Vt. R. Crim. P. 30
Reporter’s Notes-2017 Amendment
Rule 30 is amended contemporaneously with an amendment of V.R.C.P. 51(b) to clarify those circumstances in both criminal and civil trials in which objections to proposed jury instructions fully articulated at a charge conference may be preserved, without the necessity for their reassertion after the court’s reading of the instructions and prior to the jury’s retirement for deliberations. The amendment essentially shifts the objection process to the charge conference, excepting the need for post-instruction objections in the event that the court’s instructions as actually given differ from that indicated on the record at the charge conference.
Rule 30 is reorganized into three separate paragraphs, and subdivision (c) is added to clarify the circumstances under which an objection to a jury instruction is sufficiently preserved. The amendments are intended to address the circumstances in issue in State v. Vuley, 2013 VT 9, ¶¶ 36-40, 193 Vt. 622, 70 A.3d 940, and Straw v. Visiting Nursing Ass’n, 2013 VT 102, ¶¶ 10-13, 195 Vt. 152, 86 A.3d 1016 (construing V.R.C.P. 51(b)), to clarify that while an objection to an instruction must still be distinctly articulated with the grounds thereof, the objection may be preserved if it is so articulated in conformity with the rule at a charge conference so that the court can fully appreciate the objection and consider whether changes to the instructions are appropriate. Cf. State v. Kolibas, 2012 VT 37, ¶¶ 10-12, 191 Vt. 474, 48 A.3d 610 (construing as sufficient for preservation post-charge objections which briefly, but succinctly, stated grounds thereof, where there had been “lengthy debate” at the charge conference as to the instruction in issue). The amendments address perceived problems under prior practice with unnecessary delay, and extension of the time for commencement of deliberations, in order for the court to receive and address lengthy and detailed repetition of prior objections to instructions that have already been ruled upon.
The amendments do not obviate the need for fair and reasonable articulation of specific objections to jury instructions, asserted distinctly and stating the bases thereof. However, the amendments contemplate that where the record of an objection to a jury instruction is well developed, with distinct articulation at a charge conference in the case, a lengthy repetition of the specific objection and its bases is not required postcharge and predeliberation, provided that the instructions as actually given do not differ from those approved by the court as a result of the charge conference.
The amendments do not require reassertion of objections to instructions given in the manner prescribed, unless the court’s instruction as given does not comport with the particular language of an instruction that has been indicated by the court in a precharge ruling, or the court has omitted a particular instruction to the jury altogether. Nor does the rule preclude assertion of objection to an instruction the basis for which is first presented in the court’s instructions as actually stated to the jury. In such circumstances, preservation of objection would require full articulation of a party’s objection, distinctly and stating the bases thereof, postcharge, and predeliberation, to provide the court with the opportunity to reasonably address any claim of error.
In order to provide a clear record of the assertion of requests for particular instructions, the court’s actions thereon, and objections thereto, the amendments contemplate that the court will file for record a copy of the original proposed instructions that are subject to review at the charge conference, as well as a copy of the written instructions actually read to the jury and provided to them for purposes of their deliberations. It is often difficult to reasonably discern, and assess upon review, transcript objections and argument as to proposed instruction content of pages, paragraphs and lines referred to only by those references, without examination of the documents in the hands of the parties and the court at the pertinent time.
References to “shall” are generally amended to “must” consistent with general restyling of the rules of procedure by the Court. The change in terminology is stylistic rather than substantive.