Misconduct by an attorney, individually or in concert with others, including the following acts or omissions, shall constitute grounds for discipline, whether or not the act or omission occurred in the course of an attorney-client relationship:

Annotation I. General Consideration. Law reviews. For article, “The Perjurious Defendant: A Proposed Solution to the Defense Lawyer’s Conflicting Ethical Obligations to the Court and to His Client”, see 59 Den. L.J. 75 (1981). For Article, “Incriminating Evidence: What to do With a Hot Potato”, see 11 Colo. Law. 880 (1982). For article, “The Search for Truth Continued: More Disclosure, Less Privilege”, see 54 U. Colo. L. Rev. 51 (1982). For article, “The Search for Truth Continued, The Privilege Retained: A Response to Judge Frankel”, see 54 U. Colo. L. Rev. 67 (1982). For article, “Descriptions of Disciplinary Matters”, see 14 Colo. Law. 1418 (1985). Annotator’s note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this rule. Constitutionality upheld. This rule is not unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986). Standards used in determining constitutional challenges to rule. Same standards used in determining a constitutional challenge to a statute are used in determining constitutional challenge to this rule or a disciplinary rule under the code of professional responsibility. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986). Presumption of constitutionality attaches to such enactment, and the burden is on the party challenging an enactment to demonstrate its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986). Since a disciplinary rule is promulgated for the purpose of guiding lawyers in their professional conduct, and is not directed to the public at large, the central consideration in resolving a vagueness challenge should be whether the nature of the proscribed conduct encompassed by the rule is readily understandable to a licensed lawyer. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986). ABA standards for imposing lawyer sanctions utilized to determine proper sanction in disciplinary proceeding and certain findings as to aggravating and mitigating factors made. People v. Susman, 787 P.2d 1119 (Colo. 1990); In re Quiat, 979 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1999); In re Meyers, 981 P.2d 143 (Colo. 1999); People v. Sweetman, 218 P.3d 1123 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2008 ). Applied in People v. Schermerhorn, 193 Colo. 364, 567 P.2d 799 (1977); People v. Pittam, 194 Colo. 104, 572 P.2d 135 (1977); People v. Voss, 196 Colo. 485, 587 P.2d 787 (1978); People v. Harthun, 197 Colo. 1, 593 P.2d 324 (1979); People ex rel. Gallagher v. Hertz, 608 P.2d 335 (Colo. 1979); People ex rel. Goldberg v. Gordon, 199 Colo. 296, 607 P.2d 995 (1980); People v. Barbour, 199 Colo. 126, 612 P.2d 1082 (1980); People v. Hilgers, 200 Colo. 211, 612 P.2d 1134 (1980); People v. Lanza, 200 Colo. 241, 613 P.2d 337 (1980); People v. Dixon, 200 Colo. 520, 616 P.2d 103 (1980); People v. Hurst, 200 Colo. 537, 618 P.2d 1113 (1980); People v. Berge, 620 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1980); People v. Davis, 620 P.2d 725 (Colo. 1980); People v. Gottsegen, 623 P.2d 878 (Colo. 1981); People v. Luxford, 626 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1981); People v. Dutton, 629 P.2d 103 (Colo. 1981); People v. Rotenberg, 635 P.2d 220 (Colo. 1981); People v. Barbour, 639 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1982); People v. Whitcomb, 676 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1983); People v. Emmert, 676 P.2d 672 (Colo. 1983); People v. Spangler, 676 P.2d 674 (Colo. 1983); People v. Moore, 681 P.2d 480 (Colo. 1984); People v. Underhill, 683 P.2d 349 (Colo. 1984); People v. Simon, 698 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1985); People v. Franco, 698 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1985); People v. Madrid, 700 P.2d 558 (Colo. 1985); People v. Blanck, 700 P.2d 560 (Colo. 1985); People v. Danker, 735 P.2d 874 (Colo. 1987); People v. Quintana, 752 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1988); People v. Smith, 778 P.2d 685 Colo. (1989). II. Grounds. A. In General. Violation of election laws sufficient to justify public censure. People v. Casias, 646 P.2d 391 (Colo. 1982). Actions taken by attorney contrary to court order violate this rule and justify suspension. People v. Awenius, 653 P.2d 740 (Colo. 1982). Demonstration of rehabilitation required for readmittance to bar. Where a practicing attorney breached fiduciary duties to his client in misrepresenting his dealings and in handling of funds given to him in trust, his conduct warranted disbarment, and before he may seek readmittance to the state bar association, he must first demonstrate to the grievance committee that rehabilitation has occurred and that he is entitled to a new start. People ex rel. Buckley v. Beck, 199 Colo. 482, 610 P.2d 1069 (1980). Actions of a suspended attorney who took part in a complex real estate transaction and engaged in the practice of law by representing, counseling, advising, and assisting a former client warranted suspension until he demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he has been rehabilitated; (2) he has complied with and will continue to comply with all applicable disciplinary orders and rules; and (3) he is competent and fit to practice law. People v. Belfor, 200 Colo. 44, 611 P.2d 979 (1980). Maximum suspension of three years rather than disbarment appropriate for attorney who violated a number of disciplinary rules including filing a false claim for loss of unemployment damages; failure to prepare case for trial over two-year period; failure to file affidavit required under grandparent visitation statute; arriving at settlement conference in intoxicated state; failure to file complaint and representing to client that case was close to being settled; and failure to notify disciplinary counsel of conviction of driving while ability impaired. People v. Anderson, 828 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1992). Aggravating factors present in case include attorney’s substantial experience in the practice of law, attorney’s prior disciplinary record, attorney’s pattern of misconduct taking place over several years and involving multiple offenses, the practice of deceit by attorney to mislead clients concerning the status of their cases, the obstruction of disciplinary proceedings by attorney’s intentional failure to respond to requests for investigation, and the display of indifference to making restitution by the failure to repay a retainer after promising to do so. People v. Fahrney, 791 P.2d 1116 (Colo. 1990). Aggravating factors present in case were: (1) A dishonest and selfish motive on the part of the respondent; (2) a pattern of misconduct; (3) multiple offenses; and (4) substantial experience in the practice of law. People v. Finesilver, 826 P.2d 1256 (Colo. 1992). Aggravating factors present in case include: (1) The attorney’s prior disciplinary record; (2) a dishonest or selfish attitude on the part of the attorney; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) the attorney’s refusal to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct; (5) the vulnerability of the client’s wife and her children during the attorney’s representation of them; and (6) the attorney’s substantial experience in the practice of law. In re Quiat, 979 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1999). Aggravating factors present in case include: (1) Attorney’s history of prior discipline; (2) the vulnerable status of the attorney’s victims; and (3) the attorney’s obstruction of the disciplinary process. In re Meyers, 981 P.2d 143 (Colo. 1999). Aggravating factors present in case include the respondent attorney’s dishonest and selfish motive, pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, the vulnerability of the victims, the respondent’s substantial experience with the law, and the respondent’s indifference to making restitution. People v. Sweetman, 218 P.3d 1123 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2008 ). Mitigating factors present in case included the respondent’s full and free disclosure to the grievance committee and the hearing board, good character and reputation, and the respondent’s remorse for wrongdoing. People v. Finesilver, 826 P.2d 1256 (Colo. 1992). Insofar as respondent’s addiction to illegal drugs was a symptom of more deeply seated psychological and emotional problems, the respondent established the existence of these allegedly mitigating factors. However, even though the respondent testified that none of the converted funds were used to purchase illegal drugs, the supreme court is inclined to view the respondent’s drug use itself as an aggravating rather than mitigating factor. People v. Finesilver, 826 P.2d 1256 (Colo. 1992). Several significant aggravating factors are that the respondent engaged in multiple offenses and in a pattern of misconduct, failed to cooperate with the grievance committee in the attorney discipline proceedings, and submitted false statements and false evidence to the court in a related proceeding. People v. Hellewell, 827 P.2d 527 (Colo. 1992). Aggravating factors in case where three-year suspension rather than disbarment imposed include prior disciplinary offenses, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during