This rule sets forth the exclusive process for garnishment. There shall be five (5) types of writs:

Annotation I. General Consideration. Law reviews. For article, “Seizure of Person or Property: Rules 101-104 “, see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 603 (1951). For article, “One Year Review of Civil Procedure and Appeals”, see 39 Dicta 133 (1962). Garnishment is a deprivation of defendant’s property, or right to the use of his property. Bernhardt v. Commodity Option Co., 187 Colo. 89, 528 P.2d 919 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004, 95 S. Ct. 2406, 44 L. Ed. 2d 673 (1975). The whole object of garnishment is to reach effects or credits in the garnishee’s hands, and to subject them to the payment of such judgment as the plaintiff may recover against the defendant. It results necessarily that there can be no judgment against the garnishee until judgment against the defendant shall have been recovered. McPhee v. Gomer, 6 Colo. App. 461, 41 P. 836 (1895). Garnishment is strictly a statutory remedy. Troy Laundry & Mach. Co. v. City & County of Denver, 11 Colo. App. 368, 53 P. 256 (1898); Black v. Plumb, 94 Colo. 318, 29 P.2d 708, 91 A.L.R. 133 (1934). The remedy of garnishment was unknown at common law and exists only by reason of statute or rules of procedure enacted pursuant to statutory authority. Worchester v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 172 Colo. 352, 473 P.2d 711 (1970). Garnishment proceedings cannot be sustained if they go beyond statute. State v. Elkins, 84 Colo. 409, 270 P. 875 (1928). Garnishment proceedings fall under the equity arm of a court, the purpose being to summarily reach ordinarily nonleviable evidences of debt, to prevent the loss or dissipation of such assets, to determine the ownership of such funds, and to provide for the equitable distribution thereof, such being triable by the court and not by a jury. Worchester v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 172 Colo. 352, 473 P.2d 711 (1970); Great Neck Plaza, L.P. v. Le Peep Restaurants, LLC, 37 P.3d 485 (Colo. App. 2001). Writ of garnishment must be specific as to debtor. Berns, Clancy & Associates v. Bank of Boulder, 717 P.2d 1022 (Colo. App. 1986). When garnishment proceeding considered “determined”. A garnishment proceeding may not be considered “determined” until decisions regarding the rights of parties to the action can be made, and nothing but ministerial functions remain to be done. Nolan v. District Court, 195 Colo. 6, 575 P.2d 9 (1978); In re Seay, 97 Bankr. 41 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989 ). Until the time for filing an exemption under § 13-54-106 expires, the garnishment proceedings are not determined. Nolan v. District Court, 195 Colo. 6, 575 P.2d 9 (1978); In re Seay, 97 Bankr. 41 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989 ). This rule has no provision for release of cash. This rule relates to garnishment and has no provision similar to C.R.C.P. 102 for release of cash in the hands of a garnishee. Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Hughes, 367 F.2d 526 (10th Cir. 1966). Attorneys’ fees not permitted in garnishment. Neither this rule nor any other section or rule permits award of attorneys’ fees for the garnishee in a garnishment. Commercial Claims, Ltd. v. First Nat’l Bank, 649 P.2d 736 (Colo. App. 1982). This rule creates an exception to the American rule in garnishment actions; hence, the trial court was authorized to make an award of attorney fees. Hoang v. Monterra Homes (Powderhorn) LLC, 129 P.3d 1028 (Colo. App. 2005), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Hoang v. Assurance Co. of Am., 149 P.3d 798 (Colo. 2007). This rule is not applicable to spendthrift provisions of a will. Brasser v. Hutchison, 37 Colo. App. 528, 549 P.2d 801 (1976). Funds under the control of a trustee subject to spendthrift provisions cannot be garnisheed. Brasser v. Hutchison, 37 Colo. App. 528, 549 P.2d 801 (1976). The intent of congress that social security benefits be exempt from seizure is not undercut or in any way compromised by this rule. Ortiz v. Valdez, 971 P.2d 1076 (Colo. App. 1998). Amendment of answer. Although this section is silent as to whether answers filed to a writ of garnishment may be amended, the guiding principle is that where the adverse party has not changed his position based on the original answer, the court, in its discretion should freely grant amendments. Brown v. Schumann, 40 Colo. App. 336, 575 P.2d 443 (1978). Where the inability to amend would entirely foreclose the requesting party’s case, and where the opposing party could show no prejudice to his case from the proposed amendment (other than the “prejudice” of having the garnishment determined on its merits), and where no prejudice to the court itself was evident from the record, the trial court abuses its discretion in ignoring the garnishee’s amended answer. Brown v. Schumann, 40 Colo. App. 336, 575 P.2d 443 (1978). Pending appellate review does not convert a judgment to a contingent