Annotation Annotator’s note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this rule. Procedural due process does not include criminal defendant’s rights. In every disciplinary proceeding a lawyer is entitled to procedural due process, but those rights do not extend so far as to guarantee the full panoply of rights afforded to an accused in a criminal case. People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1981); People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986); People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996); People v. Smith, 937 P.2d 724 (Colo. 1997). Sixth amendment rights to jury trial and speedy trial do not attach in discipline cases, since by its terms the sixth amendment only applies in criminal cases. People v. Smith, 937 P.2d 724 (Colo. 1997). Fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination did not operate to preclude respondent from being compelled to attend his own deposition. People v. Smith, 937 P.2d 724 (Colo. 1997). No due-process violation where presiding officer of the board also served on the hearing panel that reviews the board’s action. People v. Fitzgibbons, 909 P.2d 1098 (Colo. 1996); People v. Smith, 937 P.2d 724 (Colo. 1997). Consideration of charges not made in formal complaint against an attorney constitutes a violation of the respondent’s rights to procedural due process of law. People v. Emeson, 638 P.2d 293 (Colo. 1981). Right to call witnesses is a basic tenet of due process and applies to an attorney facing disciplinary charges. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986). This right, however, is not absolute. Due process does not vest a respondent in a disciplinary proceeding with a right to call any and all witnesses or elicit any testimony whatever; so long as the respondent is accorded a full and fair opportunity to present a defense to a charge, the tribunal hearing the case is entitled to exercise a sound discretion in limiting the type of evidence and the number of witnesses offered at a hearing. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986). Standard of proof in disciplinary proceeding. The disciplinary prosecutor has to prove allegations of misconduct by clear, convincing and substantial evidence. People v. Bugg, 635 P.2d 881 (Colo. 1981) (decided under former Rule 249, C.R.C.P.). Clear and convincing evidence is proof which persuades the trier of fact that the truth contention is highly probable. It is evidence stronger than a preponderance by less than beyond reasonable doubt. People v. Distel, 759 P.2d 654 (Colo. 1988). Evidence which clearly and unequivocally establishes unlawful conduct of a lawyer should be admissible in a disciplinary proceeding if the official misconduct does not shock the conscience of the court or is not in bad faith. People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1981). Unlike the rule applicable to a criminal proceeding, evidence of professional misconduct obtained by law enforcement officers should be admissible at a disciplinary proceeding unless the officers themselves engaged in outrageous misconduct or acted in bad faith in obtaining the challenged evidence. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986). If governmental officials act outrageously or in bad faith in obtaining challenged evidence, due process of law requires the exclusion of such evidence or perhaps the even more drastic remedy of dismissal. There is no “bright line” or “per se” rule in this area of the law and each case must be decided on the basis of its own peculiar facts. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986). Evidence of attorney’s disciplinary record may be properly admitted to the extent allowed under the Colorado rules of evidence in order to refute claim that he regularly attended to client matters. People v. Yaklich, 744 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1987). Such evidence may be introduced to impeach respondent’s credibility. People v. Distel, 759 P.2d 654 (Colo. 1988). When acting as fact finder in attorney disciplinary proceedings, grievance committee has duty to assess credibility of all evidence before it, both controverted and uncontroverted. People v. Distel, 759 P.2d 654 (Colo. 1988). Presiding disciplinary judge (PDJ) has exclusive authority under section (b) of this rule to hear respondent’s motion for sanctions under C.R.C.P. 11(a). The plain language of the rules, their context, and the design of the attorney regulation system support conclusion that PDJ has exclusive authority to consider and rule on a C.R.C.P. 11(a) motion for sanctions. People v. Trupp, 51 P.3d 985 (Colo. 2002). Abuse of discretion for presiding disciplinary judge to hold that assistant attorney regulation counsel violated rule when she advanced claim that attorney had violated C.R.P.C. 8.4(c). No evidence that assistant attorney regulation counsel failed to investigate either the facts or the law and she did not misrepresent them in the complaint. People v. Trupp, 92 P.3d 923 (Colo. 2004). Applied in People ex rel. Goldberg v. Gordon, 199 Colo. 296, 607 P.2d 995 (1980).