disciplinary process, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct, vulnerability of victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law. Mitigating factors include remoteness of prior offenses and gesture of restitution. People v. Anderson, 828 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1992). Public censure was appropriate where attorney made false statements in the course of discovery in cases where the attorney was the plaintiff. Evidence showed that the attorney was suffering from a psychiatric condition at the time, and the assistant disciplinary counsel could not prove that the attorney’s false statements were knowing, but only that they were negligent. People v. Dillings, 880 P.2d 1220 (Colo. 1994). Mitigating factors present in case include: (1) At the time of the misconduct, the attorney was experiencing personal problems; (2) the attorney cooperated during the disciplinary proceedings; (3) the attorney has a good character and reputation in the community; and (4) there has been a substantial delay in these disciplinary proceedings. In re Quiat, 979 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1999). Attorney’s depression did not qualify as mitigating factor of mental disability where no testimony showed depression caused the misconduct. People v. Reynolds, 933 P.2d 1295 (Colo. 1997). The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 did not prevent the Colorado supreme court from disciplining attorney who suffered from depression in light of finding that the depression had not been shown to have directly caused his misconduct. People v. Reynolds, 933 P.2d 1295 (Colo. 1997). Demonstration of drug rehabilitation and of improved business practices required for reinstatement. Where attorney was suspended for misuse of client funds due to confusion and inattention resulting from cocaine addiction, he would be required to demonstrate a history of negative drug screening tests and that he had educated himself about the business aspects of practicing law, including the handling of trust accounts, to qualify for reinstatement following three-year suspension. People v. Schubert, 799 P.2d 388 (Colo. 1990). Demonstration of participation in a course of therapy for clinical depression required for reinstatement where attorney was suspended for inattention resulting from such depression. People v. Barr, 855 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1993). Demonstration of four conditions required for attorney publicly censured after conviction of driving while ability impaired: Continue psychotherapy, remain on antabuse, submit monthly reports regarding progress on antabuse, and execute written authorization to therapist to release medical information regarding status on antabuse. People v. Rotenberg, 911 P.2d 642 (Colo. 1996). Pattern of misconduct involving failure to render services, multiple offenses, and conversion of client’s property sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. Vermillion, 814 P.2d 795 (Colo. 1991). Conduct found to violate this rule. People v. Bugg, 635 P.2d 881 (Colo. 1981). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify public censure. People v. Barnthouse, 941 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1997). Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify public censure. People v. Bollinger, 648 P.2d 620 (Colo. 1982); People v. Bergmann, 716 P.2d 1089 (Colo. 1986); People v. Mayer, 716 P.2d 1094 (Colo. 1986); People v. Carpenter, 731 P.2d 726 (Colo. 1987); People v. Horn, 738 P.2d 1186 (Colo. 1987); People v. Stauffer, 745 P.2d 240 (Colo. 1987); People v. Wilson, 745 P.2d 248 (Colo. 1987); People v. Dowhan, 759 P.2d 4 (Colo. 1988); People v. Wyman, 769 P.2d 1076 (Colo. 1989); People v. Smith, 769 P.2d 1078 (Colo. 1989); People v. Feiman, 778 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1990); People v. Vigil, 779 P.2d 372 (Colo. 1989); People v. Malman, 779 P.2d 380 (Colo. 1989). People v. Barr, 805 P.2d 440 (Colo. 1991); People v. Volk, 805 P.2d 1116 (Colo. 1991); People v. Tatum, 814 P.2d 388 (Colo. 1991); People v. Shunneson, 814 P.2d 800 (Colo. 1991); People v. Mulvihill, 814 P.2d 805 (Colo. 1991); People v. Gebauer, 821 P.2d 782 (1991); People v. Borchard, 825 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1992); People v. Dillings, 880 P.2d 1220 (Colo. 1994); People v. Tauger, 893 P.2d 121 (Colo. 1995). Evidence sufficient to justify suspension from the practice of law. People v. Belfor, 197 Colo. 223, 591 P.2d 585 (1979); People v. Goss, 646 P.2d 334 (Colo. 1982). Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Yaklich, 646 P.2d 938 (Colo. 1982); People v. Craig, 653 P.2d 1115 (Colo. 1982); People v. Kane, 655 P.2d 390 (Colo. 1982); People v. Vernon, 660 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1982); People v. Tyler, 678 P.2d 1014 (Colo. 1984); People v. Pilgrim, 698 P.2d 1322 (Colo. 1985); People v. Spurlock, 713 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1985); People v. Doolittle, 713 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1985); People v. Foster, 716 P.2d 1069 (Colo. 1986); People v. Coca, 716 P.2d 1073 (Colo. 1986); People v. Barnett, 716 P.2d 1076 (Colo. 1986); People v. Larson, 716 P.2d 1093 (Colo. 1986); People v. McPhee, 728 P.2d 1292 (Colo. 1986); People v. Yost, 729 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1986); People v. Holmes, 731 P.2d 677 (Colo. 1987); People v. May, 745 P.2d 218 (Colo. 1987); People v. Turner, 746 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1987); People v. Geller, 753 P.2d 235 (Colo. 1988); People v. Convery, 758 P.2d 1338 (Colo. 1988); People v. Lustig, 758 P.2d 1342 (Colo. 1988); People v. Goldberg, 770 P.2d 408 (Colo. 1989); People v. Barnthouse, 775 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1026, 110 S. Ct. 734, 107 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1990); People v. Fahrney, 782 P.2d 743 (Colo. 1989); People v. Bottinelli, 782 P.2d 746 (Colo. 1989); People v. Chappell, 783 P.2d 838 (Colo. 1989); People v. Gregory, 788 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1990); People v. Bergmann, 790 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1990); People v. Hensley-Martin, 795 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1990); People v. Garrett, 802 P.2d 1082 (Colo. 1990); People v. Crimaldi, 804 P.2d 863 (Colo. 1991); People v. Mandell, 813 P.2d 732 (Colo. 1991); People v. Whitaker, 814 P.2d 812 (Colo. 1991); People v. Dowhan, 814 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1991); People v. Nulan, 820 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1991); People v. Williams, 824 P.2d 813 (Colo. 1992); People v. Dieters, 825 P.2d 478 (Colo. 1992); People v. Eaton, 828 P.2d 246 (Colo. 1992); People v. Williams, 915 P.2d 669 (Colo. 1996); People v. Pierson, 917 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1996); People v. Reynolds, 933 P.2d 1295 (Colo. 1997); People v. Graham, 933 P.2d 1321 (Colo. 1997); People v. Nelson, 941 P.2d 922 (Colo. 1997). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. Ashley, 817 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1991); People v. Rouse, 817 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1991); People v. Calt, 817 P.2d 969 (Colo. 1991); People v. Koransky, 824 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1992); People v. Brown, 840 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1992); People v. Bennett, 843 P.2d 1385 (Colo. 1993); People v. Walsh, 880 P.2d 766 (Colo. 1994); People v. Madigan, 938 P.2d 1162 (Colo. 1997); People v. Odom, 941 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1997); People v. Clyne, 945 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1997); In re Hugen, 973 P.2d 1267 (Colo. 1999). Conduct violating this rule sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. Dwyer, 652 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1982); People v. Golden, 654 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1982); People v. Blanck, 713 P.2d 832 (Colo. 1985); People v. Martinez, 739 P.2d 838 (Colo. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1054, 108 S. Ct. 1003, 98 L. Ed. 2d 970 (1988); People v. Lovett, 753 P.2d 205 (Colo. 1988); People v. Brooks, 753 P.2d 208 (Colo. 1988); People v. Cantor, 753 P.2d 238 (Colo. 1988); People v. Turner, 758 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1988); People v. Danker, 759 P.2d 14 (Colo. 1988); People v. Reeves, 766 P.2d 1192 (Colo. 1988); People v. Felker, 770 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1989); People v. Kengle, 772 P.2d 605 (Colo. 1989); People v. Greene, 773 P.2d 528 (Colo. 1989); People v. Vernon, 782 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1989); People v. Johnston, 782 P.2d 1195 (Colo. 1989); People v. Hedicke, 785 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1990); People v. Dulaney, 785 P.2d 1302 (Colo. 1990); People v. Gregory, 797 P.2d 42 (Colo. 1990); People v. Stayton, 798 P.2d 903 (Colo. 1990); People v. Dohe, 800 P.2d 71 (Colo. 1990); People v. Broadhurst, 803 P.2d 478 (Colo. 1990); People v. Goens, 803 P.2d 480 (Colo. 1990); People v. Bergmann, 807 P.2d 568 (Colo. 1991); People v. Rhodes, 814 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1991); People v. Wilson, 814 P.2d 791 (Colo. 1991); People v. Grossenbach, 814 P.2d 810 (Colo. 1991); People v. Hansen, 814 P.2d 816 (Colo. 1991); People v. Kramer, 819 P.2d 77 (Colo. 1991); People v. Finesilver, 826 P.2d 1256 (Colo. 1992); People v. Kelley, 840 P.2d 1068 (Colo. 1992); People v. Littlefield, 893 P.2d 773 (Colo. 1995); People v. Townshend, 933 P.2d 1327 (Colo. 1997); People v. Mason, 212 P.3d 141 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2009 ). B. Violation of Code of Professional Responsibility. Law reviews. For article, “Punishing Ethical Violations: Aggravating and Mitigating Factors”, see 20 Colo. Law. 243 (1991). Annotator’s note. For additional annotations, see the annotations under the disciplinary rules for the canons included in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Disbarment is warranted where attorney converted client funds and where factors in mitigation, although present, were not sufficient to justify a lesser sanction. People v. Ogborn, 887 P.2d 21 (Colo. 1994). District attorney’s failure to prosecute personal friend for possession of marijuana violates code of professional responsibility and warrants three-year suspension. People v. Larsen, 808 P.2d 1265 (Colo. 1991). Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and fails to disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict. Respondent admittedly and knowingly failed to fully disclose to a client the possible effect of a conflict of interest and was therefore suspended from the practice of law for ninety days, stayed upon the successful completion of a one-year period of probation. People v. Fischer, 237 P.3d 645 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2010 ). Suspension for one year and one day was warranted for attorney who violated C.R.P.C. 1.1 and C.R.P.C. 8.4 by preparing and filing child support worksheets that failed to properly reflect the new stipulation concerning custody and where aggravating factors included a previous disciplinary history and failure to appear in the grievance proceedings in violation of section (7) of this rule. People v. Davies, 926 P.2d 572 (Colo. 1996). One-year suspension warranted when attorney’s behavior constituted nine separate violations of the Colorado rules of professional conduct by challenging a final judgment repeatedly in state, federal, and water courts and pursuing a frivolous federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act lawsuit without a rudimentary analysis of the facts, while disregarding a judge’s order to cease collateral attacks. People v. Maynard, 238 P.3d 672 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2009 ). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify public censure. People v. Smith, 819 P.2d 497 (Colo. 1991). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Moya, 793 P.2d 1154 (Colo. 1990); People v. Creasey, 793 P.2d 1159 (Colo. 1990); People v. Schmad, 793 P.2d 1162 (Colo. 1990); People v. Lopez, 796 P.2d 957 (Colo. 1990); People v. Sullivan, 802 P.2d 1091 (Colo. 1990); People v. Lamberson, 802 P.2d 1098 (Colo. 1990); People v. Rhodes, 803 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1991); People v. Flores, 804 P.2d 192 (Colo. 1991); People v. Ross, 810 P.2d 659 (Colo. 1991); People v. Dash, 811 P.2d 36 (Colo. 1991); People v. Honaker, 814 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1991); People v. Heilbrunn, 814 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1991); People v. Mulligan, 817 P.2d 1028 (Colo. 1991); People v. Redman, 819 P.2d 495 (Colo. 1991); People v. Rader, 822 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1992); People v. Farrant, 852 P.2d 452 (Colo. 1993); People v. Robinson, 853 P.2d 1145 (Colo. 1993); People v. Barr, 855 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1993); People v. Dickinson, 903 P.2d 1132 (Colo. 1995); In re Demaray, 8 P.3d 427 (Colo. 1999). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. Lyons, 762 P.2d 143 (Colo. 1988); People v. Frank, 782 P.2d 769 (Colo. 1989); In re Bilderback, 971 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1999). C. Violation of Legal Ethics. Where severe sanctions necessitated. Where misconduct is grievous and demonstrates insensitivity to the professional obligations of a lawyer, it necessitates a severe sanction to reflect the gravity of the breach of ethical standards and to protect the public from future unprofessional conduct. People v. Razatos, 636 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1981), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 930, 102 S. Ct. 1415, 71 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1982). Of more concern is our responsibility to protect the public interest by ensuring continued confidence of the people of this state in the function and role of the office of district attorney and the integrity of the legal profession and the judicial system. People v. Brown, 726 P.2d 638 (Colo. 1986). The public has a right to expect that one who engages in such gregarious professional misconduct shall be disciplined appropriately. People v. Kendrick, 646 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1982). Where an attorney demonstrates an extreme indifference to the welfare of his clients and the status of their cases and an extreme insensitivity to his professional duties in the face of adverse judgments due to neglect, client complaints, and repeated disciplinary proceedings, disbarment is the appropriate sanction. People v. Wyman, 782 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1989). Total disregard of obligation to protect a client’s rights and interests over an extended period of time in conjunction with the violation of a number of disciplinary rules and an extended prior record of discipline requires most severe sanction of disbarment. People v. O’Leary, 783 P.2d 843 (Colo. 1989). The severity of the ethical violations may be balanced by lack of prior discipline, absence of injury to clients, compliance with court ordered treatment plan, and dismissal of criminal charges in felony prosecution. People v. Abelman, 744 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1987). Continued representation of clients with conflicting interests violates this rule and warrants discipline. People v. Awenius, 653 P.2d 740 (Colo. 1982). Adjudicating, as a judge, the criminal case of a person who is his client in a divorce proceeding warrants public censure because it is the duty of an attorney-judge to promptly disclose conflicts of interest and to disqualify himself without suggestion from anyone. People v. Perrott, 769 P.2d 1075 (Colo. 1989). Unauthorized recordation of telephone conversation established unethical conduct. Telephone conversation, which attorney initiated and recorded without the permission of other party to conversation, established unethical conduct on attorney’s part. People v. Wallin, 621 P.2d 330 (Colo. 1981). Suggesting that witness have ex parte communication with chief justice. Where an attorney suggested to a principal witness in a pending grievance proceeding against that attorney that he write a letter on behalf of the attorney to the chief justice of the state supreme court, substantially recanting his testimony in the grievance proceeding, the attorney’s conduct violated this rule and the code of professional responsibility. Public censure is the appropriate discipline for this breach of professional obligations. People v. Hertz, 638 P.2d 794 (Colo. 1982). Most severe punishment is required when a lawyer disregards his professional obligations and converts his clients’ funds to his own use. People v. Kluver, 199 Colo. 511, 611 P.2d 971 (1980); People v. Kendrick, 646 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1982); People v. Bealmear, 655 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1982); People v. Costello, 781 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1989). Conversion of client funds is conduct warranting disbarment because it destroys the trust essential to the attorney-client relationship, severely damages the public’s perception of attorneys, and erodes public confidence in our legal system. People v. Radosevich, 783 P.2d 841 (Colo. 1989). When an attorney converts client property, disbarment is an appropriate sanction. People v. Hellewell, 827 P.2d 527 (Colo. 1992). Disbarment justified. Misappropriation of client’s funds, falsifying billing records of clients, failure to disclose conviction, and disbarment from another state’s bar warrant disbarment. People v. Miller, 744 P.2d 489 (Colo. 1987). Disbarment warranted where attorney accepted fees to represent clients after an order of suspension was entered against the attorney and the attorney failed to notify certain of his clients and opposing counsel of his suspension. People v. Zimmermann, 960 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1998). Disbarment was the proper remedy in view of the numerous and grave instances of professional misconduct, including the intentional misappropriation of client funds. People v. Lefly, 902 P.2d 361 (Colo. 1995). Aiding client to violate custody order sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. Chappell, 927 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1996). Misappropriation of funds, failure to account, and deceit and fraud in handling the affairs of a client necessitate that an attorney be disbarred. People v. Bealmear, 655 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1982). Misuse of funds by a lawyer strikes at the