Section 52-192a – Offer of compromise by plaintiff. Acceptance by defendant. Amount and computation of interest

May 11, 2021 | Civil Procedure, Connecticut

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, after commencement of any civil action based upon contract or seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought, the plaintiff may, not earlier than one hundred eighty days after service of process is made upon the defendant in such action but not later than thirty days before trial, file with the clerk of the court a written offer of compromise signed by the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s attorney, directed to the defendant or the defendant’s attorney, offering to settle the claim underlying the action for a sum certain. For the purposes of this section, such plaintiff includes a counterclaim plaintiff under section 8-132. The plaintiff shall give notice of the offer of compromise to the defendant’s attorney or, if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, to the defendant himself or herself. Within thirty days after being notified of the filing of the offer of compromise and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court, the defendant or the defendant’s attorney may file with the clerk of the court a written acceptance of the offer of compromise agreeing to settle the claim underlying the action for the sum certain specified in the plaintiff’s offer of compromise. Upon such filing and the receipt by the plaintiff of such sum certain, the plaintiff shall file a withdrawal of the action with the clerk and the clerk shall record the withdrawal of the action against the defendant accordingly. If the offer of compromise is not accepted within thirty days and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court, the offer of compromise shall be considered rejected and not subject to acceptance unless refiled. Any such offer of compromise and any acceptance of the offer of compromise shall be included by the clerk in the record of the case.
(b) In the case of any action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death, whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, the plaintiff may, not earlier than three hundred sixty-five days after service of process is made upon the defendant in such action, file with the clerk of the court a written offer of compromise pursuant to subsection (a) of this section and, if the offer of compromise is not accepted within sixty days and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court, the offer of compromise shall be considered rejected and not subject to acceptance unless refiled.
(c) After trial the court shall examine the record to determine whether the plaintiff made an offer of compromise which the defendant failed to accept. If the court ascertains from the record that the plaintiff has recovered an amount equal to or greater than the sum certain specified in the plaintiff’s offer of compromise, the court shall add to the amount so recovered eight per cent annual interest on said amount, except in the case of a counterclaim plaintiff under section 8-132, the court shall add to the amount so recovered eight per cent annual interest on the difference between the amount so recovered and the sum certain specified in the counterclaim plaintiff’s offer of compromise. The interest shall be computed from the date the complaint in the civil action or application under section 8-132 was filed with the court if the offer of compromise was filed not later than eighteen months from the filing of such complaint or application. If such offer was filed later than eighteen months from the date of filing of the complaint or application, the interest shall be computed from the date the offer of compromise was filed. The court may award reasonable attorney’s fees in an amount not to exceed three hundred fifty dollars, and shall render judgment accordingly. This section shall not be interpreted to abrogate the contractual rights of any party concerning the recovery of attorney’s fees in accordance with the provisions of any written contract between the parties to the action.

Conn. Gen. Stat. ยง 52-192a

(P.A. 76-316, S. 2; P.A. 77-269, S. 1, 2; P.A. 79-60; 79-250, S. 1; P.A. 81-315, S. 3; P.A. 82-160, S. 94; 82-228; P.A. 83-295, S. 9; P.A. 92-110, S. 1; P.A. 94-20; P.A. 01-71, S. 1; P.A. 05-275, S. 4; P.A. 07-141, S. 16; P.A. 11-77, S. 1.)

Amended by P.A. 11-0077, S. 1 of the the 2011 Regular Session, eff. 10/1/2011.

