The attorney for the state shall have an equivalent opportunity to speak to the court and to present any information relevant to sentencing.
A report made prior to an adjudication of guilt shall not be submitted to the court or its contents disclosed to anyone until after such adjudication, except that a judge may, with the written consent of the defendant, inspect a presentence report at any time and may, if the defendant’s consent expressly so states, permit the defendant’s attorney, or a defendant appearing pro se, and the attorney for the state to inspect the report.
Vt. R. Crim. P. 32
Reporter’s Notes-2020 Amendment
Rule 32(c)(4) is amended consistent with the decisions in State v. Lumumba, 2018 VT 40, 207 Vt. 254, 187 A.3d 353, State v. Bostwick, 2014 VT 97, 197 Vt. 345, 103 A.3d 476, and State v. Cornell, 2014 VT 82, 197 Vt. 294, 103 A.3d 469. These decisions address the necessity for procedures requiring parties to object to recommended probation conditions in presentence investigation reports, in addition to factual assertions pertinent to sentence, on grounds that the conditions are not reasonably related to the offense of conviction and thus overly harsh or excessive. The amendment is consistent with, yet not as expansive as, the provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f)(1), which requires specific written objection not only to factual assertions pertinent to sentence, but to all material information, sentencing guideline ranges, and policy statements in presentence investigation reports.
In Lumumba, 2018 VT 40, ¶ 28, the Court requested the Criminal Rules Committee to
probation conditions at sentencing. Proposed rules should set forth how the State and defendants must raise and preserve issues. Our recent decisions have required evidence to support specific conditions to show the condition is related to the crime for which a defendant is convicted and necessary for rehabilitation. If a defendant objects to a condition because it does not meet that standard or for another reason that will require evidentiary support for the condition, then the defendant should have to state this position prior to sentencing to enable the State to obtain the necessary evidence.
Subparagraph (c)(4)(A) is amended, consistent with the Court’s direction in Lumumba, to require advance written objection to any recommendations for probation conditions set forth in the presentence investigation report. As reflected in the existing rule, the amendment is intended to provide advance notice of any such objections to enable the parties to secure and present any evidence that would serve to provide record basis either for inclusion of the recommended conditions in the sentence given, or rejection of them by the court.
Subparagraph (c)(4)(A) is also amended to require that written objections to PSI content be submitted to the court at least 7 days prior to sentencing (unless good cause is shown for later objection), rather than the 5 days prescribed by the existing rule. This amendment is intended to render the rule consistent with the “day is a day” method of calculation of time periods of V.R.Cr.P. 45.
Finally, the subparagraph is amended to include an express requirement that copies of any written objections be provided to the opposing party. Timely notice of any objections enables the party opponent to secure and present any evidence necessary to support inclusion or rejection of any factual assertion or recommended probation condition set forth in the PSI.
Part of former (c)(4)(A) has been made into new subparagraph (B).
New subparagraph (c)(4)(C) requires that before pronouncing sentence and concluding the sentencing hearing, the sentencing court must provide opportunity for comment and objection to what are in effect any “unnoticed” conditions of probation. This includes conditions not included in a signed plea agreement acknowledged by the defendant or the subject of request or argument by the parties, that the court, in its discretion, nonetheless determines to be warranted on the sentencing record. This amendment is intended to expressly provide a defendant with an opportunity to articulate objection to conditions of probation that may not have reasonably featured at all in the course of the sentencing record, and thus to preserve claims of error as to purportedly unnoticed or “surprise” conditions, without the necessity of filing a motion for correction of sentence under V.R.Cr.P. 35.
Existing subparagraph (B) is relettered as subparagraph (D).
Reporter’s Notes-2018
Amendment Rule 32(c)(4)(A) is amended to conform its 3-day time period to the contemporaneously amendment of V.R.Cr.P. 45, which adopts the “day is a day” standard for the computation of the running of time periods in criminal cases.
Reporter’s Notes-2017 Amendment
Subdivision 32(g) is added in response to the Comi’s decision in State v. Morse, 2014 VT 84, 197 Vt. 495,106 A.3d 902, to provide specific procedures for conduct of restitution hearings convened pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 7043. Paragraph 32(g)(1) prescribes the procedure in restitution hearings generally, including allocation of the burden of proof in establishing restitution claims payable to a victim of crime. The paragraph also adopts by reference the provisions of subparagraph 32(c)(4)(A), specifying procedural due process in restitution hearings, and evidentiary standards therein, including admission of hearsay evidence determined by the comi to be reliable. As in sentencing proceedings, the Rules of Evidence do not apply. V.R.E. ll01(b)(3); Morse, 2014 VT 84, ¶¶ 13-19.
Paragraph 32(g)(2) specifies written prehearing disclosures that are required to be made to the defendant by the prosecuting attorney, and by the defendant to the prosecuting attorney. The disclosures to. be made by the prosecuting attorney include a written statement of the amount of restitution claimed, copies of documents intended to be introduced in evidence to support claims of a victim’s material loss and restitution to be ordered, as well as the existence and terms, if known after reasonable inquiry, of any policy of liability insurance of the victim or a third party which would serve to independently compensate the victim apart from an order of restitution. In cases in which a defendant claims that a victim’s material losses are not “uninsured,” 13 V.S.A. § 7043(a)(2), and thus not compensable in restitution by reason of the defendant’s own, or a third pariY’s liability insurance that would serve to cover the loss, he or she must make such written prehearing disclosure to the prosecuting attorney as well. The existence of liability insurance coverage held personally by the victim or the defendant is uniquely and reasonably within their direct knowledge, and the rule contemplates that this infOlmation would be routinely subject to disclosure. Information about other insurance coverage for the losses in issue held by third parties such as family members, friends, or other property owners involved in the losses may not be so readily available. The rule imposes an obligation of reasonable inquiry as to the existence and terms of such other insurance, anticipating disclosure of such information as is reasonably known, to enable the court to render a fully informed decision on the issue of material loss as the term is defined by 13 V.S.A. § 7043(a)(2).
In restitution proceedings, the Court must make findings and orders as to two distinct issues: (1) the amount of the restitution for the victim’s uninsured material losses sustained in consequence of the defendant’s offense; and (2) whether the defendant has the present financial ability to pay the established restitution obligation, either in full, or on a schedule of prospective payments until the obligation is paid in full. 13 V.S.A. § 7043(d). These are two separate issues. A defendant’s financial inability to make restitution payment goes to the second, and has no bearing upon the cOUl1’s determination of the amount of uninsured loss that is subject to a restitution obligation. Paragraph 32(g)(3) requires that if a defendant intends to raise the issue of inability to pay restitution, he or she must provide written notice to this effect to the court and prosecuting attorney at least 14 days prior to the restitution hearing. This disclosure requirement is intended to enable the prosecuting attorney and the cOUl1 to know that evidence may be required on the issue of ability to pay from the defendant or other sources. See 13 V.S.A. § 7043(d)(2); State v. Vezina, 2015 VT 56, 199 Vt. 175,121 A.3d 1195. The amended rule contemplates that a defendant’s failure to provide timely notice may not be construed as a waiver of the right to be heard or to present evidence as to alleged inability to pay restitution. However, an untimely interposed assertion of inability to pay may provide grounds for continuance or such other orders as the cOUl1 deems just under the circumstances.