The facts on which the motion is based should be alleged specifically and the motion sworn to.
FL. R. Crim. P. 3.190
Committee Notes.
1968 Adoption. (a) New; devised by committee.
(b) Substantially the same as section 909.02, Florida Statutes, except changes name of “motion to quash” to “motion to dismiss.” This conforms to the terminology of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The statute authorizing the state to appeal from certain orders, section 924.07, Florida Statutes, should be amended by substituting the words “motion to dismiss” for “motion to quash.”.
(c) Combines the substance of sections 909.01 and 909.06, Florida Statutes. Subdivision (4) affords a new remedy to an accused. Although there is now a conclusive presumption of probable cause once an indictment or information is filed (see Sullivan v. State, 49 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1951)), it is felt that this rule is necessary. Primarily, this procedure will permit a pretrial determination of the law of the case when the facts are not in dispute. In a sense, this is somewhat similar to summary judgment proceedings in civil cases, but a dismissal under this rule is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution.
(d) New; based on Marks v. State, 115 Fla. 497, 155 So. 727 (1934), and what is generally regarded as the better practice. Hearing provision based on federal rule 41(e).
(e) Combines federal rule 12(b)(5) and section 909.05, Florida Statutes. With reference to the maximum time that a defendant will be held in custody or on bail pending the filing of a new indictment or information, the trial court is given discretion in setting such time as to both the indictment and information. This proposal differs from section 909.05, Florida Statutes, with reference to the filing of a new indictment in that the statute requires that the new indictment be found by the same grand jury or the next grand jury having the authority to inquire into the offense. If the supreme court has the authority to deviate from this statutory provision by court rule, it seems that the trial court should be granted the same discretion with reference to the indictment that it is granted concerning the information. The statute is harsh in that under its provisions a person can be in custody or on bail for what may be an unreasonable length of time before a grand jury is required to return an indictment in order that the custody or bail be continued.
(g)(1) This subdivision is almost the same as section 916.02(1), Florida Statutes.
(g)(2) This subdivision is almost the same as section 916.02(2), Florida Statutes.
(g)(3) This subdivision is almost the same as section 916.03, Florida Statutes.
(g)(4) This subdivision rewords a portion of section 916.04, Florida Statutes.
(g)(5) This subdivision rewords section 916.07, Florida Statutes.
(h) Same as federal rule 41(e) as to the points covered.
(i) This rule is based on 38-144-11 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure and federal rule 41(e).
(j) This subdivision rewords and adds to federal rule 14. It covers the subject matter of section 918.02, Florida Statutes.
(k) This rule is almost the same as federal rule 13, with provision added for trial by affidavit.
(l) Substantially same as section 916.06, Florida Statutes, with these exceptions: application cannot be made until indictment, information, or trial affidavit is filed; application must be made at least 10 days before trial; oral deposition in addition to written interrogatories is permissible.
1972 Amendment. Subdivision (h) is amended to require the defendant to specify the factual basis behind the grounds for a motion to suppress evidence. Subdivision (l) is amended to permit the state to take depositions under the same conditions that the defendant can take them. Former subdivisions (j) and (k) transferred to rules 3.150, 3.151, and 3.152. Subdivisions (l) and (m) renumbered (j) and (k) respectively. Otherwise, same as prior rule.
1977 Amendment. This amendment resolves any ambiguity in the rule as to whether the state must file a general or a specific traverse to defeat a motion to dismiss filed under the authority of rule 3.190(c)(4).
See State v. Kemp, 305 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974 ).
The amendment clearly now requires a specific traverse to specific material fact or facts.
1992 Amendment. The amendments, in addition to gender neutralizing the wording of the rule, make a minor grammatical change by substituting the word “upon” for “on” in several places. The amendments also delete language from subdivision (a) to eliminate from the rule any reference as to when pretrial motions are to be served on the adverse party. Because rule 3.030 addresses the service of pleadings and papers, such language was removed to avoid confusion and reduce redundancy in the rules.
2002 Amendment. If the trial court exercises its discretion to consider the motion to suppress during trial, the court may withhold ruling on the merits of the motion, and motion for a judgment of acquittal, and allow the case to be submitted to the jury. If the defendant is acquitted, no further proceedings regarding the motion to suppress or motion for a judgment of acquittal would be necessary. However, if the jury finds the defendant guilty of the crime charged, the trial court could then consider the motion to suppress post-trial in conjunction with the defendant’s renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal or motion for new trial.