Proceedings instituted against an attorney pursuant to this Rule are disability proceedings. Transfer to disability inactive status is not a form of discipline and does not involve a violation of the attorney’s oath. The pendency of proceedings provided for by this Rule shall not defer or abate other proceedings conducted pursuant to these Rules, unless after a hearing the Presiding Disciplinary Judge determines that the attorney, is unable to assist in the defense of those other proceedings because of the disability. If such other proceedings are deferred, then the deferral shall continue until such time as the attorney is found to be eligible for reinstatement as provided by C.R.C.P. 251.30.
An attorney against whom disability proceedings are pending shall be given notice of such proceedings. Notice shall be given in such a manner as the Presiding Disciplinary Judge may direct. The Presiding Disciplinary Judge may appoint counsel to represent the attorney if the attorney is without adequate representation.
C.R.C.P. 251.23
This rule was previously numbered as 241.19.
Annotation Annotator’s note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this rule. Former section (a) is not unconstitutional. Requiring attorney to prove mental illness by clear and convincing evidence was not contrary to ยง 13-25-127(1), which establishes a preponderance of the evidence as the quantum of proof in civil cases, because an attorney disciplinary proceeding is not strictly a civil proceeding. People v. Sullivan, 802 P.2d 1091 (Colo. 1990). Supreme court affirms order of presiding disciplinary judge (PDJ) transferring attorney to disability inactive status. The office of attorney regulation counsel (OARC) adequately petitioned PDJ for a disability proceeding under section (c) of this rule by filing status report. Because the status report unquestionably put attorney on notice of the disability proceeding and gave him or her a meaningful opportunity to oppose the OARC’s request for an independent medical examination (IME), the report satisfied the “petition” requirement of section (c). In addition, the law of the case doctrine did not preclude the PDJ from reconsidering his or her decision to disregard the report of the first medical expert retained to conduct an IME of the attorney. In light of testimony of this expert, PDJ acted “upon proper grounds” when her or she decided to reconsider earlier ruling disregarding expert’s report. Even without medical report, adverse inference of disability drawn by PDJ on the basis of attorney’s disregard of orders to cooperate in second IME process was by itself sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the attorney suffers from a mental or emotional infirmity or illness and that such infirmity or illness prevents the attorney from both defending himself or herself in the consolidated disciplinary proceeding and fulfilling the responsibilities as an attorney, thereby requiring the attorney to petition for reinstatement under C.R.C.P. 251.30. In re Bass, 142 P.3d 1259 (Colo. 2006). Applied in People v. Luxford, 626 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1981); People v. Southern, 638 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1982); People v. Barbour, 639 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1982); People v. Dwyer, 652 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1982); People v. Craig, 708 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1985).