary to the spirit of the rules of civil procedure. Moses v. Moses, 180 Colo. 397, 505 P.2d 1302 (1973); Semental v. Denver County Court, 978 P.2d 668 (Colo. 1999) (construing substantially similar language in CRCP 501 ). The rules permit a court to deal with a case on the merits and look through form to substance; such was the state of the law in Colorado prior to the adoption of these rules. Waite v. People, 83 Colo. 162, 262 P. 1009 (1928). Although substantive rights are not affected, the rules of civil procedure are procedural, and there is no attempt under them to affect the substantive rights of litigants. Crowley v. Hardman Bros., 122 Colo. 489, 223 P.2d 1045 (1950). Special statutory procedures supersede the Colorado rules of civil procedure and must be followed. In re Oxley, 182 Colo. 206, 513 P.2d 1062 (1973). Language in ยง 37-92-304(3) to be construed with section (a). Section 37-92-304(3) ‘s mandatory language that hearings shall be held where a protest has been filed and on cases of rereferral by a water referee to a water judge must be construed together with section (a) of this rule. In re Bunger v. Uncompahgre Valley Water Users Ass’n, 192 Colo. 159, 557 P.2d 389 (1976). Mental health proceedings are not adversary. Where a proceeding is an inquiry into the mental condition of a defendant who has been committed under a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the proceeding is not an adversary proceeding in the usual sense of a case which is controlled by the rules of civil procedure. People v. District Court, 192 Colo. 225, 557 P.2d 414 (1976). Historically, the supreme court has considered mental health proceedings to be special statutory proceedings. People v. District Court, 192 Colo. 225, 557 P.2d 414 (1976). Juvenile proceedings are governed by the procedural rules contained in the Colorado Children’s Code. People ex rel. M.C.L., 671 P.2d 1339 (Colo. App. 1983). Applied in Senne v. Conley, 110 Colo. 270, 133 P.2d 381 (1943); Berryman v. Berryman, 115 Colo. 281, 172 P.2d 446 (1946); Bridges v. Ingram, 122 Colo. 501, 223 P.2d 1051 (1950); Stalford v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 128 Colo. 441, 263 P.2d 436 (1953); Stull v. District Court, 135 Colo. 86, 308 P.2d 1006 (1957); Graham v. District Court, 137 Colo. 233, 323 P.2d 635 (1958); Sprott v. Roberts, 154 Colo. 252, 390 P.2d 465 (1964); Rasmussen v. Freehling, 159 Colo. 414, 412 P.2d 217 (1966); Greco v. Pullara, 166 Colo. 465, 444 P.2d 383 (1968); In re Blair, 42 Colo. App. 270, 592 P.2d 1354 (1979). III. Effective Date. Applied in Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, 108 Colo. 538, 120 P.2d 641 (1941) (former code of civil procedure effective to April 6, 1941).
For courts and court procedure generally, see title 13, C.R.S. For exemption of certain statutory proceedings from the rules of civil procedure, see C.R.C.P. 81.