Notwithstanding the entry of a default, the Regulation Counsel shall give the respondent notice of the final hearing, at which the respondent may appear and present arguments to the Hearing Board regarding the form of discipline to be imposed.
Thereafter, the Hearing Board shall review all pleadings, arguments, and the report of investigation and shall prepare a report setting forth its findings of fact and its decision as provided in C.R.C.P. 251.19.
If, however, after the entry of default neither the respondent nor Regulation Counsel timely requests a hearing before the Hearing Board, then the sanctions hearing shall be held solely before the Presiding Disciplinary Judge.
C.R.C.P. 251.15
This rule was previously numbered as 241.13.
Annotation Annotator’s note. The following annotations include cases decided under former C.R.C.P. 241.13, which was similar to this rule. Both the charges and the well-pleaded facts are deemed admitted by the entry of a default judgment. People v. Richards, 748 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1987); People v. Young, 201 P.3d 1273 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2008 ). The allegations of fact were deemed admitted where attorney did not answer the complaint filed in the case and the hearing board entered a default against him. People v. Davies, 926 P.2d 572 (Colo. 1996); In re Demaray, 8 P.3d 427 (Colo. 1999). A motion to set aside a default because the respondent failed to file a timely answer under this rule can be analogized to a motion under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). The decision to grant relief is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion. In re Weisbard, 25 P.3d 24 (Colo. 2001). In a motion to set aside a default judgment, the movant bears the burden of proving the grounds for relief by clear, strong, and satisfactory proof. In re Weisbard, 25 P.3d 24 (Colo. 2001). Because an attorney has a duty to cooperate with disciplinary proceedings, default judgments are not subject to being set aside easily. In re Weisbard, 25 P.3d 24 (Colo. 2001). In setting aside a default judgment on the grounds of excusable neglect, the court must determine: Whether the neglect causing the default was excusable; whether the movant has alleged a meritorious defense; and whether relief from the order would be equitable. In re Weisbard, 25 P.3d 24 (Colo. 2001). Failure to act because of carelessness and negligence is not excusable neglect. In re Weisbard, 25 P.3d 24 (Colo. 2001). Applied in People v. Moore, 681 P.2d 480 (Colo. 1984); People v. Stauffer, 745 P.2d 240 (Colo. 1987); People v. Jacobson, 747 P.2d 654 (Colo. 1987); People v. Dohe, 800 P.2d 71 (Colo. 1990); People v. Ashley, 817 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1991); People v. Rouse, 817 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1991); People v. Barr, 855 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1993); In the Matter of Scott, 979 P.2d 572 (Colo. 1999).