liability or to a debt owing in the future. Shawn v. 1776 Corp., 787 P.2d 183 (Colo. App. 1989). Stay of further garnishment proceedings until garnished judgments were no longer subject to stays of execution is the proper procedure and fully protects the interests of both garnishee and garnishor. Shawn v. 1776 Corp., 787 P.2d 183 (Colo. App. 1989). A liability is not contingent merely because the garnishee disputes whether it breached its contract with the debtor. Walk-In Med. Centers, Inc. v. Breuer Capital Corp., 778 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Colo. 1991). Unless a notice of garnishment properly runs with an accurate and sufficiently specific description against the individual to whom the garnishee may be indebted, a garnishee is totally unaffected by the notice served upon him. Anderson Boneless Beef v. Sunshine Health Care Center, Inc., 852 P.2d 1340 (Colo. App. 1993). Applied in Stone v. Chapels for Meditation, Inc., 33 Colo. App. 346, 519 P.2d 1233 (1974). II. Provisions Applicable to All Forms of Garnishments. A. When Writ Issues. Annotator’s note. Since section (b) of this rule was similar to § 129 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was supplanted by the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, relevant cases construing that section have been included in the annotations to this rule. Before the turn of the century it was impossible to seize a debt owed by a nonresident garnishee to a principal defendant where the court had no jurisdiction over the situs of the debt. Garrett v. Garrett, 30 Colo. App. 167, 490 P.2d 313 (1971). Under the present rule for garnishment, a court has jurisdiction for garnishment of a debt upon obtaining jurisdiction over the garnishee. Garrett v. Garrett, 30 Colo. App. 167, 490 P.2d 313 (1971). Writ of garnishment can only be issued after issuance of a writ of attachment. Bernhardt v. Commodity Option Co., 187 Colo. 89, 528 P.2d 919 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004, 95 S. Ct. 2406, 44 L. Ed. 2d 673 (1975). However, a proceeding by garnishment, though an independent suit, is auxiliary to the main suit. McPhee v. Gomer, 6 Colo. App. 461, 41 P. 836 (1895). A judgment is hypothetical when taken in advance of a judgment in the main suit, as it is dependent upon a judgment subsequently obtained. McPhee v. Gomer, 6 Colo. App. 461, 41 P. 836 (1895). The issuance of a post-judgment writ of garnishment without a writ of execution is one alternative authorized by C.R.C.P. 69(a). Warner/Elektra/Atlantic Corp. v. B & R Record & Tape Merchandisers, Inc., 40 Colo. App. 179, 570 P.2d 1320 (1977). When the creditor and debtor have already participated in a complete hearing on the merits of the debt, as is the case with post-judgment garnishment, there is no due process advantage to be gained by forcing the garnishor to file an additional writ. Warner/Elektra/Atlantic Corp. v. B & R Record & Tape Merchandisers, Inc., 40 Colo. App. 179, 570 P.2d 1320 (1977). When the principal judgment has been obtained, the validity of the judgment against the garnishee depends upon the validity of the judgment against the defendant. McPhee v. Gomer, 6 Colo. App. 461, 41 P. 836 (1895). Without jurisdiction of the defendant and a judgment against him, a judgment against the garnishee is void, and its payment will not protect the garnishee. McPhee v. Gomer, 6 Colo. App. 461, 41 P. 836 (1895). Garnishment is proper only after a valid judgment has been entered. W. Med. Prop. Corp. v. Denver Opportunity, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1980). If the debtor could bring an immediate action to recover the debt from the garnishee, then the debt is due and payable within the meaning of the rule. Martinez v. Dixon, 710 P.2d 498 (Colo. App. 1985); Flanders Elec. v. Davall Controls & Eng., 831 P.2d 492 (Colo. App. 1992). In the absence of statute, if the assessment or demand has not been previously made in accordance with law, the garnishee is not liable. Universal Fire Ins. Co. v. Tabor, 16 Colo. 531, 27 P. 890 (1891). Garnishee cannot be placed in a worse position than if defendant enforced his own claim. In the absence of fraud between defendant and a garnishee, the latter cannot be placed, through garnishment proceedings, in a worse position than if defendant’s claim were enforced by defendant himself. Universal Fire Ins. Co. v. Tabor, 16 Colo. 531, 27 P. 890 (1891). Writ of garnishment impounds all moneys held by garnishee and owing to the judgment debtor as of the date the writ is served. Graybar Elec. Co. v. Watkins Elec. Co., 626 P.2d 1157 (Colo. App. 1980), rev’d on other grounds, 662 P.2d 1064 (Colo. 1983). The trial court obtains jurisdiction over all the monies held by garnishee which are owing to the judgment debtor on the date of the service of the writ of garnishment. Martinez v. Dixon, 710 P.2d 498 (Colo. App. 1985). A sheriff is not required to make diligent search for other property of defendant before writ may issue. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Lednum, 82 Colo. 472, 260 P. 1017 (1927). An indebtedness only can be made the subject of garnishment, and, in order that a liability may be an indebtedness within the meaning of the law, it must arise out of contract. Lewis v. City & County of Denver, 9 Colo. App. 328, 48 P. 317 (1897). Garnishment applies only to contracts and not to tort actions. The controlling characteristic of the remedy by garnishment is that the liability of the garnishee must originate in, and be dependent on, contract. A right of action for a tort is not, therefore, the subject of garnishment in most jurisdictions. A claim in tort, not reduced to judgment, is not a debt within the meaning of the statutes in reference to garnishment. And the rule is the same where as between the tortfeasor and the person to whom the wrong was done the latter might at his option either hold the tortfeasor to his liability in tort, or, waiving the tort, treat him as his debtor, since the creditor of the wronged person is not at liberty to exercise this option in his place and so evade the general rule as to garnishment of claims in tort by substituting therefor a liquidated claim “quasi ex contractu”. Black v. Plumb, 94 Colo. 318, 29 P.2d 708 (1934). A court should dismiss the action when it appears beyond question that the action sounds in tort. Donald Co. v. Dubinsky, 74 Colo. 128, 219 P. 209 (1923); Black v. Plumb, 94 Colo. 318, 29 P.2d 708 (1934). A tort claim cannot be adjudicated in a garnishment procedure, for to do so compels the garnishee to enter into combat with an adversary other than its own and do battle with one who had never had any contract relation with him. Steen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 157 Colo. 99, 401 P.2d 254 (1965). Since there is nothing in an insurance policy, either expressly or impliedly, making a garnisher privity in contract with an insured, a stranger to the insurance policy involved, as a garnisher, can have no claim against the company, as garnishee, unless and until such transpires. Steen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 157 Colo. 99, 401 P.2d 254 (1965). Where one, for a valuable consideration, has assumed the obligation of another, he may be held liable as garnishee, and it is not necessary that the garnishee hold tangible real or personal property of the debtor, for the assumption of the debts of another when in proper form is a right, credit, or chose in action required to be reported in garnishment proceedings. Field Family Constr. Co. v. Ryan, 145 Colo. 598, 360 P.2d 110 (1961). A widow’s allowance is subject to garnishment. Isbell-Kent-Oakes Dry Goods Co. v. Larimer County Bank & Trust Co., 75 Colo. 451, 226 P. 293 (1924). A plaintiff in garnishment does not stand in the position of a purchaser in good faith and for value, but is in no better position than a purchaser or assignee with notice. Collins v. Thuringer, 92 Colo. 433, 21 P.2d 709 (1933). A garnishment proceeding cannot displace prior valid and bona fide existing right and claims against the debt or property involved. Collins v. Thuringer, 92 Colo. 433, 21 P.2d 709 (1933). For example, an attorney’s lien is prior and superior to any right acquired by a plaintiff in such proceedings. Collins v. Thuringer, 92 Colo. 433, 21 P.2d 709 (1933). Garnishment under executions is properly subordinated to garnishment under writs of attachment theretofore served on the same creditor, although the latter are, as a precautionary measure, again served on the same date as that issued under the writ of execution. Larimer County Bank & Trust Co. v. Colo. Rubber Co., 79 Colo. 4, 243 P. 622 (1926). A creditor accepting provisions of assignment cannot reach funds of sale through garnishment. If a creditor accepts, and acts under, the provisions of an assignment for the benefit of creditors, he may not thereafter repudiate his acceptance and claim property in the hands of the trustee for the satisfaction of his debt or reach funds derived from the sale thereof by proceedings in garnishment. McMullin v. Keogh-Doyle Meat Co., 96 Colo. 298, 42 P.2d 463 (1935). Contingent liabilities are not garnishable. Flanders Elec. v. Davall Controls & Eng., 831 P.2d 492 (Colo. App. 1992). B. Service of Writ. Annotator’s note. Since section (c) of the prior version of this rule was similar to § 130 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was supplanted by the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, relevant cases construing that section have been included in the annotations to this rule. Creditor must proceed in state where employment services rendered. The state in which services were rendered and in which the employer and employee reside is the situs of a chose and action for wages, and a creditor of the employee, who would reach the fund by garnishment, must proceed in that state. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Maggard, 6 Colo. App. 85, 39 P. 985 (1895). The fact that the employer is a railroad company operating a line through different states does not change this rule. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Maggard, 6 Colo. App. 85, 39 P. 985 (1895). Where an order for a widow’s allowance and service of garnishment summons affecting the same are made on the same day, they are presumptively at the same time. Isbell-Kent-Oakes Dry Goods Co. v. Larimer County Bank & Trust Co., 75 Colo. 451, 226 P. 293 (1924). Content of summons not prescribed. This section contains no provision that the court set forth any particular matters in the summons. Security State Bank v. Weingardt, 42 Colo. App. 219, 597 P.2d 1045 (1979). Writ of garnishment served upon garnishee is insufficient if it fails to provide due process notice that a judgment could be entered against the garnishee based solely upon amount of judgment previously entered if garnishee fails to respond. Don J. Best Trust v. Cherry Creek Nat. Bank, 792 P.2d 303 (Colo. App. 1990). A writ of garnishment pursuant to this rule and C.R.C.P. 403 provides a judgment creditor with an efficient mechanism for garnishing property to satisfy a proper judgment, provides the judgment debtor with an expedited procedure to protect his or her exempt property, and affords the judgment debtor significantly more process than is required by the United States and Colorado Constitutions. Ortiz v. Valdez, 971 P.2d 1076 (Colo. App. 1998). C. Jurisdiction. Garnishment cannot be extended by construction to cases which are not within both its letter and spirit, although it is true that the garnishment statutes of Colorado specifically require that they shall be liberally construed so as to promote their objects. This applies, however, only to the enforcement of the remedy after jurisdiction has attached; it does not permit courts to enlarge or extend by implication the scope of the statutes, so as to bring within their jurisdiction any cases except those to which the statutes manifestly and clearly apply. As to this, the rule of strict construction prevails, the statutes being in derogation of the common law. Troy Laundry & Mach. Co. v. City & County of Denver, 11 Colo. App. 368, 53 P. 256 (1898); Black v. Plumb, 94 Colo. 318, 29 P.2d 708 (1934). Where a garnishee is doing business within Colorado, service of a writ of garnishment upon it at its place of business properly brings it within the jurisdiction of the court in a garnishment proceeding. Garrett v. Garrett, 30 Colo. App. 167, 490 P.2d 313 (1971). Where it is claimed that the court does not have jurisdiction, but there was a judgment and execution in the main cause, regularly obtained, a return of the writ of garnishment, showing due service, gives the court jurisdiction over the garnishee. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Lednum, 82 Colo. 472, 260 P. 1017 (1927) (decided under § 135 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was replaced by the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941). A garnishment can reach only such property as belongs to the debtor. Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Moore, 93 Colo. 151, 25 P.2d 180 (1933); People ex rel. J.W., 174 P.3d 315 (Colo. App. 2007). This rule shows an intent that every sort of interest of the debtor might be garnished. Bank of Grand Junction v. Bank of Vernal, 81 Colo. 483, 256 P. 660 (1927). The assertion by a garnishee of a jurisdictional defense to a judgment for which he is sought to be held is not a collateral but a direct attack upon the judgment. Tabor v. Bank of Leadville, 35 Colo. 1, 83 P. 1060 (1905). Dormancy of judgment in foreign state does not defeat rights of creditor under this rule. Ryan v. Duffield, 899 P.2d 378 (Colo. App. 1995). Rather than reviving a judgment lien obtained in a foreign state and subsequently recorded in Colorado, garnishments created new and separate liens against the estate of the judgment debtor. Further, the garnishments were not an effort by the judgment creditor to maintain an action in Colorado that could not be maintained in the foreign state, but instead were ancillary to the judgment previously obtained. Ryan v. Duffield, 899 P.2d 378 (Colo. App. 1995). D. Objection of Judgment Debtor – Exemptions. Law reviews. For note, “A Discussion of Garnishment and Its Exemptions”, see 27 Dicta 453 (1950). Absence of a creditor-debtor relationship between judgment debtor and garnishee and the existence of an agreement between such parties which specifically negated garnishee’s assumption of any of judgment debtor’s liability precluded judgment creditors’ proceeding against garnishee. Coin Serv. Investors, Inc. v. Grooms, 743 P.2d 42 (Colo. App. 1987). Garnishee is entitled to an evidentiary hearing concerning the validity of the garnished debt in order to afford due process to the garnishee. Maddalone v. C.D.C., Inc., 765 P.2d 1047 (Colo. App. 1988). Failure to comply with a court order does not supercede requirement to set a hearing. The court may not sanction a party for his or her failure to comply with a court order by refusing to set a hearing on an objection or claim of exemption. The setting of a hearing