Colorado

Civil Procedure

Rule 251.20 – Attorney Convicted of a Crime

(a) Proof of Conviction. Except as otherwise provided by these Rules, a certified copy of the judgment of conviction from the clerk of any court of criminal jurisdiction indicating that an attorney has been convicted of a crime in that court shall conclusively establish the existence of such conviction for purposes of disciplinary proceedings in this state and shall be conclusive proof of the commission of that crime by the respondent.
(b) Duty to Report Conviction. Every attorney subject to these Rules, upon being convicted of a crime, except those misdemeanor traffic offenses or traffic ordinance violations, not including the use of alcohol or drugs, shall notify the Regulation Counsel in writing of such conviction within 14 days after the date of the conviction. In addition, the clerk of any court in this state in which the conviction was entered shall transmit to the Regulation Counsel within 14 days after the date of the conviction a certificate thereof.
(c) Commencement of Disciplinary Proceedings Upon Notice of Conviction. Upon receiving notice that an attorney subject to these Rules has been convicted of a crime, other than a serious crime as hereinafter defined, the Regulation Counsel shall, following an investigation as provided in these Rules, make a determination as provided in C.R.C.P. 251.11 or refer the matter to the committee for further proceedings consistent with C.R.C.P. 251.12.

If the conviction is for a serious crime as hereinafter defined, the Regulation Counsel shall obtain the record of conviction and prepare and file a complaint against the respondent as provided in C.R.C.P. 251.14.

If a complaint is filed against a respondent pursuant to the provisions of this Rule, the Regulation Counsel shall present proof of the criminal conviction and may present any other evidence which the Regulation Counsel deems appropriate. If the respondent’s criminal conviction is either proved or admitted, the respondent shall have the right to be heard by the Hearing Board only on matters of rebuttal of any evidence presented by the Regulation Counsel other than proof of the conviction.

(d) Conviction of a Serious Crime-Immediate Suspension. The Regulation Counsel shall report to the Supreme Court the name of any attorney who has been convicted of a serious crime, as hereinafter defined. The Supreme Court shall thereupon issue a citation directing the convicted attorney to show cause why the attorney’s license to practice law should not be immediately suspended pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.8. Upon full consideration of the matter, the Supreme Court may either impose immediate suspension for a definite or indefinite period or may discharge the rule to show cause. The fact that a convicted attorney is seeking appellate review of the conviction shall not limit the power of the Supreme Court to impose immediate suspension.
(e) Serious Crime Defined. The term serious crime as used in these Rules shall include:

(1) Any felony; and
(2) Any lesser crime a necessary element of which, as determined by its statutory or common law definition, involves interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, willful extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such crime; or solicitation of another to commit such crime.
(f) Notice to Clients and Others of Immediate Suspension. An order of immediate suspension of an attorney pursuant to this Rule shall constitute a suspension of the attorney for the purpose of the provisions of C.R.C.P. 251.28.
(g) Automatic Reinstatement From Immediate Suspension When Conviction Reversed. An attorney suspended under the provisions of this Rule shall be reinstated to practice law immediately upon filing a certificate demonstrating that the underlying criminal conviction has been reversed; provided, however, that reinstatement of the attorney shall have no effect on any proceedings conducted pursuant to these Rules then pending against him.
(h) Conviction Defined. The term conviction as used in these Rules shall include any ultimate finding of fact in a criminal proceeding that an individual is guilty of a crime, whether the judgment rests on a verdict of guilty, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere, and irrespective of whether entry of judgment or imposition of sentence is suspended or deferred by the court.

C.R.C.P. 251.20

Source: Amended and adopted June 25, 1998, effective January 1, 1999; b amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1 b.

This rule was previously numbered as 241.16.