heart of the legal profession by destroying public confidence in lawyers. The most severe punishment is required when a lawyer disregards his professional obligations and converts his clients’ funds to his own use. People v. Buckles, 673 P.2d 1008 (Colo. 1984). Attorney’s misuse of funds, writing of bad checks, and neglect in handling a legal matter justify disbarment. People v. Murphy, 778 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1989). A stipulation of misconduct admitting to withdrawing money while acting as personal representative so that one’s corporation can post an appeal bond, converting funds from estates while serving as personal representative, converting settlement proceeds, and converting funds while serving as president of endowment foundation warrant disbarment. People v. Costello, 781 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1989). Converting estate or trust funds for one’s personal use, overcharging for services rendered, neglecting to return inquiries relating to client matters, failing to make candid disclosures to grievance committee, and attempting to conceal wrongdoing during disciplinary proceedings violates this rule and warrants the severe sanction of disbarment. People v. Gerdes, 782 P.2d 2 (Colo. 1989). Exploiting a client’s friendship and trust to extort funds for one’s personal use, failing to take any action on behalf of a client, and failing to cooperate with the grievance committee in its investigation of complaints with respect to such matters violates this rule and warrants disbarment. People v. McMahill, 782 P.2d 336 (Colo. 1989). Commingling trust funds, failing to maintain complete records of client’s funds, and failure to render appropriate accounts to client constitutes grounds for discipline. People v. Wright, 698 P.2d 1317 (Colo. 1985). Failure to deposit funds in trust account, to notify client of receipt of funds and provide accounting, and to forward file promptly to new attorney and communicating with former client on the subject of representation after client had obtained new legal counsel, along with other offenses, warrants public censure. People v. Swan, 764 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1988). Public censure justified. Failure to place client’s funds in interest bearing account to detriment of client, wrongful disbursement of funds, misrepresentation to the court, and failure to comply with court order to produce documentation warrant, at the very least, public censure. People v. C de Baca, 744 P.2d 512 (Colo. 1987). Refusal to provide accounting for money and jewelry delivered to him, and refusal to itemize the services performed and the costs incurred, warrants disbarment. People v. Lanza, 660 P.2d 881 (Colo. 1983). Failure and refusal to refund unearned portions of fees collected from two clients constituted violations of this rule, DR 9-102, Code of Prof. Resp., and DR 2-110, Code of Prof. Resp. People v. Gellenthien, 621 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1981). Suspension justified considering respondent’s violations of ethical duties to client and other aggravating factors including a pattern of misconduct, a substantial experience in the practice of law, and the vulnerability of respondent’s client. People v. Grossenbach, 803 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1991). Where money was accepted for investment plans which were totally false, fictitious, and fraudulent, attorney violated legal ethics and disbarment was appropriate. People v. Kramer, 819 P.2d 77 (Colo. 1991). An attorney’s appearance as counsel of record in numerous court proceedings following an order of suspension constituted grounds for attorney discipline. People v. Kargol, 854 P.2d 1267 (Colo. 1993). Attorney’s admitted initiation of sexual contact and sexual intrusion on a client violate sections (2), (3), and (5) of this rule. People v. Dawson, 894 P.2d 756 (Colo. 1995). D. Violation of Honesty, Justice, or Morality. Attorney never to obstruct justice or judicial process. An attorney has a high duty as an officer of the court to never participate in any scheme to obstruct the administration of justice or the judicial process. People v. Kenelly, 648 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1982); People v. Haase, 781 P.2d 80 (Colo. 1989). A lawyer who holds the position of district attorney, with the substantial powers of that office, assumes responsibilities beyond those of other lawyers and must be held to the highest standard of conduct. When those powers are abused and duties ignored, the discipline must be commensurate with the act. People v. Brown, 726 P.2d 638 (Colo. 1986). Conduct of counsel found contrary to standards of honesty, justice and integrity. People v. Emmert, 632 P.2d 562 (Colo. 1981). Submission of false transcript to obtain admission to law school and to qualify for admission as a member of the bar is a violation of this rule and requires that respondent’s admission to the bar be voided. People v. Culpepper, 645 P.2d 5 (Colo. 1982). Failure to disclose conviction and disbarment from another state’s bar. An attorney’s failure to disclose her conviction and a subsequent disbarment from bar of another state prior to being admitted to the Colorado bar constitutes conduct involving fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation prejudicial to the administration of justice. People v. Mattox, 639 P.2d 397 (Colo. 1982). Attorney’s failure to disclose felony conviction and subsequent disbarment from bar of another state is sufficient for disbarment. People v. Brunn, 764 P.2d 1165 (Colo. 1988). Attorney/real estate broker lying to salesperson working for attorney/real estate broker regarding progress and completion of transfer of salesperson’s license was a violation even though salesperson was not a client. People v. Susman, 747 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1987). Accepting marijuana in exchange for legal services warrants one-year suspension from practice of law. People v. Davis, 768 P.2d 1227 (Colo. 1989). Alcohol and health problems not excuse. Alcohol and health problems, as well as emotional problems, do not excuse an attorney’s dilatory practices and false statements to his clients. People v. Goss, 646 P.2d 334 (Colo. 1982). Efforts at rehabilitation do not excuse conduct which includes dishonesty and fraud, failing to preserve identity of client funds, and failing to properly pay or deliver client funds, and which otherwise warrants disbarment. People v. Shafer, 765 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1988). Attorney’s conduct (committing fraud by check) provides grounds for discipline under rules of civil procedure and violates the code of professional responsibility. People v. Proffitt, 731 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1987). Chief deputy district attorney’s theft of less than $50 constitutes conduct warranting public censure where significant mitigating factors exist. People v. Buckley, 848 P.2d 353 (Colo. 1993). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify public censure. People v. Rader, 822 P.2d 950 (Colo. 1992). Attorney’s failure to file personal state and federal income tax returns and to pay withholding taxes for federal income taxes and FICA, and use of cocaine and marijuana constitute conduct warranting suspension for one year and one day. People v. Holt, 832 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1992). Suspension of one year and one day warranted where attorney sexually mistreated employees of his law firm. People v. Lowery, 894 P.2d 758 (Colo. 1995). Suspension for one year and one day appropriate when attorney terminated representation without reasonable notice, failed to provide client with accounting and refund, and failed to meet continuing education requirements. Restitution required as condition of reinstatement. People v. Rivers, 933 P.2d 6 (Colo. 1997). Suspension for one year and one day warranted where attorney knowingly submitted a false statement to the small business administration for the purpose of obtaining a loan. People v. Mitchell, 969 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1998). Attorney’s commission of bank fraud constitutes misconduct involving an act or omission violating the highest standards of honesty, justice, or morality and warrants disbarment. People v. Terborg, 848 P.2d 346 (Colo. 1993). Six-month suspension justified where attorney knowingly failed to perform services for client, knowingly violated court order, engaged in dishonest conduct, and intentionally failed to respond to formal complaint or to cooperate with grievance committee without good cause. People v. Smith, 880 P.2d 763 (Colo. 1994). Attorney’s admitted initiation of sexual contact and sexual intrusion on a client violate sections (2), (3), and (5) of this rule. People v. Dawson, 894 P.2d 756 (Colo. 1995). Public censure warranted for attorney’s solicitation of prostitution during telephone conversation with wife of client whom he was representing in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. People v. Bauder, 941 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1997). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Eastepp, 884 P.2d 305 (Colo. 1994). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. Sims, 913 P.2d 526 (Colo. 1996); People v. Allbrandt, 913 P.2d 532 (Colo. 1996). E. Gross Negligence. Lawyer owes obligation to client to act with diligence in handling his client’s legal work and in his representation of his client in court. People v. Bugg, 200 Colo. 512, 616 P.2d 133 (1980). Attorney violated section (4) by engaging in two non-sufficient funds transactions involving his “special” account, and 22 non-sufficient funds transactions in his personal account. People v. Johnson, 944 P.2d 524 (Colo. 1997). Failure to take action on behalf of client. In failing to represent or take any action on behalf of his client after he was retained and entrusted with work and in making representations to his client which were false, an attorney violates this rule and the code of professional responsibility. People v. Southern, 638 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1982). Failing to record deeds of trust. An attorney’s conduct in borrowing money from his former clients and in failing to record deeds of trust on their behalf to be used as security constitutes professional misconduct and is sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Brackett, 667 P.2d 1357 (Colo. 1983). Continued pattern of conduct involving neglect and misrepresentation. Attorney disbarred for continued pattern of conduct involving neglect and misrepresentation, and for failure to cooperate in investigation by grievance committee. People v. Young, 673 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1984); People v. Johnston, 759 P.2d 10 (Colo. 1988). Pattern of neglect which has not been corrected despite lesser sanctions requires imposition of suspension for protection of public. People v. Mayer, 744 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1987). Repeated neglect and delay in handling legal matters and failure to comply with the directions contained in a letter of admonition and to answer letter of complaint from the grievance committee constitute a violation of this rule and, with other offenses of the code of professional responsibility, are sufficient to justify suspension for three years. People v. Hebenstreit, 764 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1988). Abandoning clients sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. Sanders, 713 P.2d 837 (Colo. 1985); People v. Susman, 787 P.2d 1119 (Colo. 1990). Conduct manifesting gross carelessness in representation of clients is sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Roehl, 655 P.2d 1381 (Colo. 1983). Attorney’s neglect of dissolution case and misrepresentation to client concerning the filing of dissolution petition was especially egregious in view of client’s desire to remarry. Conduct, in addition to number and severity of other instances of misconduct, taking into account mitigating factors, is sufficient for suspension. People v. Griffin, 764 P.2d 1166 (Colo. 1988). Failure to perform adequate research on statute of limitations problem, given the time available and the urgings of clients to proceed, constitutes gross negligence within meaning of this rule. Attorney’s claimed reliance on federal court decision declaring statute of limitations unconstitutional was objectively unreasonable in light of state court decision which expressly disagreed with federal court decision. People v. Barber, 799 P.2d 936 (Colo. 1990). Suspension is appropriate discipline given the number and severity of instances of misconduct, including pattern of neglect over clients’ affairs over lengthy period and in variety of circumstances and misrepresentation in dissolution case to client who wished to remarry concerning the filing of a dissolution petition. Considering proper mitigating factors such as attorney’s lack of experience, absence of prior discipline, attorney’s willingness to undergo psychiatric evaluation and accept transfer to disability inactive status, suspension without credit for time on disability inactive status is appropriate. People v. Griffin, 764 P.2d 1166 (Colo. 1988). Undertaking to provide services to clients in areas in which one lacks experience, which would ordinarily result in a reprimand, warrants a 30-day suspension when coupled with continued neglect after private censure. People v. Frank, 752 P.2d 539 (Colo. 1988). Neglect of client matters, use of cocaine, and failure to respond to complaint and client correspondence warrant public censure in light of participation in comprehensive rehabilitation programs. People v. Driscoll, 716 P.2d 1086 (Colo. 1986). Respondent’s continued neglect of matters entrusted to him, including his failure to deliver a promissory note and his failure to record a deed of trust, and respondent’s acceptance of a retainer and his subsequent failure to litigate the matter warrant suspension from the practice of law for two years. Respondent’s misconduct was aggravated by his failure to cooperate with the grievance committee. People v. Fagan, 791 P.2d 1123 (Colo. 1990). Failure to timely file a paternity action constitutes neglect of a legal matter that warrants public censure. People v. Good, 790 P.2d 331 (Colo. 1990). Suspension for one year and one day appropriate where attorney violated section (4) by not returning or accounting for client funds held for emergencies after the clients fired the attorney and for negligently converting other client funds to the attorney’s own use. People v. Johnson, 944 P.2d 524 (Colo. 1997). Abandonment of law practice and conversion of clients’ funds to attorney’s own use justifies disbarment of attorney. People v. Franks, 791 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1990). Disbarment is appropriate discipline for attorney who caused potentially serious injury to clients by abandoning his practice, knowingly failing to perform services for clients, and engaging in pattern of neglect. People v. Nichols, 796 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1990). Aggravating factors in case were the previous issuance of a letter of admonition for a disciplinary offense, the lawyer’s actions in dealing with clients which establish a dishonest or selfish motive, the acceptance of new clients and the charging of retainers immediately before lawyer moved to Ireland, multiple offenses and a repetition of the same conduct, the bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process, the utilization of the substantial experience and expertise of the lawyer in the practice of law to collect substantial fees for services that the lawyer knew he could not perform, and the total indifference of the lawyer to making restitution and to repaying misappropriated funds. People v. Franks, 791 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1990). Neglect of a legal matter entrusted to the attorney and misrepresentation to the client in connection with a real estate transaction constituted violations of this rule and various other rules. People v. Susman, 787 P.2d 1119 (Colo. 1990). Failure to file petition for dissolution of marriage and failure to return unearned legal fees sufficient to warrant 45-day suspension. People v. Combs, 805 P.2d 1115 (Colo. 1991). Attorney’s lack of preparation for trial constituted gross negligence. People v. Butler, 875 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1994). F. Criminal Behavior. Disciplinary proceedings are sui generis in nature, and conviction of a criminal offense is not a condition precedent to the institution of such proceedings nor does acquittal constitute a ban to such proceedings. People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1981); People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986). Acquittal may be considered by grievance committee. Although an acquittal is not a bar to disciplinary action, it may be considered by the grievance committee. People v. Kenelly, 648 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1982). Disbarment warranted by attorney’s conviction of conspiracy to deliver counterfeited federal reserve notes, serious neglect of several legal matters, unjustified retention of clients’ property, failure to respond to the grievance committee, and previous disciplinary record. People v. Mayer, 752 P.2d 537 (Colo. 1988). Felonious conduct and violation of code of professional responsibility justifies disbarment. Where a lawyer’s conduct not only constitutes a violation of the code of professional responsibility, but also involves felonious conduct, clearly and convincingly proven by testimony of sheriff’s officers, the grievance committee is justified in requiring disbarment. People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1981). Conviction of a district attorney of two felonies and a misdemeanor while in office warrants the most severe sanction-disbarment. People v. Brown, 726 P.2d 638 (Colo. 1986). Conviction of a serious felony involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and conversion of clients funds in another state and failure to notify Colorado authorities of same justifies disbarment. People v. Hedicke, 785 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1990). Use of license to practice law for the purpose of bringing into being an illegal prostitution enterprise renders disbarment the only possible form of discipline. Any lesser sanction would unduly depreciate such misconduct in the eyes of the public and the legal profession. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986). Disbarment not unjust discipline for embezzling funds from estate of client, conversion of money belonging to employer, and convictions of theft and unlawful distribution and possession of controlled substance, after consenting to entry of disbarment in another jurisdiction. People v. Fitzke, 716 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1986). Where there is a great weight of mitigating evidence, even when an attorney has engaged in serious criminal conduct which would ordinarily justify disbarment, a three-year suspension and the requirement to pay costs of the disciplinary proceeding may be appropriate in lieu of disbarment. People v. Preblud, 764 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1988). Existence of numerous mitigating factors warrant three-year suspension and payment of costs rather than disbarment for attorney convicted of felony violations of the California Revenue and Taxation Code. People v. Mandell, 813 P.2d 732 (Colo. 1991). Felony theft held sufficient grounds for suspension. People v. Petrie, 642 P.2d 519 (Colo. 1982). Defendant intentionally and without permission took eyeglass frames from two retail stores and thereby violated section (5). There were many aggravating factors, the only mitigating factor was a suspension eight years prior. One year suspension levied. People v. Barnthouse, 948 P.2d 534 (Colo. 1997). Conviction for sale of narcotic drug warrants disbarment and action striking attorney’s name from the role of lawyers authorized to practice before the court. People v. McGonigle, 198 Colo. 315, 600 P.2d 61 (1979). Conviction of conspiracy to violate drug laws. A lawyer who enters into a conspiracy to violate the law by importing narcotic drugs for distribution should be disbarred. People v. Unruh, 621 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1980). Conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine warrants disbarment and the striking of the attorney’s name from the roll of attorneys licensed to practice in this state. People v. Avila, 778 P.2d 657 (Colo. 1989). Use of professional status to accomplish illicit commercial transaction. Violation of the criminal laws of Colorado is grounds for discipline, and the use of one’s professional status to accomplish an illicit commercial transaction for profit demands the most severe sanction. People v. McGonigle, 198 Colo. 315, 600 P.2d 61 (1979). Attorney’s use of his position as director of a bank to arrange financial transactions in a manner prohibited by federal law, where his conduct was deliberate, carefully planned, and extended over a period of a year and a half, justified disbarment, notwithstanding such factors as attorney’s full restitution to bank, his cooperation with federal officials, his lack of any prior criminal record, his history of community service, and the existence of psychological problems which may have precipitated his illegal activity and which have been acknowledged and solved. People v. Loseke, 698 P.2d 809 (Colo. 1985). Structuring financial transaction to avoid reporting requirements, a felony under federal law, warranted disbarment. In re DeRose, 55 P.3d 126 (Colo. 2002). Committing offense of bigamy and placing unauthorized signatures upon land deeds warranted public censure. People v. Tucker, 755 P.2d 452 (Colo. 1988). Committing offense of third-degree sexual assault on a client and recklessly accusing a lawyer and judge of having an improper ex parte communication warranted suspension for a year and a day, and, for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding, the sexual assault only had to be proved by clear and convincing evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Egbune, 971 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1999). Neglect of client matters, use of cocaine, and failure to respond to complaint and client correspondence warrant public censure in light of participation in comprehensive rehabilitation programs. People v. Driscoll, 716 P.2d 1086 (Colo. 1986). Public censure appropriate in light of mitigating circumstances for possession of cocaine in violation of state and federal controlled substance laws. People v. Gould, 912 P.2d 556 (Colo. 1996). Discharging firearm in direction of spouse while intoxicated, although not a crime involving dishonesty, goes beyond mere negligence and public censure is appropriate. Mitigating factors, although present, were insufficient to warrant making censure private. People v. Senn, 824 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1992). Adopting a conscious scheme to take ownership of homes, collect rents from tenants, make virtually no efforts to sell the homes, and permit foreclosures to occur on which the department of housing and urban development (HUD) would absorb the losses constituted equity skimming in violation of § 18-5-802 and constitutes a violation of sections (A)(4) and (A)(6) for which suspension for one year is appropriate. People v. Phelps, 837 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1992). Suspension of one year and one day warranted for attorney who entered guilty plea to class 5 felony of failure to pay employee income tax withheld and who violated other disciplinary rules involving neglect of legal matter, failure to seek lawful objectives of client, intentional failure to carry out employment contract resulting in intentional prejudice or damage to client. People v. Franks, 866 P.2d 1375 (Colo. 1994). Suspension of two years warranted for attorney who reached a consent settlement with the securities and exchange commission stating that he had employed devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud or made untrue statements of material fact or engaged in acts, practices, or courses of business which operated as a fraud or deceit upon persons in violation of the Securities and Exchange Act. People v. Hanks, 967 P.2d 141 (Colo. 1998). Where deputy district attorney was convicted of possession of cocaine under federal law, one-year suspension is appropriate due to seriousness of offense and fact that attorney had higher responsibility to the public by virtue of engaging in law enforcement. People v. Robinson, 839 P.2d 4 (Colo. 1992). Guilty pleas of deputy district attorney for acting as an accessory to a crime and for official misconduct relating to the disposal of drug paraphernalia warrants six-month suspension. Respondent’s status as a deputy district attorney at the time she committed the offenses is an aggravating factor because public officials engaged in law enforcement have assumed an even greater responsibility to the public than have other lawyers. People v. Freeman, 885 P.2d 205 (Colo. 1994). Suspension of one year and one day appropriate for experienced attorney and judicial officer who pled guilty to unlawful use of a controlled substance. People v. Stevens, 866 P.2d 1378 (Colo. 1994). Attorney who was not charged or convicted of a substance abuse related crime was suspended. The attorney’s drug problem was self-reported, he had voluntarily hospitalized himself and undergone an after-care program, and he had over one year of sustained recovery. People v. Ebbert, 873 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1994). Suspension of three years was appropriate for attorney who drove a vehicle on at least four occasions after his driver’s license was revoked and who also failed to appear in two cases involving his illegal driving. People v. Hughes, 966 P.2d 1055 (Colo. 1998). Attorney offered money to two police officers in the context of releasing his client from custody. The attorney alleged such action was a joke intended to teach his client that the police would not release the client from custody. Such activity was determined to be bribery even though the attorney was not charged by the police and sufficient for a three-year suspension. In re Elinoff, 22 P.3d 60 (Colo. 2001). Suspension for one year and one day warranted where attorney failed to appear in county court on a charge of driving under the influence. People v. Myers, 969 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1998). Entering guilty pleas to multiple counts of bank fraud evidences serious criminal conduct warranting disbarment. People v. Vidakovich, 810 P.2d 1071 (Colo. 1991). Pleading guilty to a single count of bank fraud evidences serious criminal conduct warranting disbarment. People v. Terborg, 848 P.2d 346 (Colo. 1993). Entering guilty plea to committing mail fraud evidences serious criminal conduct warranting disbarment. People v. Bollinger, 859 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993). When a lawyer knowingly converts client funds, disbarment is virtually automatic, at least in the absence of significant factors in mitigation. People v. McDonnell, 897 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1995). Convictions for conspiring to commit fraud against the United States and impeding an officer of a United States court justify disbarment. People v. Pilgrim, 802 P.2d 1084 (Colo. 1990). Conviction for bankruptcy fraud warrants disbarment. People v. Brown, 841 P.2d 1066 (Colo. 1992). Disbarment is warranted where attorney was convicted of felony offense of forging a federal bankruptcy judge’s signature and had engaged in multiple types of other dishonest conduct and where there was an insufficient showing of mental disability. People v. Goldstein, 887 P.2d 634 (Colo. 1994). Suspension justified where respondent violated federal and state laws by failing to file personal income tax returns, failing to pay withholding