Conn. Gen. Stat. ยง 54-193
(1949 Rev., S. 8871; P.A. 76-35, S. 1, 2; P.A. 77-604, S. 40, 84; P.A. 80-313, S. 53; P.A. 86-197; P.A. 00-87, S. 1, 2; P.A. 10-180, S. 6; P.A. 12-5, S. 36; P.A. 14-185, S. 1.)
Qui tam information amendable, notwithstanding no new information for same cause could be brought. 10 C. 472. Grand juror’s complaint and information of state’s attorney part of same proceeding and prevents running of statute. 49 C. 437. Statute does not run as to conspiracy until last overt act is committed. 126 C. 85. Cited. 150 C. 229; 163 Conn. 230. Prosecution within 1 year for first offender. Id., 234. P.A. 76-35, which amended statute to remove the 5-year limitation on prosecutions for capital or class A felonies, was not applied retroactively to crimes committed while 5-year limitation was in effect in absence of language clearly necessitating such construction. 189 C. 346. Cited. 197 Conn. 436; Id., 507. Protection afforded by statute may be waived; treated as an affirmative defense, not as jurisdictional. 199 Conn. 631. Prosecution for violation of Sec. 53a-54(a)(1) not barred by this section. 201 C. 435. Cited. 204 C. 98; 213 Conn. 388; 233 Conn. 403; 235 Conn. 145; 242 Conn. 409. Amendment to statute of limitations applies retroactively to crimes committed before its effective date but for which the preamendment limitation period had not yet expired. 276 C. 633. Plainly and unambiguously provides that statute of limitations runs from the date of the offense. 301 Conn. 630. Cited. 28 CA 91; 34 Conn.App. 473; 35 CA 754; 41 CA 476. It is not necessary in criminal prosecution to prove the precise day the acts were committed. 4 CS 259. Cited. 6 CS 349; 24 CS 312. After a nolle prosequi has been entered, statute of limitations continues to run and a prosecution may be resumed only on a new information and a new arrest. 32 CS 504. Cited. 35 CS 565. Issuance of arrest warrant starts prosecution and tolls statute of limitations. 38 Conn.Supp. 377. The prosecution of defendant began with his arrest; once prosecution has commenced within time period allowed by appropriate statute of limitations, the prosecutor has broad discretion as to what crimes to charge in any particular situation. 39 Conn.Supp. 347. Subsec. (b): Cited. 202 C. 86; Id., 93. Issuance of arrest warrant is sufficient initiation of a prosecution to toll statute of limitations if warrant served with due diligence. Id., 443. Cited. 209 Conn. 52; 211 C. 441; 228 C. 393. Although the case against defendant under Sec. 20-427 was initially dismissed based on statute of limitations, state’s successful appeal on statute of limitations calculation and subsequent trial did not constitute unlawful double jeopardy. 250 C. 1. When the state files an amended or substitute information after the limitations period has passed, a timely information will toll statute of limitations only if the amended or substitute information does not broaden or substantially amend the charges made in the timely information. 305 Conn. 330. Once a defendant has demonstrated his nonelusiveness and availability for arrest during the statutory period, the state must demonstrate the reasonableness of any delay between the issuance and service of an arrest warrant, at least when service occurs after the expiration of the limitation period. 325 C. 793. Cited. 15 CA 222; 21 CA 449; 26 Conn.App. 674; 42 CA 790. Pursuant to Subsec., charged violations of Sec. 14-227a were subject to a 1-year limitations period because they were not punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year; trial court did not improperly deny defendant’s motion to dismiss counts of information on grounds that statute of limitations precluded prosecution of counts where court found no evidence that defendant raised statute of limitations as an affirmative defense at trial. 61 CA 90. Prosecution was time barred where the police department did not make sufficient effort to ensure that warrant was timely served and therefore the state could not demonstrate that delay of nearly 3 years on service of arrest warrant was reasonable to toll statute of limitations. 130 CA 734. Subsec. (d): Re meaning of “fled” in former Subsec. (c), plain language does not require defendant to leave the state with intent to avoid prosecution, and Subsec. may toll statute of limitations when defendant absents himself from the jurisdiction with reason to believe that an investigation may ensue as a result of his actions. 306 C. 698.