Cited. 188 C. 213. In the context of statute, reference to “verdict” incorporates a recovery awarded by the court; prejudgment and postjudgment interest discussed with reference to Sec. 37-3a. 192 C. 301. Does not apply to state; sovereign immunity not expressly waived. 205 Conn. 542. Cited. 206 C. 100. Is applicable to court as well as jury trials. 208 C. 82. Cited. 211 C. 648; 225 Conn. 146; 227 Conn. 914; 228 C. 206; 229 C. 525; 231 C. 745; 234 C. 169; 239 Conn. 144; Id., 708; Id., 769; Id., 802; 240 C. 49; Id., 287; Id., 799; 241 C. 319. Statute permits plaintiff to offer only one offer of judgment as to each defendant. 249 C. 339. Since intent of statute is to promote settlement and preserve judicial resources, contractual policy limitations on damages have no effect on section and its mandatory punitive provisions cannot be avoided. 256 C. 667. Relevant figure for determining whether to award interest under statute is amount of the jury verdict, not amount of the postapportionment judgment rendered pursuant to Sec. 31-293. 264 C. 314. Under 2005 revision, the legislative grant of authority to courts under section to award offer of judgment interest after a trial reasonably cannot be construed to mean “after a settlement” even if the parties agree to treat settlement as a verdict and judgment in plaintiff’s favor for purposes of section. 294 C. 719. Amendment to section in 2007 evidences legislature’s understanding that an amendment was necessary to bring condemnation appeals within the ambit of section, and prior to 2007, legislature did not intend for section to be applicable to condemnation appeals. Id., 803. Substitution of plaintiff under Sec. 52-109 did not render previously filed offers of judgment invalid and unenforceable, rather, the seemingly divergent principle of this section, which is punitive in nature, and Sec. 52-109, which is highly remedial, must be reconciled and leads to conclusion that substitution of plaintiff validated the offers of judgment such that interest began to accrue as of date of substitution. 297 C. 105. Cited. 3 Conn.App. 111; Id., 570; 8 CA 254; 13 CA 712; 21 CA 366; Id., 549. Imposes penalty for wasting Connecticut judicial resources; court will not permit defendant to avoid consequences of his decision to ignore plaintiff’s offer of judgment merely because his contract obligations were made in another state. 22 CA 640. Cited. 25 CA 67; 26 CA 231; Id., 322; 30 CA 664; 31 Conn.App. 806; 32 CA 118; 33 Conn.App. 662; Id., 842; 35 CA 504; 36 CA 653; 38 CA 685; 42 CA 239; Id., 712; 43 CA 645; 44 CA 154; 45 Conn.App. 165; Id., 543; 46 CA 37. Nothing in Subsec. (a) or (b) indicates that the offer of judgment must not include interest pursuant to Sec. 37-3a. 67 CA 100. Court correctly interpreted language of section in this unique case to hold that amended complaint became equivalent of original complaint for purposes of calculation of interest. 81 CA 419. Claim that court improperly awarded plaintiff interest pursuant to offer of judgment statute could not be properly reviewed because defendant failed to file motion for articulation seeking an explanation from the court as to basis for finding that renewed offer of judgment was still valid. 96 CA 294. Court properly awarded offer of compromise interest on basis of defendants’ having rejected plaintiff’s offer; defendants’ offered no authority for proposition that inadequate performance of the party making an offer of compromise precludes the statutorily prescribed remedy. 102 CA 23. The court upheld award of judgment interest in accordance with 1999 revision of section and rejected defendant’s argument that defendant’s conditional acceptance of plaintiff’s offer of judgment is an exception permitted under statute, since such conditional acceptance was a counteroffer and defendant’s interpretation ignores the punitive aspect of section. 111 CA 287. Plaintiff failed to meet “sum certain” and “equal to or greater than” requirements of Subsecs. (a) and (c) where relief requested was $500,000 with interest, appraisal and other fees expended up to $20,000 and all necessary land use certificates and approvals, and relief recovered was $899,480 with interest and no such certificates and approvals. 163 CA 190. Subsec. (a): Although the required attorney’s signature on an offer of judgment was inscribed by the attorney’s law partner with attorney’s permission, the document is in substantial compliance with the law and such irregularity does not disadvantage defendant. 68 CA 596. Plaintiff is not required to state in an offer of judgment the period of time that defendant has to accept the offer; including reference to the acceptance period in offer of judgment is a courtesy, done in order to save defendant from having to consult language of statute. 103 CA 20. Subsec. (b): Requirements, purpose, de novo review, and application to unified offers of judgment. 245 C. 1. Where trial court granted defendant’s motion for remittitur due to limit of plaintiff’s underinsured motorist coverage pursuant to Sec. 38a-336, interest awarded pursuant to section is to be based on judgment amount, rather than verdict amount. 288 C. 38. Trial court exceeded statutory authority by trebling award of attorney’s fees. 47 CA 517. Calculation of interest under Subsec. discussed. 88 CA 459. Subsec. (c): Where jury award of $4.2 million in dram shop action was reduced by court to $250,000 pursuant to Sec. 30-102, trial court properly found that plaintiff had “recovered” $250,000 for purposes of calculating interest under this Subsec., and interest award under this Subsec. did not undermine legislative purpose of limiting recoverable damages under Dram Shop Act. 136 CA 805. Trial court properly awarded interest under section to plaintiffs because the combined jury verdict exceeded the unified offer of compromise and, where there are two plaintiffs and the claim of one of them is derivative of the other, offer of compromise interest based on the full jury award achieves the purpose of section. 156 CA 453.