taxes, using cocaine, and using marihuana. People v. Holt, 832 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1992). The fact that no specific client of the respondent was actually harmed by the respondent’s misconduct misses the point in proceeding for suspension of an attorney. While the primary purpose of attorney discipline is the protection of the public and not to mete punishment to the offending lawyer, lawyers are, nonetheless, charged with obedience to the law, and intentional violation of those laws subjects an attorney to the severest discipline. People v. Holt, 832 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1992). Lack of prior disciplinary record insufficient to call for sanction less than disbarrment where attorney convicted of bankruptcy fraud, conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud and other federal offenses. People v. Schwartz, 814 P.2d 793 (Colo. 1991). Although attorney had not previously been disciplined, sanction of disbarment was warranted where attorney’s felony conviction for possession of a firearm occurred while he was still on probation for a felony conviction for possession of marijuana. People v. Laquey, 862 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1993). Lack of prior disciplinary record insufficient to call for sanction less than disbarment where attorney pleaded guilty to bribery. People v. Viar, 848 P.2d 934 (Colo. 1993). Conviction for aiding fugitive to flee warrants disbarment despite lack of a prior disciplinary record. People v. Bullock, 882 P.2d 1390 (Colo. 1994). Respondent given two-year suspension for aiding and abetting aliens’ entry into the United States and by advising clients to make misrepresentations for such entry. Such an act generally warrants disbarment, but respondent’s full disclosure during proceedings, expression of remorse, and the fact that a prior offense was remote in time were mitigating factors. Respondent also required to discontinue the representation of clients before INS and the Department of Labor. People v. Boyle, 942 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1997). Six-month suspension justified for attorney pleading guilty to making and altering a false and forged prescription for a controlled substance and of criminal attempt to obtain a controlled substance by forgery and alteration, where mitigating factors included: (1) No prior disciplinary history; (2) personal or emotional problems at time of misconduct; (3) full and free disclosure by attorney to grievance committee; (4) imposition of other penalties and sanctions resulting from criminal proceeding; (5) demonstration of genuine remorse; and (6) relative inexperience in the practice of law. People v. Moore, 849 P.2d 40 (Colo. 1993). Six-month suspension appropriate for respondent convicted of drunken driving offense and assault. People v. Shipman, 943 P.2d 458 (Colo. 1997); People v. Reaves, 943 P.2d 460 (Colo. 1997). Chief deputy district attorney’s theft of less than $50 constitutes conduct warranting public censure where significant mitigating factors exist. People v. Buckley, 848 P.2d 353 (Colo. 1993). Attorney’s failure to file personal state and federal income tax returns and to pay withholding taxes for federal income taxes and FICA, and use of cocaine and marijuana constitute conduct warranting suspension for one year and one day. People v. Holt, 832 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1992). Failure to file federal income tax returns in combination with mitigating factors of no prior discipline and significant personal problems at the time of the misconduct warrants public censure. People v. Tauger, 893 P.2d 121 (Colo. 1995). Public censure was appropriate where significant mitigating factors were present. Attorney was convicted of vehicular assault, a class 4 felony, and two counts of driving under the influence of alcohol. The crimes are strict liability offenses for which attorney must serve three years in the custody of the department of corrections, followed by a two-year mandatory period of parole. Section 18-1-105(3) provides that, while he is serving his sentence, attorney is disqualified from practicing as an attorney in any state courts. The sentence and disqualification from practicing law are a significant “other penalty or sanction” and therefore a mitigating factor in determining the level of discipline. In re Kearns, 991 P.2d 824 (Colo. 1999) (decided under former C.R.C.P. 241.6(5) ). Public censure was warranted where attorney twice requested arresting officers in driving under the influence cases not to appear at license revocation hearings before the department of motor vehicles. People v. Carey, 938 P.2d 1166 (Colo. 1997). Public censure was appropriate where an already suspended attorney was the subject of prior discipline for misdemeanor convictions of assault and driving while impaired and where an additional period of suspension would have little, if any, practical effect and would not have afforded a meaningful measure of protection for the public. People v. Flores, 871 P.2d 1182 (Colo. 1994). Public censure warranted for attorney’s solicitation of prostitution during telephone conversation with wife of client whom he was representing in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. People v. Bauder, 941 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1997). Suspension for 180 days is warranted based upon conviction of third degree assault charges. People v. Knight, 883 P.2d 1055 (Colo. 1994). The conduct of an attorney who is convicted of domestic violence and who fails to report the conviction substantially reflects adversely on the attorney’s fitness to practice. The aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors; accordingly, the proper form of discipline is six months’ suspension. In re Hickox, 57 P.3d 403 (Colo. 2002). Disbarment is warranted for driving while impaired, marihuana possession, improperly executing agreement without authority, and failing to perform certain professional duties, despite the lack of a prior record. People v. Gerdes, 891 P.2d 995 (Colo. 1995). Attorney’s admitted initiation of sexual contact and sexual intrusion on a client violate sections (2), (3), and (5) of this rule. People v. Dawson, 894 P.2d 756 (Colo. 1995). Disbarment warranted where attorney was convicted of two separate sexual assaults on a client and a former client and attorney’s previous dishonest conduct was an aggravating factor as well as findings of the attorney’s selfish motive in engaging in the sexual misconduct, the two clients’ vulnerability, the attorney’s more than 20 years practicing law, and the attorney’s failure to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. People v. Bertagnolli, 922 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1996). Notwithstanding the entry of attorney’s “Alford” plea in sexual assault proceedings, for purpose of disciplinary proceeding the attorney was held to have actually committed the acts necessary to accomplish third degree sexual assault and therefore the attorney knowingly had sexual contact with a former client and with a current client without either woman’s consent. People v. Bertagnolli, 922 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1996). Disbarment warranted for attorney convicted of criminal attempt to commit sexual exploitation of a child, a class 4 felony. People v. Damkar, 908 P.2d 1113 (Colo. 1996). Disbarment warranted for attorney convicted of one count of sexual assault on a child, notwithstanding lack of a prior record of discipline. People v. Espe, 967 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1998). Disbarment warranted for attorney convicted in Hawaii of second-degree murder. People v. Draizen, 941 P.2d 280 (Colo. 1997). Disbarment appropriate sanction for attorney who intentionally killed another person. Despite a lack of prior discipline in this state, giving full faith and credit to another state’s law and its jury finding that attorney intentionally took her husband’s life by shooting him 10 times with a firearm, disbarment is an appropriate sanction. People v. Sims, 190 P.3d 188 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2008 ). Disbarment warranted for writing nonsufficient funds checks while practicing law during a period of suspension and committing several other disciplinary rules violations. People v. Fager, 938 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1997). Disbarment justified in a reciprocal discipline proceeding where attorney convicted of knowingly making false statements to obtain a loan from a federal savings and loan institution. Attorney was also disbarred by the United States court of federal claims and had his license revoked by the Virginia state bar for the same offense. Unless certain exceptions exist, the same discipline that was imposed in the foreign jurisdiction is generally imposed in a reciprocal discipline proceeding. People v. Kiely, 968 P.2d 110 (Colo. 1998). Disbarment warranted for knowingly abandoning clients, converting their funds, and causing actual financial and emotional harm to them. Attorney violated duty to preserve clients’ property, to diligently perform services on their behalf, to be candid with them during the course of the professional relationship, and to abide by the legal rules of substance and procedure that affect the administration of justice. People v. Martin, 223 P.3d 728 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2009 ). Disbarment warranted for attorney convicted of conspiracy to commit tax fraud, tax evasion, and aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false income tax return. People v. Evanson, 223 P.3d 735 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2009 ). