In order to maintain the highest standards of professional conduct, attorneys who have demonstrated that they are unable, or are likely to be unable, to discharge their professional responsibilities shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary or disability proceedings.
Editor’s note: Rules 241.1 through 241.26, C.R.C.P., were repealed and reenacted by the Supreme Court. Rules 251.1 through 252.16 replace Rules 241.1 through 241.26 on July 1, 1998 or January 1, 1999, as indicated in the source note following the rule. For an explanation of the implementation of these rules see the order from the Office of the Chief Justice following this editor’s note.
Law reviews: For article, “How the New Attorney Regulation System Will Work”, see 28 Colo. Law. 57 (February 1999); for article, “Colorado’s Attorney Regulation System: An Update”, see 35 Colo. Law. 25 (April 2006); for article, “Attorney Discipline and Disability Process and Procedure-Part I”, see 36 Colo. Law. 23 (February 2007); for article, “Attorney Discipline and Disability Process and Procedure-Part II”, see 36 Colo. Law. 41 (March 2007). ORDER
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado has adopted a series of changes to the attorney grievance system. Most of the reforms are incorporated into Rules that have been adopted effective January 1, 1999. However, a number of the reforms will come into effect over the course of the next six months. Hence, the Court enters this Order to permit immediate implementation of some programs and to insure an orderly transition to the new system.
It is Ordered:
DONE at Denver, Colorado, this 30th day of June, 1998.
ANTHONY F. VOLLACK, Chief Justice
C.R.C.P. 251.1
This rule was previously numbered as 241.1.
Annotation Law reviews. For note, “Standards of Discipline for Attorneys in Colorado and the Significance of the Code of Professional Responsibility”, see 50 Den. L.J. 207 (1973). For article, “Avoiding Family Law Malpractice: Recognition and Prevention-Parts I and II”, see 14 Colo. Law. 787 and 991 (1985). Annotator’s note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this rule. Rule held constitutional. Rule provides sufficient guidelines to impose attorney discipline and is not, therefore, unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process of law. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986); People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996). Bill of rights freedoms should not be prevented. The supreme court should never make an order which would prevent any lawyer, or association of lawyers, from enjoying to the fullest the fundamental freedoms contained in the bill of rights. In re Petition of Colo. Bar Ass’n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958). There is lodged in the supreme court exclusive power to admit applicants to the bar of this state, to prescribe the rules to be followed in the discipline of lawyers, and to revoke a license to practice law or otherwise assess penalties in disciplinary proceedings where the conduct of the lawyer accused either amounts to a violation of law or involves moral turpitude or dishonorable conduct; in all these matters full responsibility rests with the court. In re Petition of Colo. Bar Ass’n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958); People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996). Granting person permission to practice law is sole prerogative of supreme court of Colorado. People v. Belfor, 200 Colo. 44, 611 P.2d 979 (1980) (decided under prior rule). And statute disqualifying a convicted felon of practicing as an attorney in no wise interferes with the exclusive right of the supreme court to determine the rules and regulations which shall govern those seeking admission to the bar nor does the statute impinge in any real sense the judicial right to discipline those licensed to practice law. Rather, such a statute is an effort by the general assembly under its police power to bar convicted felons from practicing law in the courts, which the general assembly has the power to do so, since it does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. People v. Buckles, 167 Colo. 64, 453 P.2d 404 (1968). The supreme court has the inherent power, apart from rule or statute, as well as the duty, to suspend an attorney whose conduct tends to obstruct or impede the administration of justice. People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971). Supreme court authority in disciplinary proceedings is limited to lawyers. In re Petition of Colo. Bar Ass’n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958). Purpose of the bar and the admission requirements is to protect the public from unqualified individuals who charge fees for providing incompetent legal advice. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Grimes, 654 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1982). The procedures in force which must be followed in actions for the discipline of lawyers are defined in these rules on the discipline of attorneys. In re Petition of Colo. Bar Ass’n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958). These rules require that the pendency of investigations be strictly confidential. In re Petition of Colo. Bar Ass’n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958). No person acting as a representative of the supreme court has any power or authority to express an opinion concerning the propriety or the ethics of the conduct of any lawyer. In re Petition of Colo. Bar Ass’n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958). In disciplinary proceedings the supreme court acts under well-established rules which protect the attorney from possible unjust public criticism until guilt is established under due process of law. In re Petition of Colo. Bar Ass’n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958). Previously, disciplinary action could not be taken merely for violating standards of ethics. In re Petition of Colo. Bar Ass’n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958). To be actionable, it must have amounted to a violation of law, or involve moral turpitude or dishonorable conduct. See In re Petition of Colo. Bar Ass’n, 137 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958). License to practice law assures public that the lawyer who holds the license will perform basic legal tasks honestly and without undue delay, in accordance with the highest standards of professional conduct. People ex rel. Silverman v. Anderson, 200 Colo. 76, 612 P.2d 94 (1980); People v. Meldahl, 200 Colo. 332, 615 P.2d 29 (1980); People v. Witt, 200 Colo. 522, 616 P.2d 139 (1980); People v. Dixon, 621 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1981); People v. Kendrick, 646 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1982). An attorney must adhere with dedication to the highest standards of honesty and integrity in order that members of the public are assured that they may deal with attorneys with the knowledge that their matters will be handled with absolute propriety. People v. Golden, 654 