Annotation Law reviews. For article, “Pleadings, Rules 7 to 25 “, see 28 Dicta 368 (1951). For article, “Pleadings and Motions: Rules 7-16 “, see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 542 (1951). For article, “Standard Pleading Samples to Be Used in Quiet Title Litigation”, see 30 Dicta 39 (1953). For article “Van Cise on Rule Eleven”, see 31 Dicta 14 (1954). For note, “One Year Review of Colorado Law-1964”, see 42 Den. L. Ctr. J. 140 (1965). For article, “Rule 11 as a Litigation Tool”, see 12 Colo. Law. 1242 (1983). For article, “Lawyers’ Liability for Attorney’s Fees Awarded Against Clients”, see 12 Colo. Law. 1638 (1983). For article, “The Expanding Liability of Colorado Lawyers for Sanctions and Malpractice Claims”, see 22 Colo. Law. 1701 (1993). For article, “Recovery of Attorney Fees and Costs in Colorado”, see 23 Colo. Law. 2041 (1994). For article, “Discrete Task Representation a/k/a Unbundled Legal Services”, see 29 Colo. Law. 5 (January 2000). For article, “Combating Bad-Faith Litigation Tactics With Claims for Abuse of Process”, see 38 Colo. Law. 31 (December 2009). Annotator’s note. For cases construing verification of pleadings as required by § 67 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was supplanted by this rule in 1941, see Martin v. Hazzard Powder Co., 2 Colo. 596 (1875); Nichols v. Jones, 14 Colo. 61, 23 P. 89 (1890); Speer v. Craig, 16 Colo. 478, 27 P. 891 (1891); Tulloch v. Belleville Pump & Skein Works, 17 Colo. 579, 31 P. 229 (1892); Perras v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 5 Colo. App. 21, 36 P. 637 (1894); Hill Brick & Tile Co. v. Gibson, 43 Colo. 104, 95 P. 293 (1908); Rice v. Van Why, 49 Colo. 7, 111 P. 599 (1910); Johnson v. Johnson, 78 Colo. 187, 240 P. 944 (1925); Prince Hall Grand Lodge v. Hiram Grand Lodge, 86 Colo. 330, 282 P. 193 (1929). For cases construing § 66 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was supplanted in part by this rule in 1941, concerning sham answers, see Glenn v. Brush, 3 Colo. 26 (1876); Rhodes v. Hutchins, 10 Colo. 258, 15 P. 329 (1887); Patrick v. McManus, 14 Colo. 65, 23 P. 90 (1890); Johnson v. Tabor, 4 Colo. App. 183, 35 P. 199 (1893); Cochrane v. Parker, 5 Colo. App. 527, 39 P. 361 (1895); Sylvester v. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 21 Colo. App. 464, 122 P. 62 (1912); Eastenes v. Adams, 93 Colo. 258, 25 P.2d 741 (1933); Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Sys. v. Doak, 94 Colo. 200, 29 P.2d 625 (1934); Greagor v. Wilson, 103 Colo. 329, 86 P.2d 265 (1938). The rule imposes the following independent duties on an attorney or litigant who signs a pleading: (1) Before a pleading is filed, there must be a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law; (2) based on this investigation, the signer must reasonably believe that the pleading is well grounded in fact; (3) the legal theory asserted in the pleading must be based on existing legal principles or a good faith argument for the modification of existing law; and (4) the pleading must not be filed for the purpose of causing delay, harassment, or an increase in the cost of litigation. Maul v. Shaw, 843 P.2d 139 (Colo. App. 1992). The standard established by this rule focuses on what should have been done before a pleading was filed, and trial court’s award of attorney fees to person wrongfully sued, even though the case was dismissed, was not abuse of discretion where the plaintiffs were not prevented from conducting additional investigation to establish whether they were suing the correct party. Switzer v. Giron, 852 P.2d 1320 (Colo. App. 1993). Sanction under this rule can be imposed only, as the rule itself states, if a pleading is signed in violation of the rule and not on the basis of any post-signing, post-filing conduct by the attorney. SRS, Inc. v. Southward, 2012 COA 19, 272 P.3d 1179. Inquiry under section (a) of this rule does not turn on the outcome of the case; instead, it turns on whether attorney met the reasonable inquiry and proper purpose threshold in preparing and signing the pleading. The rule’s explicit application to the signing attorney or pro se party signing the pleading is clear and unambiguous. While pleadings may identify other attorneys who may have had some role in the case, the signature requirement is designed to hold only the signing attorney responsible for the required