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. Allbrandt, 913 P.2d 532 (Colo. 1996); In re Tolley, 975 P.2d 1115 (Colo. 1999) (decided under former rule 241.6 ). G. Violation of Other Rules. Disbarment in another state violates this rule and warrants disbarment. People v. Montano, 744 P.2d 480 (Colo. 1987); People v. Brunn, 764 P.2d 1165 (Colo. 1988). Disbarment from practice in federal court violates this rule and warrants discipline. People v. Awenius, 653 P.2d 740 (Colo. 1982). Suspension from practice in federal tax court violates this rule and warrants discipline. People v. Hartman, 744 P.2d 482 (Colo. 1987). Pattern of neglect which has not been corrected despite lesser sanctions requires imposition of suspension for protection of public. People v. Mayer, 744 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1987). Repeated neglect and delay in handling legal matters and failure to comply with the directions contained in a letter of admonition and to answer letter of complaint from the grievance committee constitute a violation of this rule and, with other offenses of the code of professional responsibility, are sufficient to justify suspension for three years. People v. Hebenstreit, 764 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1988). Repeated misconduct charges warranted suspension of licenses. Where respondent had been disciplined three times previously, once by private censure and twice by letters of admonition and where two of the matters involved delay and the respondent’s failure to inform his clients of the status of their cases, subsequent misconduct warranted that respondent’s license to practice law be suspended for six months. People ex rel. Silverman v. Anderson, 200 Colo. 76, 612 P.2d 94 (1980). Two-year suspension was not excessively harsh where previous suspension and vulnerability of young, unsophisticated client in current matter are properly considered as aggravating factors in fixing punishment. People v. Yaklich, 744 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1987). Continuing to represent client and failing to comply with disciplinary rule after initial suspension from practice of law warrants suspension for additional year. People v. Underhill, 708 P.2d 790 (Colo. 1985). Continuing to practice while suspended is conduct justifying disbarment. People v. James, 731 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1987). Conduct violating this rule, in conjunction with other disciplinary rules, sufficient to justify disbarment where the attorney continued to practice law while on suspension, repeatedly neglecting his clients and failing to take reasonable steps to protect clients’ interests. People v. Fager, 938 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1997). Multiple criminal and traffic convictions demonstrate a pattern of misconduct, and the presence of multiple offenses warrants suspension for six months with the requirement of reinstatement proceedings. People v. Van Buskirk, 962 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1998). H. Failure to Respond to Grievance Committee. Failure to answer a disciplinary complaint is itself a violation of the disciplinary rules. People v. Richards, 748 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1987). Because an attorney has a duty to cooperate with disciplinary proceedings under this rule, default judgments are not subject to being set aside easily. In re Weisbard, 25 P.3d 24 (Colo. 2001). Continued pattern of conduct involving neglect and misrepresentation. Attorney disbarred for continued pattern of conduct involving neglect and misrepresentation, and for failure to cooperate in investigation by grievance committee. People v. Young, 673 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1984); People v. Johnston, 759 P.2d 10 (Colo. 1988). Stipulation of deputy public defender that he failed to communicate with a client for seven months and failed to answer in a timely manner either the request for investigation or the formal complaint in the disciplinary matter, and his neglect of six separate professional matters over a three-year period warrant a 30-day suspension where substantial mitigating factors exist, including the absence of a prior disciplinary history, the absence of a selfish or dishonest motive, the presence of serious personal and emotional problems, a cooperative attitude throughout the disciplinary proceedings, a good character and professional reputation, the imposition of other penalties or sanctions, and the presence of remorse. People v. Bobbitt, 859 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1993). Depositing personal funds into COLTAF account, paying personal bills from that account, and then knowingly failing to respond to the investigation into the use of the account justifies 60-day suspension with conditions of reinstatement. People v. Herrick, 191 P.3d 172 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2008 ). Failure to respond to informal complaints constitutes failure to respond to a request by the grievance committee without good cause. People v. Quick, 716 P.2d 1082 (Colo. 1986). Neglect of client matters, use of cocaine, and failure to respond to complaint and client correspondence warrant public censure in light of participation in comprehensive rehabilitation programs. People v. Driscoll, 716 P.2d 1086 (Colo. 1986). Failure to take action on behalf of client in civil action, failure to advise client of claim, attempt to place property beyond the reach of creditors, and failure to cooperate in disciplinary proceedings justifies three-year suspension of attorney. People v. Baptie, 796 P.2d 978 (Colo. 1990). Suspension for three years is appropriate where lawyer failed to respond to motions or appear at hearing, resulting in dismissal of clients’ bankruptcy proceeding, thereby increasing clients’ debts tenfold. The hearing board further found that the attorney engaged in bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings and refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct or the vulnerability of his clients. People v. Farrant, 883 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1994). Fabrication of administrative decision and settlement discussions to conceal respondent’s failure to prosecute client’s wage claim unnecessarily wasted grievance committee’s time and resources, warranting increased period of suspension and relatively high assessment of costs. People v. Gaimara, 810 P.2d 1076 (Colo. 1991). Disbarment appropriate remedy for attorney who neglected client’s legal matter, failed to return retainer after being requested to do so, abandoned law practice, evaded process, and failed to respond to request of grievance committee. People v. Williams, 845 P.2d 1150 (Colo. 1993). Disbarment appropriate remedy for attorney who neglected a legal matter, misappropriated funds and property, abandoned client, engaged in fraud, evaded process, and failed to cooperate in disciplinary investigation. People v. Hindman, 958 P.2d 463 (Colo. 1998). Disbarment warranted for attorney who abandoned her law practice, disregarded court orders, made misrepresentations to her clients, and failed to respond or appear, with aggravating factors. People v. Valley, 960 P.2d 141 (Colo. 1998). Failure to respond to request for investigation from grievance committee is a violation of former section (7). People v. Taylor, 799 P.2d 930 (Colo. 1990); People v. Dash, 811 P.2d 36 (Colo. 1991); People v. Creasey, 811 P.2d 40 (Colo. 1991); People v. Ashley, 817 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1991); People v. Kramer, 819 P.2d 77 (Colo. 1991); People v. Hebenstreit, 823 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1992); People v. Raubolt, 831 P.2d 462 (Colo. 1992); People v. Honaker, 847 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1993); People v. Honaker, 863 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1993); People v. Thomas, 925 P.2d 1081 (Colo. 1996). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify public censure. People v. Titoni, 893 P.2d 1322 (Colo. 1995). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify suspension when attorney currently on disability inactive status. People v. Moya, 793 P.2d 1154 (Colo. 1990). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify suspension. People v. Taylor, 799 P.2d 930 (Colo. 1990); People v. Raubolt, 831 P.2d 462 (Colo. 1992); People v. Scott, 936 P.2d 573 (Colo. 1997); People v. Swarts, 239 P.3d 441 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2010 ); People v. Staab, 287 P.3d 122 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2012 ). Conduct violating this rule in conjunction with other disciplinary rules is sufficient to justify disbarment. People v. Whitcomb, 819 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1991); People v. Fritsche, 897 P.2d 805 (Colo. 1995); People v. Marsh, 908 P.2d 1115 (Colo. 1996); People v. Mannix, 936 P.2d 1285 (Colo. 1997); People v. Fager, 938 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1997); People v. Holmes, 955 P.2d 1012 (Colo. 1998).