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1982). As officers of the court, lawyers are charged with obedience to the laws of this state and to the laws of the United States, and intentional violation by them of these laws subjects them to the severest discipline. People v. Wilson, 176 Colo. 389, 490 P.2d 954 (1971). Attorney never to obstruct justice or judicial process. An attorney has a high duty as an officer of the court to never participate in any scheme to obstruct the administration of justice or the judicial process. People v. Kenelly, 648 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1982); People v. Richards, 748 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1987). Since a lawyer is an officer of the court, the court cannot tolerate or allow fraud by a lawyer to go unpunished, for to declare such acts to be unprofessional conduct would be to use the mildest of language. People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971). Disciplining those who perpetrate fraud on courts is a sacred duty. A most sacred duty is to maintain the integrity of the law profession by disciplining lawyers who indulge in practices which are designed to perpetrate a fraud on the courts. People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971). A lawyer who holds the position of district attorney, with the substantial powers of that office, assumes responsibilities beyond those of other lawyers and must be held to the highest standard of conduct. People v. Brown, 726 P.2d 638 (Colo. 1986). Public expects appropriate discipline for misconduct. The public has a right to expect that one who engages in professional misconduct shall be disciplined appropriately. People ex rel. Silverman v. Anderson, 200 Colo. 76, 612 P.2d 94 (1980); People v. Meldahl, 200 Colo. 332, 615 P.2d 29 (1980); People v. Witt, 616 P.2d 139 (Colo. 1980); People v. Dixon, 621 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1981); People v. Kendrick, 646 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1982). Supreme court has, as part of inherent powers, ultimate and exclusive responsibility for the structure and administration of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. People v. Susman, 196 Colo. 458, 587 P.2d 782 (1978); Mulei v. Jet Courier Serv., Inc., 860 P.2d 569 (Colo. App. 1993); Matter of Greene, 2013 CO 29, 302 P.3d 690. In a disciplinary proceeding, the court’s primary duty is to protect the public and the legal profession from unscrupulous lawyers. People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1981); People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986); People v. Grenemyer, 745 P.2d 1027 (Colo. 1987). Disciplinary proceedings are sui generis in nature, and conviction of a criminal offense is not a condition precedent to the institution of such proceedings nor does acquittal constitute a bar to such proceedings. People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1981); People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986). Although attorney discipline proceedings have been characterized as quasi-criminal in nature, Colorado has chosen to follow a largely civil model for the enforcement of attorney discipline. Matter of Greene, 2013 CO 29, 302 P.3d 690. The doctrine of claim preclusion applies to attorney discipline proceedings. Matter of Greene, 2013 CO 29, 302 P.3d 690. Four conditions are required to invoke claim preclusion: (1) Finality of the earlier judgment; (2) identity of subject matter; (3) identity of claims; and (4) identity of the parties, or at least those in privity with them. Matter of Greene, 2013 CO 29, 302 P.3d 690. For purposes of claim-preclusion analysis, the concept of a “criminal episode” offers an analog for a “transaction or connected series of transactions” of attorney misconduct. Matter of Greene, 2013 CO 29, 302 P.3d 690. Where a number of violations of the same ethical rule were allegedly committed by the same attorney, and the violations did not constitute a single transaction or series of transactions or share any interrelatedness of proof, the attorney regulation counsel was not precluded from filing a second complaint. Matter of Greene, 2013 CO 29, 302 P.3d 690. Where the crime with which an attorney is charged is one of serious consequences denoting moral turpitude, which he is found guilty of, he cannot, in good conscience, be permitted to practice law in this state. eople v. Wilson, 176 Colo. 389, 490 P.2d 954 (1971). Acts and conduct on the part of an attorney which establish that he is incapable of being trusted, when coupled with acts of dishonesty and deceit, render that person unworthy of public confidence and recognition by the courts. People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971). Such acts should be promptly and severely punished. In that the foundation of the legal profession is honor, if acts which a respondent has committed are not promptly and severely punished, the public will not have reason to trust those lawyers who maintain the high standards of the profession. People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971). Conduct of counsel found contrary to standard of honesty, justice, and integrity. People v. Van Nocker, 176 Colo. 354, 490 P.2d 697 (1971). Attorney is subject to jurisdiction of court even though disbarred for failure to comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility while practicing law as an officer of this court. People v. Richards, 748 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1987); People v. Koransky, 830 P.2d 490 (Colo. 1992); People v. Vigil, 945 P.2d 1385 (Colo. 1997). Attorney who is licensed to practice law in Colorado is subject to the jurisdiction of the supreme court for violations of ethical obligations under the rules of professional conduct that are committed while the license to practice is suspended. In re C de Baca, 11 P.3d 426 (Colo. 2000). Attorney who is a member of the Colorado bar is subject to the jurisdiction of the supreme court and its grievance committee for professional misconduct committed in another jurisdiction where attorney is licensed to practice law despite fact that attorney does not maintain a law office in this state and has not paid the required registration fee or satisfied the continuing legal education requirements of this state. People v. Schindelar, 845 P.2d 1146 (Colo. 1993). Because hearing board’s decision raised an important question of law, whether ยง 12-5-120 authorizes an attorney to assert a retaining lien on a United States passport, the supreme court invoked its plenary authority under section (d) to address it, even though hearing board had dismissed the complaint. Matter of Attorney G., 2013 CO 27, 302 P.3d 248. Applied in People v. Hebeler, 638 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1981); People v. Archuleta, 638 P.2d 255 (Colo. 1981); People v. Gellenthien, 638 P.2d 295 (Colo. 1981); People v. Proffitt, 731 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1987); People v. Turner, 758 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1988).