Conn. Gen. Stat. ยง 46b-15
(P.A. 81-272, S. 2; P.A. 86-337, S. 7; P.A. 87-567, S. 4, 7; P.A. 91-6, S. 1, 3; 91-381, S. 3, 7; P.A. 95-193, S. 1; P.A. 96-180, S. 158, 166; P.A. 97-126, S. 1; P.A. 99-186, S. 4; P.A. 00-196, S. 24; P.A. 01-130, S. 11, 12; P.A. 02-127, S. 7; 02-132, S. 54; May 9 Sp. Sess. P.A. 02-7, S. 77; P.A. 03-202, S. 4; P.A. 05-152, S. 3; P.A. 06-152, S. 2; P.A. 07-78, S. 1; P.A. 10-36, S. 4; 10-144, S. 1, 2; P.A. 11-152, S. 1; P.A. 12-114, S. 1; June 12 Sp. Sess. P.A. 12-2, S. 97; P.A. 13-3, S. 36; 13-194, S. 2; P.A. 14-217, S. 120; P.A. 16-34, S. 3; 16-105, S. 4; P.A. 17-163, S. 1; 17-237, S. 112.)
Section requires a continuous threat of present physical pain or physical injury. 104 CA 20; Id., 26. Trial court did not exceed its statutory authority when it ordered alcohol abuse counseling since it could reasonably have concluded that such counseling was necessary for the protection of the family, and did not exceed its statutory authority by extending restraining order to protect adult daughter since section allows orders appropriate for the protection of other persons as the court sees fit. 127 CA 586. Provision that “the court may impose such sanctions as the court deems appropriate” is ambiguous, and incarceration was not an appropriate sanction in a civil contempt proceeding for violation of a domestic restraining order where incarceration would not allow a contemnor to avoid or lessen the sentence of incarceration by purging himself of the contempt. 143 CA 1. The word “stalking” is to be construed according to its commonly approved usage, as opposed to the narrower definitions of stalking found in the Penal Code; trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding in the context of all of the evidence that defendant’s conduct in driving past plaintiff’s home, turning around, and driving past the home a second time constituted an act of stalking. 150 CA 105. Cited. 44 CS 235.
See Sec. 51-5c re automated registry of protective orders.