certification. If more than one attorney signs a pleading, each one who has signed the pleading is responsible for the certification. People v. Trupp, 51 P.3d 985 (Colo. 2002). Section (a) requires a signature and holds the signing attorney responsible for the certificate. Certification by signature requirement vindicates rule’s purpose: To deter the filing of frivolous actions and pleadings. It personalizes the responsibility of the person who has undertaken to certify the pleading. Here, only the attorney who signed complaint and amended complaint at issue is answerable to the motion for sanctions. Presiding disciplinary judge erred by ordering attorney whose name appeared in the signature block on both pleadings, but who did not sign either of the pleadings, to respond to motion for sanctions. People v. Trupp, 51 P.3d 985 (Colo. 2002). Abuse of discretion for presiding disciplinary judge to hold that assistant attorney regulation counsel violated rule when she advanced claim that attorney had violated C.R.P.C. 8.4(c). No evidence that assistant attorney regulation counsel failed to investigate either the facts or the law and she did not misrepresent them in the complaint. People v. Trupp, 92 P.3d 923 (Colo. 2004). Compliance with this rule should be had in all pleadings. Lewis v. Buckskin Joe’s, Inc., 156 Colo. 46, 396 P.2d 933 (1964). Even though C.R.P.C. 1.2(c) allows unbundling of legal services, an attorney remains obligated to comply with section (b) of this rule. In re Merriam, 250 Bankr. 724 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000 ). This rule is applicable to motions and other papers pursuant to C.R.C.P. 7(b)(2), and sanctions may be imposed for violation. An attorney or litigant who signs a motion or other paper has the same obligation as the signer of a pleading to ensure that the document is factually and legally justified. Jensen v. Matthews-Price, 845 P.2d 542 (Colo. App. 1992). Sanctions are improper where allegations set forth in response brief were based on statements made during witness’ deposition. Jensen v. Matthews-Price, 845 P.2d 542 (Colo. App. 1992). Trial court abused its discretion when, as a sanction for filing a disclosure certificate signed by plaintiff’s former attorney’s paralegal rather than the plaintiff herself, the court limited the witnesses the plaintiff could call to the defendant and herself. Defendants did not suffer any prejudice as a result of the improper signing of the certificate since the filing served its purpose of timely informing them of the evidence plaintiff intended to present at trial. Keith v. Valdez, 934 P.2d 897 (Colo. App. 1997). This rule contemplates an answer that speaks the truth. Lewis v. Buckskin Joe’s, Inc., 156 Colo. 46, 396 P.2d 933 (1964). Where none of the specific denials has any foundation in fact, a general denial should not be filed. Lewis v. Buckskin Joe’s, Inc., 156 Colo. 46, 396 P.2d 933 (1964). This rule grants authority for subjecting an attorney to appropriate disciplinary action. Nelson v. District Court, 136 Colo. 467, 320 P.2d 959 (1957). Court may impose appropriate sanctions for violation of rule, including reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleadings. Schmidt Const. Co. v. Becker-Johnson Corp., 817 P.2d 625 (Colo. App. 1991). Assessment of costs should await final judgment and become a part thereof, thus subject to review. Nelson v. District Court, 136 Colo. 467, 320 P.2d 959 (1957). To warrant the trial court’s exercise of discretion in ordering sanctions against a client under the rule, the trial court must find and the record must confirm some nexus between the proscribed conduct and a specific undertaking by or knowledge of the client that the rule is being violated. Maul v. Shaw, 843 P.2d 139 (Colo. App. 1992); Domenico v. Sw. Props. Venture, 914 P.2d 390 (Colo. App. 1995). Trial court’s discretion. Whether attorney fees are awarded under this rule is within the trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed unless the discretion is abused. Findings of the trial court that the plaintiff bank’s claims of fraud were not groundless or frivolous were supported by the record, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for sanctions. First Interstate Bank v. Berenbaum, 872 P.2d 1297 (Colo. App. 1993). A state court cannot impose sanctions under this rule for the conduct of an attorney during