Colorado

Family Law

Section 14-5-207 – Determination of controlling child support order

(a) If a proceeding is brought under this article and only one tribunal has issued a child support order, the order of that tribunal controls and must be recognized.
(b) If a proceeding is brought under this article, and two or more child support orders have been issued by tribunals of this state, another state, or a foreign country with regard to the same obligor and same child, a tribunal of this state having personal jurisdiction over both the obligor and individual obligee shall apply the following rules and by order shall determine which order controls and must be recognized:

(1) If only one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this article, the order of that tribunal controls.
(2) If more than one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this article:

(A) An order issued by a tribunal in the current home state of the child controls; or
(B) If an order has not been issued in the current home state of the child, the order most recently issued controls.
(3) If none of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this article, the tribunal of this state shall issue a child support order, which controls.
(c) If two or more child support orders have been issued for the same obligor and same child, upon request of a party who is an individual or that is a support enforcement agency, a tribunal of this state having personal jurisdiction over both the obligor and the obligee who is an individual shall determine which order controls under subsection (b) of this section. The request may be filed with a registration for enforcement or registration for modification pursuant to part 6 of this article, or may be filed as a separate proceeding.
(d) A request to determine which is the controlling order shall be accompanied by a copy of every child support order in effect and the applicable record of payments. The requesting party shall give notice of the request to each party whose rights may be affected by the determination.
(e) The tribunal that issued the controlling order under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section has continuing jurisdiction to the extent provided in section 14-5-205 or 14-5-206.
(f) A tribunal of this state that determines by order which is the controlling order under subsection (b)(1), (b)(2), or (c) of this section, or that issues a new controlling order under subsection (b)(3) of this section, shall state in that order:

(1) The basis upon which the tribunal made its determination;
(2) The amount of prospective support, if any; and
(3) The total amount of consolidated arrears and accrued interest, if any, under all of the orders after all payments made are credited as provided by section 14-5-209.
(g) Within thirty days after issuance of an order determining which is the controlling order, the party obtaining the order shall file a certified copy of it in each tribunal that issued or registered an earlier order of child support. A party or support enforcement agency obtaining the order that fails to file a certified copy is subject to appropriate sanctions by a tribunal in which the issue of failure to file arises. The failure to file does not affect the validity or enforceability of the controlling order.
(h) An order that has been determined to be the controlling order, or a judgment for consolidated arrears of support and interest, if any, made pursuant to this section shall be recognized in proceedings under this article.

C.R.S. § 14-5-207

Amended by 2015 Ch. 173,§ 9, eff. 7/1/2015.
L. 93: Entire article R&RE, p. 1587, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 97: Entire section amended, p. 535, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 1246, § 7, effective July 1, 2004. L. 2015: (a), (b), and (c) amended, (HB 15-1198), ch. 173, p. 548, § 9, effective July 1.

COMMENT

In addition to the introduction of the concepts of one-order and continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in Section 205, another dramatic founding principle of UIFSA was to establish a system whereby the multiple orders created by URESA and RURESA could be reconciled in the transition from a world with multiple child-support orders to a one-order-at-a-time world. This principle introduced by Section 207 was subsequently incorporated into the requirements of 28 USC 1738B, Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders, a.k.a. FFCCSOA.

The combination of FFCCSOA becoming effective on October 20, 1994 and the adoption of UIFSA (1996) being mandated for all states by January 1, 1998, has made this section almost never used. The existence of multiple, valid orders for ongoing support have all but disappeared.

Sections 209-210, and especially Section 207, are designed to span the gulf between the one-order system created by UIFSA and the multiple-order system previously in place under RURESA and URESA. These transitional procedures necessarily must provide for the eventual elimination of existing multiple support orders in an expeditious and efficient manner. Although FFCCSOA was effective October 20, 1994 and all U.S. jurisdictions enacted UIFSA by 1998, considerable time is required to pass before its one-order system could be completely in place. For example, multiple 21-year child-support orders issued for an infant in 1996 and 1997 would, by their terms, not end the conflict until the first expires 2017 absent resolution of the conflict by a tribunal under this section. Nonetheless, at least on the appellate level, the problem of multiple orders is fast disappearing. This section provides a relatively simple procedure to identify a single viable order that will be entitled to prospective enforcement in every state.

Subsection (a) declares that if only one child-support order exists, it is to be denominated the controlling order, irrespective of when and where it was issued and whether any of the individual parties or the child continue to reside in the issuing state.

