Conn. Gen. Stat. ยง 52-192a
(P.A. 76-316, S. 2; P.A. 77-269, S. 1, 2; P.A. 79-60; 79-250, S. 1; P.A. 81-315, S. 3; P.A. 82-160, S. 94; 82-228; P.A. 83-295, S. 9; P.A. 92-110, S. 1; P.A. 94-20; P.A. 01-71, S. 1; P.A. 05-275, S. 4; P.A. 07-141, S. 16; P.A. 11-77, S. 1.)
Cited. 188 C. 213. In the context of statute, reference to “verdict” incorporates a recovery awarded by the court; prejudgment and postjudgment interest discussed with reference to Sec. 37-3a. 192 C. 301. Does not apply to state; sovereign immunity not expressly waived. 205 Conn. 542. Cited. 206 C. 100. Is applicable to court as well as jury trials. 208 C. 82. Cited. 211 C. 648; 225 Conn. 146; 227 Conn. 914; 228 C. 206; 229 C. 525; 231 C. 745; 234 C. 169; 239 Conn. 144; Id., 708; Id., 769; Id., 802; 240 C. 49; Id., 287; Id., 799; 241 C. 319. Statute permits plaintiff to offer only one offer of judgment as to each defendant. 249 C. 339. Since intent of statute is to promote settlement and preserve judicial resources, contractual policy limitations on damages have no effect on section and its mandatory punitive provisions cannot be avoided. 256 C. 667. Relevant figure for determining whether to award interest under statute is amount of the jury verdict, not amount of the postapportionment judgment rendered pursuant to Sec. 31-293. 264 C. 314. Under 2005 revision, the legislative grant of authority to courts under section to award offer of judgment interest after a trial reasonably cannot be construed to mean “after a settlement” even if the parties agree to treat settlement as a verdict and judgment in plaintiff’s favor for purposes of section. 294 C. 719. Amendment to section in 2007 evidences legislature’s understanding that an amendment was necessary to bring condemnation appeals within the ambit of section, and prior to 2007, legislature did not intend for section to be applicable to condemnation appeals. Id., 803. Substitution of plaintiff under Sec. 52-109 did not render previously filed offers of judgment invalid and unenforceable, rather, the seemingly divergent principle of this section, which is punitive in nature, and Sec. 52-109, which is highly remedial, must be reconciled and leads to conclusion that substitution of plaintiff validated the offers of judgment such that interest began to accrue as of date of substitution. 297 C. 105. Cited. 3 Conn.App. 111; Id., 570; 8 CA 254; 13 CA 712; 21 CA 366; Id., 549. Imposes penalty for wasting Connecticut judicial resources; court will not permit defendant to avoid consequences of his decision to ignore plaintiff’s offer of judgment merely because his contract obligations were made in another state. 22 CA 640. Cited. 25 CA 67; 26 CA 231; Id., 322; 30 CA 664; 31 Conn.App. 806; 32 CA 118; 33 Conn.App. 662; Id., 842; 35 CA 504; 36 CA 653; 38 CA 685; 42 CA 239; Id., 712; 43 CA 645; 44 CA 154; 45 Conn.App. 165; Id., 543; 46 CA 37. Nothing in Subsec. (a) or (b) indicates that the offer of judgment must not include interest pursuant to Sec. 37-3a. 67 CA 100. Court correctly interpreted language of section in this unique case to hold that amended complaint became equivalent of original complaint for purposes of calculation of interest. 81 CA 419. Claim that court improperly awarded plaintiff interest pursuant to offer of judgment statute could not be properly reviewed because defendant failed to file motion for articulation seeking an explanation from the court as to basis for finding that renewed offer of judgment was still valid. 96 CA 294. Court properly awarded offer of compromise interest on basis of defendants’ having rejected plaintiff’s offer; defendants’ offered no authority for proposition that inadequate performance of the party making an offer of compromise precludes the statutorily prescribed remedy. 102 CA 23. The court upheld award of judgment interest in accordance with 1999 revision of section and rejected defendant’s argument that defendant’s conditional acceptance of plaintiff’s offer of judgment is an exception permitted under statute, since such conditional acceptance was a counteroffer and defendant’s interpretation ignores the punitive aspect of section. 111 CA 287. Plaintiff failed to meet “sum certain” and “equal to or greater than” requirements of Subsecs. (a) and (c) where relief requested was $500,000 with interest, appraisal and other fees expended up to $20,000 and all necessary land use certificates and approvals, and relief recovered was $899,480 with interest and no such certificates and approvals. 163 CA 190. Subsec. (a): Although the required attorney’s signature on an offer of judgment was inscribed by the attorney’s law partner with attorney’s permission, the document is in substantial compliance with the law and such irregularity does not disadvantage defendant. 68 CA 596. Plaintiff is not required to state in an offer of judgment the period of time that defendant has to accept the offer; including reference to the acceptance period in offer of judgment is a courtesy, done in order to save defendant from having to consult language of statute. 103 CA 20. Subsec. (b): Requirements, purpose, de novo review, and application to unified offers of judgment. 245 C. 1. Where trial court granted defendant’s motion for remittitur due to limit of plaintiff’s underinsured motorist coverage pursuant to Sec. 38a-336, interest awarded pursuant to section is to be based on judgment amount, rather than verdict amount. 288 C. 38. Trial court exceeded statutory authority by trebling award of attorney’s fees. 47 CA 517. Calculation of interest under Subsec. discussed. 88 CA 459. Subsec. (c): Where jury award of $4.2 million in dram shop action was reduced by court to $250,000 pursuant to Sec. 30-102, trial court properly found that plaintiff had “recovered” $250,000 for purposes of calculating interest under this Subsec., and interest award under this Subsec. did not undermine legislative purpose of limiting recoverable damages under Dram Shop Act. 136 CA 805. Trial court properly awarded interest under section to plaintiffs because the combined jury verdict exceeded the unified offer of compromise and, where there are two plaintiffs and the claim of one of them is derivative of the other, offer of compromise interest based on the full jury award achieves the purpose of section. 156 CA 453.