is mandatory, not discretionary. Borrayo v. Lefever, 159 P.3d 657 (Colo. App. 2006). Husband in post-dissolution garnishment proceeding received a proper hearing under subsection 6(c)(4) where trial court conducted a timely and thorough hearing at which it heard argument and received evidence in the form of exhibits from the interested parties and at which the husband’s counsel neither requested the opportunity to call witnesses nor objected to the proceeding. In re Gedgaudas, 978 P.2d 677 (Colo. App. 1999). E. Answer. A garnishee’s answer is made with reference to the facts existing at the time of the service of a writ of garnishment. Bragdon v. Bradt, 16 Colo. App. 65, 64 P. 248 (1901). If, at that time, the garnishee owes the defendant a debt, or has personal property of the defendant in his possession or under his control, he must so answer and abide the judgment of a court. Bragdon v. Bradt, 16 Colo. App. 65, 64 P. 248 (1901). If, at that time, he is not indebted to the defendant, or has not in his possession or under his control, any property of the defendant, he is entitled to a discharge. Bragdon v. Bradt, 16 Colo. App. 65, 64 P. 248 (1901). Garnishee is not answerable for effects of the defendant coming into his hands, or indebtedness accruing from him to the defendant, after the garnishment. Bragdon v. Bradt, 16 Colo. App. 65, 64 P. 248 (1901). It is only where the answer of a garnishee shows that he is indebted to the defendant, has personal property in his possession or under his control belonging to the defendant, or where his answer denying indebtedness to the defendant or possession of his property is successfully controverted that a judgment against him is lawful. Bragdon v. Bradt, 16 Colo. App. 65, 64 P. 248 (1901). In order to charge him upon his answer, it must contain a clear admission of a debt due to, or the possession of attachable property of the defendant. Bragdon v. Bradt, 16 Colo. App. 65, 64 P. 248 (1901). Where his answer is a substantial denial of indebtedness, or possession of attachable property belonging to the defendant, he is entitled to a judgment of discharge, unless the force of the denial is overcome by other statements in the answer or unless the answer is shown to be untrue. Bragdon v. Bradt, 16 Colo. App. 65, 64 P. 248 (1901). A delivery by the garnishee to the sheriff can be ordered only where the answer admits possession in the garnishee of property belonging to the defendant or where, upon a trial of issue joined upon the answer, such possession is found. Bragdon v. Bradt, 16 Colo. App. 65, 64 P. 248 (1901). “Supplemental answer” held no answer at all where time to answer exhausted. Bragdon v. Bradt, 16 Colo. App. 65, 64 P. 248 (1901). Note properly turned over to sheriff. Where a note in the hands of a garnishee is held pending the result of litigation on final determination of which the note inures to the benefit of the judgment creditor, it is properly turned over to the sheriff with the order that he make disposition of it in the manner required by law. Union Deposit Co. v. Driscoll, 95 Colo. 140, 33 P.2d 251 (1934). A contingent liability is not garnishable. When a garnishee alleges a contingent liability in his answer to the writ of garnishment, the proper procedure is to allow the garnishor to traverse the garnishee’s answer, followed by a trial on the issues framed. Haselden Langley Constructors, Inc. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 662 P.2d 1064 (Colo. 1983). Payment to creditor’s attorneys is payment to creditor. Where money is deposited in court by the garnishee in garnishment proceedings, payment of the fund to attorneys for the garnisheeing creditor is payment to the creditor, and an order to repay part of the fund is proper. Hahnewald v. Schlapfer, 82 Colo. 313, 260 P. 105 (1927). Default for failure of garnishee “to answer or pay” only applies if guarnishee fails to answer or pay any nonexempt earnings. People ex rel. J.W., 174 P.3d 315 (Colo. App. 2007). F. Traverse of Answer. Annotator’s note. Since sections (m) and (n) of the prior version of this rule were similar to §§ 144 and 145 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was supplanted by the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, relevant cases construing those sections have been included in the annotations to this rule. Previously, an order denying a motion to discharge a garnishee for failure of plaintiff to traverse answer of garnishee within required period was not appealable as a “final judgment, decree or order” where no final judgment was entered and garnishee specifically saved right to further challenge court’s jurisdiction and nothing in record indicated that court had passed on garnishee’s answer. Steel v. Revielle, 102 Colo. 271, 78 P.2d 980 (1938). Still garnishee cannot take advantage of his own delay. A garnishee, by its own delay having made it impossible for the plaintiff to file the traverse within the time allowed by this section, is in no position to complain, since he cannot take advantage of a situation brought about by his own neglect. Stollins v. Shideler, 91 Colo. 40, 11 P.2d 562 (1932). A traverse stating only conclusions of law and not facts is insufficient. Day v. Bank of Del Norte, 76 Colo. 223, 230 P. 785 (1924). The answer of the garnishee and the traverse of the plaintiffs are the only pleadings provided by this rule, and make up the issues in garnishment proceedings. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Mitchell, 120 Colo. 531, 211 P.2d 551 (1949). Any new matter pleaded in the traverse is deemed to be denied or avoided. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Mitchell, 120 Colo. 531, 211 P.2d 551 (1949). Where the garnishee has no opportunity to plead to a reply without further pleading, he can avail himself of any defense he might have to the new matter set up in the affidavit. Jones v. Langhorne, 19 Colo. 206, 34 P. 997 (1893). A partner may set up nonjoinder of copartner as a defense. Where a partner is sued individually for a firm debt he is usually required to plead the nonjoinder of his copartners in order that he may avail himself of this defense, but this general rule has no application to garnishment proceedings under this rule. Jones v. Langhorne, 19 Colo. 206, 34 P. 997 (1893). Subsection 8(b)(5) provides authority pursuant to § 13-16-122(1)(h) to make an award of attorney fees making § 13-17-101 et seq. inapplicable. United Bank v. State Treasurer, 797 P.2d 851 (Colo. App. 1990). An award of attorney fees under this rule is at the trial court’s discretion. United Guar. Residential Ins. Co. v. Dimmick, 916 P.2d 638 (Colo. App. 1996). G. Intervention. Annotator’s note. Since section 9 of this rule is similar to § 146 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was supplanted by the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, relevant cases construing that section have been included in the annotations to this rule. This section 9 is not mandatory, and thus, one asserting rights to property which is the subject of garnishment proceedings is free to ignore those garnishment proceedings and file an independent action to enforce those rights. El Paso County Bank v. Charles R. Milisen & Co., 622 P.2d 594 (Colo. App. 1980). In garnishment proceedings, intervention is governed by this rule which provides that a party shall proceed in accordance with C.R.C.P. 24. Capitol Indus. Bank v. Strain, 166 Colo. 55, 442 P.2d 187 (1968). Allegations of the petition in intervention held sufficient to make out a prima facie case for intervening assignee. Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Moore, 93 Colo. 151, 25 P.2d 180 (1933). With denial of right of intervention constituting reversible error. Where, in a garnishment proceeding, a third party files a petition in intervention claiming the property involved, he is entitled to have his claim tried and determined, and a denial of that right constitutes reversible error. Burnett v. Jeffers, 88 Colo. 613, 299 P. 18 (1931). Where in due time. Where the intervention is before the judgment against the garnishee and it cannot be said that the garnishment proceedings have then been determined, the intervention, therefore, is in due time. Hahnewald v. Schlapfer, 82 Colo. 313, 260 P. 105 (1927). It is error for a trial court to quash a garnishment where the writ of garnishment is issued in accordance with this rule and the answer and return of the garnishee are made within the time prescribed by rule when the regularity of the garnishment proceeding is not attacked and a motion to quash is based wholly upon a claimed right to intervene; but the intervenor tacitly recognizes the validity of the proceedings by having filed its motion to intervene therein. Capitol Indus. Bank v. Strain, 166 Colo. 55, 442 P.2d 187 (1968). An intervention by definition involves third parties, and such strangers to the original garnishment proceeding, by asserting ownership of the disputed property, necessarily put their ownership status, and all related questions, at issue. Great Neck Plaza, L.P. v. Le Peep Restaurants, 37 P.3d 485 (Colo. App. 2001). Applied in Susman v. Exchange Nat’l Bank, 117 Colo. 12, 183 P.2d 571 (1947). H. Set-off. Law reviews. For article, “Setoff and Security Interests In Deposit Accounts”, see 17 Colo. Law. 2108 (1988). Annotator’s note. Since section (p) of the prior version of this rule was similar to § 147 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was supplanted by the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, relevant cases construing that section have been included in the annotations to this rule. By this section a garnishee is allowed to retain or deduct out of the property or credits of the defendant in his hands all demands against the defendant of which he could have availed himself had he not been summoned as garnishee. Tabor v. Bank of Leadville, 35 Colo. 1, 83 P. 1060 (1905). Garnishee may plead as a defense or set-off whatever he might have pleaded were the suit directly against him by his own creditor. Sauer v. Town of Nevadaville, 