Subsection (b) establishes the priority scheme for recognition and prospective enforcement of a single order among existing multiple orders regarding the same obligor, obligee, and child. A tribunal requested to sort out the multiple orders and determine which one will be prospectively controlling of future payments must have personal jurisdiction over the litigants in order to ensure that its decision is binding on all concerned. For UIFSA to function, one order must be denominated as the controlling order, and its issuing tribunal must be recognized as having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. In choosing among existing multiple orders, none of which can be distinguished as being in conflict with the principles of UIFSA, subsection (b)(1) gives first priority to an order issued by the only tribunal that is entitled to continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the terms of UIFSA, i.e., an individual party or the child continues to reside in that state and no other state meets this criterion. If two or more tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the act, subsection (b)(2) first looks to the tribunal of the child’s current home state. If that tribunal has not issued a support order, subsection (b)(2) looks next to the order most recently issued. Finally, subsection (b)(3) provides that if none of the existing multiple orders are entitled to be denominated as the controlling order because none of the preceding priorities apply, the forum tribunal is directed to issue a new order, given that it has personal jurisdiction over the obligor and obligee. The new order becomes the controlling order, establishes the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal, and fixes the support obligation and its nonmodifiable aspects, primarily duration of support, see Sections 604 and 611(c), infra. The rationale for creating a new order to replace existing multiple orders is that there is no valid reason to prefer the terms of any one of the multiple orders over another in the absence of a fact situation described in subsections (b)(1) or (b)(2).

As originally promulgated, UIFSA did not come to grips with whether existing multiple orders issued by different states might be entitled to full faith and credit without regard to the determination of the controlling order under the act. The drafters took the position that state law, however uniform, could not interfere with the ultimate interpretation of a constitutional directive. Fortunately, this question has almost certainly been mooted by the 1996 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1738B, Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders. Congress incorporated the multiple order recognition provisions of Section 207 of UIFSA into FFCCSOA virtually word for word in the PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1996. Pub. L. 104-193, Aug. 22, 1996, 110 Stat. 2221.

It is not altogether clear whether the terms of UIFSA apply to a strictly intrastate case; that is, a situation in which multiple child-support orders have been issued by multiple tribunals of a single state and the parties and the child continue to reside in that state. This is not an uncommon situation, often traceable to the intrastate applicability of RURESA. A literal reading of the statutory language suggests the section applies. Further, FFCCSOA does not make a distinction regarding the tribunals that issued multiple orders. If multiple orders have been issued by different tribunals in the home state of the child, most likely the most recent will be recognized as the controlling order, notwithstanding the fact that UIFSA Section 207 (b)(2)(B), and FFCCSOA 42 U.S.C. § 1738B(f)(3), literally do not apply. At the very least, this section, together with FFCCSOA, provide a template for resolving such conflicts.

Subsection (c) clarifies that any party or a support enforcement agency may request a tribunal of the forum state to identify the controlling order. That party is directed to fully inform the tribunal of all existing child-support orders.

Subsection (d) seeks to assure the tribunal is furnished with all the information needed to make a proper determination of the controlling order, as well as the information needed to make a calculation of the consolidated arrears. The party or support enforcement agency requesting the determination of controlling order and determination of consolidated arrears is also required to notify all other parties and entities who may have an interest in either of those determinations. Those with such an interest most likely are support agencies and the obligee.

Subsection (e) provides that the determination of the controlling order under this section has the effect of establishing the tribunal with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction; only the order of that tribunal is entitled to prospective enforcement by a sister state.

Subsection (f) directs the forum tribunal to identify the details upon which it makes its determination of the controlling order. In addition, the tribunal is also directed to state specifically the amount of the prospective support, and to reconcile and consolidate the arrears and interest due on all of the multiple orders to the extent possible.

The party obtaining the determination is directed by subsection (g) to notify all interested tribunals of the decision after the fact. Although tribunals need not be given original notice of the proceeding, all tribunals that have contributed an order to the determination must be informed regarding which order was determined to be controlling, and should also be informed of the consolidated arrears and interest so that the extent of possible subsequent enforcement will be known with regard to each of the orders. The act does not deal with the resolution of potential conflicting claims regarding arrears; this is left to case-by-case decisions or to federal regulation.

Section 207 presumes that the parties are accorded notice and opportunity to be heard by the tribunal. It also presumes that the tribunal will be fully informed about all existing orders when it is requested to determine which one of the existing multiple child-support orders is to be accorded prospective enforcement. If this does not occur and one or more existing orders is not considered by the tribunal, the finality of its decision is likely to turn on principles of estoppel on a case-by-case basis.

Finally, subsection (h), affirms the concept that when a fully informed tribunal makes a determination of the controlling order for prospective enforcement, or renders a judgment for the amount of the consolidated arrears, the decision is entitled to full faith and credit.