Committee Notes.

1972 Adoption. Part 1 of the ABA Standard relating to providing defense services deals with the general philosophy for providing criminal defense services and while the committee felt that the philosophy should apply to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, the standards were not in such form to be the subject of that particular rule. Since the standards deal with the national situation, contained in them were alternative methods of providing defense services, i.e., assigned counsel vs. defender system; but, Florida, already having a defender system, need not be concerned with the assigned counsel system.

(a) Taken from the first sentence of ABA Standard 5.1. There was considerable discussion within the committee concerning the time within which counsel should be appointed and who should notify defendant’s counsel. The commentary in the ABA Standard under 5.1a, b, convinced the committee to adopt the language here contained.

(b) Standard 4.1 provides that counsel should be provided in all criminal cases punishable by loss of liberty, except those types where such punishment is not likely to be imposed. The committee determined that the philosophy of such standard should be recommended to the Florida Supreme Court. The committee determined that possible deprivation of liberty for any period makes a case serious enough that the accused should have the right to counsel.

(c) Based on the recommendation of ABA Standard 5.1b and the commentary thereunder which provides that implementation of a rule for providing the defendant with counsel should not be limited to providing a means for the accused to contact a lawyer.

(d) From standard 7.2 and the commentaries thereunder.

1980 Amendment. Modification of the existing rule (the addition of (b)(5)(A)-(C)) provides a greater degree of uniformity in appointing counsel to indigent defendants. The defendant is put on notice of the lien for public defender services and must give financial information under oath.

A survey of Florida judicial circuits by the Committee on Representation of Indigents of the Criminal Law Section (1978-79) disclosed the fact that several circuits had no procedure for determining indigency and that there were circuits in which no affidavits of insolvency were executed (and no legal basis for establishing or collecting lien monies).

1992 Amendment. In light of State v. District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, 569 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1990), in which the supreme court pronounced that motions seeking belated direct appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel should be filed in the trial court pursuant to rule 3.850, the committee recommends that rule 3.111(e) be amended to detail with specificity defense counsel’s duties to perfect an appeal prior to withdrawing after judgment and sentence. The present provision merely notes that such withdrawal is governed by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(3).

1998 Amendment. The amendments to (d)(2)-(3) were adopted to reflect State v. Bowen, 698 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1997), which implicitly overruled Cappetta v. State, 204 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967 ), rev’d on other grounds 216 So .2d 749 (Fla. 1968). See Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d 1057 (11th Cir. 1986), for a list of factors the court may consider. See also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984), and Savage v. Estelle, 924 F.2d 1459 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 501 U.S. 1255, 111 S.Ct. 2900, 115 L.Ed.2d 1064 (1992), which suggest that the defendant’s right to self-representation is limited when the defendant is not able or willing to abide by the rules of procedure and courtroom protocol.

2000 Amendment. This rule applies only to judicial proceedings and is inapplicable to investigative proceedings and matters. See rule 3.010.

2002 Amendment. Indigent defendants are entitled to counsel if they are either currently in custody or might be incarcerated in their case. See Alabama v. Shelton, 122 S.Ct. 1764, 1767 (2002) (Sixth Amendment forbids imposition of suspended sentence that may “end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty” unless defendant accorded “the guiding hand of counsel”). See also Tur v. State, 797 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001 ) (uncounseled plea to criminal charge cannot result in jail sentence based on violation of probationary sentence for that charge); Harris v. State, 773 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000 ).

Discharge of the public defender based on an order certifying no incarceration that is entered after the public defender has already spent considerable time and resources investigating the case and preparing a defense may leave the defendant “in a position worse than if no counsel had been appointed in the first place.” State v. Ull, 642 So. 2d 721, 724 (Fla. 1994).

In determining whether a defendant’s due process rights would be violated by the discharge of the public defender, the court should consider all of the relevant circumstances, including, but not limited to:.

1. The stage of the proceedings at which the order of no incarceration is entered.

2. The extent of any investigation and pretrial preparation by the public defender.

3. Any prejudice that might result if the public defender is discharged.

4. The nature of the case and the complexity of the issues.

5. The relationship between the defendant and the public defender.

Counsel may be provided to indigent persons in all other proceedings in, or arising from, a criminal case and the court should resolve any doubts in favor of the appointment of counsel for the defendant. See Graham v. State, 372 So. 2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 1979).

See form found at Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.994.

2005 Amendment. See Affidavit of Indigent Status as provided by In re Approval of Form for Use by Clerks of the Circuit Courts Pursuant to Rule 10-2.1(a) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 877 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2004).