Annotation Law reviews. For article, “The Rules of Professional Conduct: An Equal Opportunity for Ethical Pitfalls”, see 41 Colo. Law. 71 (October 2012). Annotator’s note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this rule. Attorney licensed to practice law in state of Colorado is subject to discipline by Colorado supreme court in the event of his conviction of a criminal offense in a foreign jurisdiction. People v. Swope, 621 P.2d 321 (Colo. 1981). Attorney’s conduct while in office not only resulted in convictions of second degree official misconduct, § 18-8-405 , and failure to disclose a conflict of interest, § 18-8-308 , but also flagrantly violated minimal standards of candor and honesty required by attorneys and justified suspension. People v. Tucker, 676 P.2d 680 (Colo. 1983). Attorney pleading guilty to cultivation of marijuana and unlawful possession of a controlled substance is subject to discipline. While convicted felon was not trafficking or dealing in illegal substances and was instead engaged in horticultural preservation and storing substance for others, suspension for three years is appropriate penalty. People v. McPhee, 728 P.2d 1292 (Colo. 1986). Accepting illegal drugs for legal services is serious criminal conduct warranting severe sanction even though it does not fit definition of serious crime provided in rule. People v. Davis, 768 P.2d 1227 (Colo. 1989). Failure to report felony conviction in another state where crime involved conversion of client funds justifies disbarment. People v. Hedicke, 785 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1990). Attorney’s failure to report felony conviction including counts involving proof of intent to defraud is sufficient for disbarment. People v. Brunn, 764 P.2d 1165 (Colo. 1988); People v. Vidakovich, 810 P.2d 1071 (Colo. 1991). Failure to report felony convictions in another state for two counts of failure to report income and two counts of filing false income tax returns warrants three-year suspension and payment of costs rather than disbarment in light of numerous mitigating factors. People v. Mandell, 813 P.2d 732 (Colo. 1991). The conduct of an attorney who fails to report a domestic violence conviction substantially reflects adversely on the attorney’s fitness to practice. Because there is no exception to the duty to report based upon mistake and because the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, the proper form of discipline is six months’ suspension. In re Hickox, 57 P.3d 403 (Colo. 2002). Failure to report felony conviction in another state for mail fraud warrants disbarment in absence of mitigating factors and where aggravating factor of a prior disciplinary record exists. People v. Bollinger, 859 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993). Lack of prior disciplinary record insufficient to call for sanction less than disbarment where attorney convicted of bank fraud. People v. Terborg, 848 P.2d 346 (Colo. 1993). Guilty plea followed by deferred judgment was a “conviction” and failure to report warranted public censure even though the conviction occurred prior to the adoption of a specific definition for the term “conviction” in this section. People v. Barnthouse, 941 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1997). Bar reinstatement required demonstration of possession of moral and professional qualifications. Where a state attorney had been convicted of failing to file his federal income tax return and making false representations to a special agent of the Internal Revenue Service regarding the filing of income tax returns, and where the attorney was later found to have made a false statement in his application to the Arizona State Bar by answering in the negative an inquiry as to whether he had ever been questioned regarding the violation of any law, he was suspended from the practice of law in Colorado for three years, and was required to demonstrate upon application for reinstatement that he possessed moral and professional qualifications for admission to the bar of this state. People v. Gifford, 199 Colo. 205, 610 P.2d 485 (1980). Bankruptcy fraud is a serious crime as defined by rule. People v. Brown, 841 P.2d 1066 (Colo. 1990). Attorney’s conviction of three counts of sexual assault on a child and three counts of aggravated incest conclusively established where the court notified him it intended to take judicial notice of the conviction and attorney neither responded to the substance of the notice nor denied the conviction occurred. Because of the nature and seriousness of the crimes for which the attorney was convicted, disbarment was appropriate. People v. Schwartz, 890 P.2d 82 (Colo. 1995). Disbarment warranted for attorney convicted of criminal attempt to commit sexual exploitation of a child, a class 4 felony. People v. Damkar, 908 P.2d 1113 (Colo. 1996). Attorney’s violations constituted “serious crimes” as defined in section (e) of this rule where the attorney pleaded guilty to making and altering a false and forged prescription for Phentermine, a controlled substance, in violation of former § 12-22-315 , a class 5 felony, and of criminal attempt to obtain a controlled substance by forgery and alteration in violation of § 18-2-101 and former § 12-22-315 , a class 6 felony. People v. Moore, 849 P.2d 40 (Colo. 1993). Lack of prior disciplinary record insufficient to call for sanction less than disbarment where attorney convicted of bankruptcy fraud and for conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud and other federal offenses. People v. Schwartz, 814 P.2d 793 (Colo. 1991). Although attorney had not previously been disciplined, sanction of disbarment was warranted where attorney’s felony conviction for possession of a firearm occurred while he was still on probation for a felony conviction for possession of marijuana. People v. Laquey, 862 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1993). Conviction for aiding fugitive to flee warrants disbarment despite lack of a prior disciplinary record. People v. Bullock, 882 P.2d 1390 (Colo. 1994). Respondent given two-year suspension for aiding and abetting aliens’ entry into the United States and by advising clients to make misrepresentations for such entry. Such an act generally warrants disbarment, but respondent’s full disclosure during proceedings, expression of remorse, and the fact that a prior offense was remote in time were mitigating factors. Respondent also required to discontinue the representation of clients before INS and the Department of Labor. People v. Boyle, 942 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1997). Disbarment is warranted for driving while impaired, marihuana possession, improperly executing agreement without permission, and failing to perform certain professional duties, despite the lack of a prior record. People v. Gerdes, 891 P.2d 995 (Colo. 1995). Conviction of attempt to commit sexual assault in the second degree on a 17-year-old high school student filing clerk working at attorney’s law firm is a serious crime as defined by the rule. The conviction together with sexual conduct toward a client warrant disbarment. People v. Dawson, 894 P.2d 756 (Colo. 1995). Disbarment warranted for attorney convicted in Hawaii of second-degree murder. People v. Draizen, 941 P.2d 280 (Colo. 1997). Disbarment warranted for writing nonsufficient funds checks while practicing law during a period of suspension and committing several other disciplinary rules violations. People v. Fager, 938 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1997). Applied in People ex rel. MacFarlane v. Harthun, 195 Colo. 38, 581 P.2d 716 (1978); People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1981); People v. Loseke, 698 P.2d 809 (Colo. 1985); People v. Proffitt, 731 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1987); People v. Geller, 753 P.2d 235 (Colo. 1988); People v. Cantor, 753 P.2d 238 (Colo. 1988).