COMMENT

This rule is applicable to all types of contempt except the comparatively narrow class of direct criminal contempts covered by A.R.S. §§ 12-861 to -863 which must be prosecuted according to the terms of those statutes.

Rule 33.1 defines criminal contempt. The definition derives from A.R.S. § 12-861 and the Arizona Supreme Court’s statements in Ong Hing v. Thurston, 101 Ariz. 92, 96, 416 P.2d 416, 420 (1966). This definition, and the succeeding sections, apply only to criminal contempt. Civil contempt, which is possible in a criminal case (such as in the case of a witness who refuses to submit to a deposition) is not treated in this rule. The general distinction between civil and criminal contempt is the purpose for which the punishment is imposed. A person is imprisoned for civil contempt to force compliance with a lawful order of the court; that person holds the keys to the jail and can gain release at any time by complying with the order. SeeShillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370-71 (1966). A criminal contempt citation, on the other hand, is intended to vindicate the dignity of the court. It is a criminal offense for which a specific punishment is meted out, over which the defendant has no control. See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 692-94 (1964).

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

Former Rule 33.1, relating to definition, was abrogated effective January 1, 2018.