a federal court proceeding even if the proceeding is part of a single litigation that also includes state law claims heard by the state court, because the decision to impose such sanctions is necessarily a matter within the jurisdiction of the court in which the conduct occurred. Boulder County Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Kraft Bldg. Contractors, 122 P.3d 1019 (Colo. App. 2005). Award of attorney fees against plaintiff’s attorney appropriate use of trial court’s discretion given attorney’s allegations as to the personal conduct of individuals who had not been joined in the action, insistence on relitigating issues when the court had made it clear that those issues were moot, reckless allegations of wrongdoing by individuals and attorneys without a showing of competent investigation or facts to support the allegations, and a request for fines or imprisonment without any showing to support such a request. Carder, Inc. v. Cash, 97 P.3d 174 (Colo. App. 2003). Trial court was not obligated to assess attorney fees as a sanction for a violation of this rule when the attorney presented a rational argument, based on documentary evidence and established principles of contract interpretation, in support of his position. E-470 Pub. Hwy. Auth. v. Jagow, 30 P.3d 798 (Colo. App. 2001), aff’d on other grounds, 49 P.3d 1151 (Colo. 2002). Sanctions are for the benefit of a party and not a nonparty. Roberts-Henry v. Richter, 802 P.2d 1159 (Colo. App. 1990). Victim of a frivolous lawsuit has a duty to mitigate attorney fees incurred in defending the lawsuit by taking reasonable measures to extricate himself or herself from the frivolous lawsuit at the earliest possible time. Consequently, trial court should not have awarded attorney fees incurred in pursuing defendant’s counterclaims after plaintiff dismissed its original complaint against defendants. Boulder County Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Kraft Bldg. Contractors, 122 P.3d 1019 (Colo. App. 2005). This rule imposes sanctions upon those who violate its provisions, it does not preclude relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). Domenico v. Sw. Props. Venture, 914 P.2d 390 (Colo. App. 1995). The failure to sign a complaint is not jurisdictional, but is subject to correction upon being called to the attention of the court. Harris v. Mun. Court, 123 Colo. 539, 234 P.2d 1055 (1951). Failure of attorney representing county department of social services to sign verified dependency petition held to be harmless. People in Interest of A.M., 786 P.2d 476 (Colo. App. 1989). County attorney not immune from award of fees under this rule when filing petition for temporary guardianship under § 26-3.1-104 . Stepanek v. Delta County, 940 P.2d 364 (Colo. 1997). Omission of party’s address does not warrant dismissal. The original failure to comply with this rule by omitting the address of the party does not warrant dismissal of an action. Glickman v. Mesigh, 200 Colo. 320, 615 P.2d 23 (1980). An independent claim based upon an alleged violation of this rule may not be asserted in a proceeding separate from the underlying cause of action. Henry v. Kemp, 829 P.2d 505 (Colo. App. 1992). Defendant in legal malpractice action entitled to hearing on his or her claim for sanctions under this rule and § 13-17-102 . When a party requests a hearing regarding the award of attorney fees and costs under § 13-17-102 , the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing. Because the trial court denied the motion without conducting a hearing on defendant’s motion for sanctions, remand is required for a hearing. Brown v. Silvern, 141 P.3d 871 (Colo. App. 2005). Applied in People v. Breazeale, 190 Colo. 17, 544 P.2d 970 (1975); Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26 (Colo. 1982); Pietrafeso v. D.P.I., Inc., 757 P.2d 1113 (Colo. App. 1988).

For stating defenses and form of denials, particularly general denials, see C.R.C.P. 8(b); for requirement of verification or affidavit in depositions to perpetuate testimony, see C.R.C.P. 27(a)(1), in injunctions, see C.R.C.P. 65, in certiorari, see C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), in civil contempt, see C.R.C.P. 107(c), in motion for service by mail or publication, see C.R.C.P. 4(g), and, in motion for an order authorizing sale under power or in response thereto, see C.R.C.P. 120.