14 Colo. 54, 23 P. 87 (1890); Tabor v. Bank of Leadville, 35 Colo. 1, 83 P. 1060 (1905). Garnishee is not to be placed in a worse position. Under no circumstances shall a garnishee, by the operation of the proceedings against him, be placed in any worse condition than he would be if the defendant’s claim against him were enforced by the defendant himself. Tabor v. Bank of Leadville, 35 Colo. 1, 83 P. 1060 (1905); Day v. Bank of Del Norte, 76 Colo. 223, 230 P. 785 (1924). Bank receiver was entitled to set-off compensation due him. Where an attempt is made in a garnishment proceeding to make a bank receiver liable for a judgment against the bank, such receiver is entitled to plead as a defense or set-off the compensation due him by the bank even though his appointment as such was void. Tabor v. Bank of Leadville, 35 Colo. 1, 83 P. 1060 (1905). A garnisheed bank may apply the amount on deposit to the credit of a debtor to the payment of his note to it although not due. Day v. Bank of Del Norte, 76 Colo. 223, 230 P. 785 (1924). Agreement after service of writ would be void. An agreement by a garnishee to apply upon or deduct from credits of the defendant in his possession, a loan made by him to the defendant after service of the writ would be void and could not be enforced by any party thereto. Day v. Bank of Del Norte, 76 Colo. 223, 230 P. 785 (1924). Garnishee bank is entitled to claim set-off against debtor’s account for moneys owed to bank even though moneys were not due at time of service of writ of garnishment. Colo. Nat. Bank – Arvada v. Greaney, 720 P.2d 611 (Colo. App. 1986). Landlord’s lien. A lease may create a valid landlord’s lien, enforceable under section 8 of this rule as a set-off. Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Bach, 665 P.2d 1034 (Colo. App. 1983). The rights and liabilities of a garnishee are to be determined as of the date of the garnishment and not upon a state of facts that existed theretofore or thereafter. Day v. Bank of Del Norte, 76 Colo. 223, 230 P. 785 (1924). It is unreasonable to require a garnishee to claim a set-off immediately upon service of the writ of garnishment; the more reasonable approach allows a garnishee the same time period to claim set-off as allowed to file its answers to the garnishment interrogatories. Colo. Nat. Bank – Arvada v. Greaney, 720 P.2d 611 (Colo. App. 1986); Flanders Elec. v. Davall Controls & Eng., 831 P.2d 492 (Colo. App. 1992). It is the responsibility of the trial court to determine the amounts and reasonableness of set-offs, and, absent an abuse of discretion, its decision will not be overturned. Flanders Elec. v. Davall Controls & Eng., 831 P.2d 492 (Colo. App. 1992). Law firm had statutory charging lien on settlement proceeds. State’s lien for child support did not have priority over charging lien. State was entitled to net settlement proceeds after deduction of attorney fees. A garnishment can only reach property that belongs to the debtor. People ex rel. J.W., 174 P.3d 315 (Colo. App. 2007). I. Claims of Third Persons. Annotator’s note. Since section (i) and (j) of the prior version of this rule were similar to §§ 138 and 141 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was supplanted by the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, relevant cases construing these sections have been included in the annotations to this rule. This section puts burden on claimant not only to assert an interest in the property but also to establish the extent of his interest. Security State Bank v. Weingardt, 42 Colo. App. 219, 597 P.2d 1045 (1979). When a garnishee in his answer states that a third party claims property in his possession belonging to the debtor, it is the duty of the court to issue a citation or summons to said party requiring him to appear and set up his claim. Burnett v. Jeffers, 88 Colo. 613, 299 P. 18 (1931). However, this rule refers to answers in good faith, so if a garnishee knows the truth he must tell it and if he tells a falsehood, at least if he tells it for a fraudulent purpose, he must pay damages. International State Bank v. Trinidad Bean & Elevator Co., 79 Colo. 286, 245 P. 489 (1926). Payment to one other than judgment debtor held improper. Where garnishee-defendant, after answering writ of garnishment, discovers that a contract between it and judgment debtor requires that payments be made jointly to debtor and another, the garnishee-defendant then pays the latter part of the sum which it admitted in its answer was due and owing the judgment debtor, and he files an amended answer to that effect, such payment is improper without a release of garnishment or order of court. Welbourne Dev. Co. v. Affiliated Clearance Corp., 28 Colo. App. 313, 472 P.2d 684 (1970). It is not essential that notice of an assignment be given in advance to a garnishee, although in the absence of knowledge or notice the latter would be protected against double payment. Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Moore, 93 Colo. 151, 25 P.2d 180 (1933). If, during the pendency of garnishment proceedings, it is established that an assignment of the subject-matter antedating the garnishment was actually executed, the absence of previous notice to the garnishee would be immaterial, and a judgment creditor would not be entitled to notice as such. Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Moore, 93 Colo. 151, 25 P.2d 180 (1933). A creditor is entitled to a fund owing defendant by his employer as against the claims of another creditor of which he had no notice where the claims of which said other creditor are not based on a contract sufficient to bind the fund. This being determined, then the only further action within the jurisdiction of the trial court is, on application, to order a judgment against the employer in favor of the defendant for the use of the plaintiff pursuant to the terms of this section. Meyer v. Delta Market, 98 Colo. 421, 57 P.2d 3 (1936). Once a third-party claimant has conceded that the disputed property may be garnished by a creditor, the claimant is thereafter estopped from claiming the proceeds of the garnishment unless there is an agreement otherwise. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Goldberg, 893 F.2d 1139 (10th Cir. 1990). Applied in Susman v. Exchange Nat’l Bank, 117 Colo. 12, 183 P.2d 571 (1947). J. Release and Discharge. A judgment in the principal proceeding is presumptively valid while lodged in an appellate court for review. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Bonebrake, 137 Colo. 37, 320 P.2d 975 (1958). Such judgment when not superseded by virtue of a failure to furnish the required bond leaves a judgment creditor in the position to take usual steps to enforce collection of his judgment, precisely as if supersedeas has not been granted. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Bonebrake, 137 Colo. 37, 320 P.2d 975 (1958). The reversal of a judgment upon which a garnishment is based leaves nothing to sustain the judgment against the garnishee. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Bonebrake, 137 Colo. 37, 320 P.2d 975 (1958). If the original judgment is reversed, a judgment in garnishment is deprived of a basis and falls with it. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Bonebrake, 137 Colo. 37, 320 P.2d 975 (1958). The existence of a valid judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to garnishment relief. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Bonebrake, 137 Colo. 37, 320 P.2d 975 (1958). Where the judgment in the main case has been reversed, then, if it is made the basis of a garnishment, it must follow that a judgment in the garnishment proceeding cannot stand alone and must be reversed. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Bonebrake, 137 Colo. 37, 320 P.2d 975 (1958). Since garnishee’s liability is not established. Where the case which found garnishee’s liability is reversed and remanded for new trial, the garnishee’s liability is not established, and garnishment should be vacated. Mitchell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 179 Colo. 372, 502 P.2d 79 (1972). Applied in E.I. Du Pont De NeMours & Co. v. Lednum, 82 Colo. 472, 260 P. 1017 (1927). K. Disbursement of Funds. Court approval not required. Subsection 2(h) requires the clerk to disburse funds to the judgment creditor without further application or order. The fact that the judgment debtor had applied for a stay had no effect on the clerk’s authority to release the garnished funds. Ryan v. Duffield, 899 P.2d 378 (Colo. App. 1995). III. Specific Forms of Garnishment. Law reviews. For article, “The Nuts and Bolts of Collecting Support”, see 19 Colo. Law. 1595 (1990). Past-due child support payments in themselves constitute debt. Colo. State Bank v. Utt, 622 P.2d 584 (Colo. App. 1980). Amount defendant admittedly owed for past-due child support may be garnished by bank which held judgment against former wife. Colo. State Bank v. Utt, 622 P.2d 584 (Colo. App. 1980). Foreclosure sale excess proceeds may be garnished. TCF Equip. Fin. v. Pub. Trustee, 2013 COA 8, 297 P.3d 1048. Law firm had statutory charging lien on settlement proceeds. State’s lien for child support did not have priority over charging lien. State was entitled to net settlement proceeds after deduction of attorney fees. A garnishment can only reach property that belongs to the debtor. People ex rel. J.W., 174 P.3d 315 (Colo. App. 2007). C.R.C.P. 102, this rule, and § 4-8-112 may be harmonized so that stock certificates may be reached by a creditor either by actual physical seizure, by a writ of attachment, if actually seized, or by serving the person who possesses the certificate with a writ of garnishment. Moreland v. Alpert, 124 P.3d 896 (Colo. App. 2005).

For the minimum amount upon which garnishment shall issue, see § 13-52-108 , C.R.S.; for group life insurance policy being exempt from garnishment, see § 10-7-205 , C.R.S.; for provisions concerning service of process, see C.R.C.P. 4(e); for presentation of defenses, see C.R.C.P. 12; for intervention, see C.R.C.P. 24.